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ABSTRACT
This enquiry into the relationship between the authority 
of the state and the freedom of the individual is conducted 
through the medium of a philosophical model of society 
initially conceived of as a political community with the 
individual in the role of citizen. The model is developed 
by introducing the notion of the state as subsuming the 
political community, and positing the individual first 
in terms of personhood derived from his parent state, 
and then in terms of autonomy. The logical relationship 
between the state as a complex of rule-governed situations 
and the freedom-seeking individual is examined. Within 
this context, the Hegelian notion of Sittlichkeit is 
introduced and developed as a concept indicative of the 
individual*s obligation to his native state. Moreover, 
the challenge which Kantian-inspired autonomy may be held 
to pose to the state * s authority is explored and found 
to be misconceived. The basis of the state * s authority 
is then examined through an enquiry into the legitimation 
of law. The implications of Rousseau*s notion of the 
general will are analysed and found to be consistent with 
Kant * s universal principle of right as offering a criterion 
by which to evaluate the justice of law. By situating 
the principle within the social context of the state the , 
principle can be given a content, a content which it is 
the purpose of the political community to determine. 
Finally, the presuppositions on which the model is based 
are shown to be generally consistent with aspects of 
Popperian epistemology.
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Introduction
1. This work is concerned with a series of problems 
Which are connected with freedom and authority; the problems 
centering on the nature of authority, its justification,
the grounds on which it may be challenged, and the relation­
ship of the individual to the authority structure of the 
state. As this enquiry is ultimately directed towards an 
investigation of freedom and authority in the political 
sphere and as the enquiry is philosophically inspired, its 
purpose must be the production of philosophical theory in 
this area. But at once a methodological problem arises.
What is the nature and function of philosophical theory here? 
If it can be reduced to political science, then the claim 
which has been made from time to time that political 
philosophy is dead would be substantiated. But if it is 
maintained that political philosophy does retain both its 
autonomy and validity as an intellectual discipline, what 
is its nature and methodology? It is this problem or group 
of problems which demand prior attention.
2. The classical approach to the problem of theorising 
about the nature of the political relationship has been to 
attempt to establish a set of axioms usually taking the form 
of basic, pre-eminent and assumed to be self-evident 
characteristics of human nature. With such characteristics 
established as the theoretical foundations, it then becomes 3, 
possible to develop a model within which is offered a 
formulation of the minimum conditions which will allow 
individuals to pursue their substantive wants without 
jeopardising the political or civil relationship which is
the necessary condition of a civil society.
So it is that for Hobbes, man’s selfish and 
aggressive nature requires that conditions of restraint be 
accepted if there is to be the possibility of a stable 
society; for Locke, man’s basic propensities towards the 
accumulation of goods and property require the sacrifice of 
a degree of persona1 autonomy in that for society to exist 
there must be some arbiter, viz., the ruler, to resolve 
conflicts as and when they arise; central to Rousseau’s 
conception of a person is the right to be free, but such 
freedom can only be guaranteed within society if the individual 
surrenders his personal autonomy in favour of subservience 
to the ’general will* which, in an apparent paradox, assures 
his freedom. Each of these philosophers postulates the 
conditions which would exist if there were no recognisable 
society in any form, that is, man living in a * state of 
nature * ; such states of affairs taking on the character 
accorded to them by man * s basic nature - for Hobbes one of 
savagery, for Locke one of acquisitiveness tainted with 
incipient conflict, for Rousseau one of idyllic virtue. Each 
postulates in differing terms the notion of a * contract* into 
which the individual enters with the state whereby restrictions 
are accepted by the individual in return for one or another 
set of advantages obtainable only within a stable and secure 
society.
The implication is that the political philosopher 
is mainly concerned with the construction of models of society 
and that it is through such models that the solution is 
offered to the major methodological problem inherent in 
polotical philosophy. This is the problem of establishing
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the function of theory in this area. But what do such models 
purport to offer?
It is clear that models can be used for different 
purposes and, as such, are amenable to categorisation in 
relatively unambiguous terms. First of all, a model can 
offe n a generalised description of society or aspects of 
society which throw into relief certain features which are 
held to be significant . Weber* s analysis of authority into 
three ideal types is of this kind. Such a model establishes, 
or seeks to establish, current de facto patterns of conduct 
against which gross deviations may be thrown into relief and, 
possibly, corrected. Secondly, there is what can be termed 
a technological function. Typically, in such a model certain 
features of reality are posited as basic assumptions and on 
these a model of society is erected which, it is held, will 
work. The Hobbesian model which begins with assumptions 
concerning the nature of man has this technological character, 
attended, perhaps, by the suggestion that this is the best 
that man can hope to achieve. Next, there is the normative 
f u n c t i o n H e r e  it can be held that it is the object of 
political theorising to present us with a iolueprint for some 
kind of ideal state of affairs - a desired end to be worked 
towards rather than a descriptive analysis. Finally, there 
is that function which is concerned with promoting an 
understanding of politics and society rather than simply 
offering a description or even an ideal. All models, including 
the Hobbesian, are open to interpretation in these terms to 
some extent. It will be the implications of this category, 
in particular, which will be examined in the following pages.
4Although the categorisation of the various discernible 
functions of models within political philosophy is a useful 
starting point, such categories do not in themselves explain 
the nature of such models nor, more importantly, their status 
in terms of which the validity of any given model is to be 
judged; and it is here that the central methodological 
problem of political philosophy is located. Contemporary 
philosophers tend to have a short way with this problem.
Robert Nozick asserts;
*A theory of a state of nature that begins with 
fundamental general descriptions of morally 
permissable and impermissable actions, and of 
deeply based reasons why some persons in any 
society would violate these moral constraints, 
and goes on to describe how a state would 
arise from that state of nature will serve 
our explanatory purposes, even if no actual 
state ever arose that way.* (l)
This forthright assertion of the explanatory power of theory
is unaccompanied by an explanation either of its nature or
its source. Michael Oakeshott offers an abstractionist
starting point for his theorising when he states;
* This ideal character (of the theory) is among 
the instruments which may be used in seeking 
to understand complex, ambiguous, historic
human associations ....  here I am not
concerned to use but to understand it in 
terms of its postulates. Arid, of course, 
it is ideal not in the sense of being a wished- 
for perfect condition of things but in being 
abstracted from the contingencies and ambiguities 
of the actual goings-on in the world.* (2)
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Both, approaches to the problem are interesting in that they 
both bear comparison with, and may be consciously based in, 
different aspects of scientific theorising. Oakeshott 
adopts an idealist approach in that, in the above passage, 
he suggests that his theory, the delineation of the * civil 
condition*, is ideal in character but is derived from being 
* abstracted from the contingencies and ambiguities of the 
actual goings-on in the world*. It is, in other words, an 
attempt to understand the political mode of association in 
terms of actual underlying principles, How the.range of 
phenomena is to be delimited in advance of the process of 
abstracting is not made clear, although it is likely that 
any political philosophy must begin by differentiating that 
which is political from that which is not (a process culminating 
in a delimiting decision which will almost certainly contain 
an arbitary element). None-the-less, the process of noticing 
a pattern of happenings in some set of phenomena and then 
accounting for the patterning in terms of a theoretical 
construction is a familiar process in scientific explanations.
Nozick, on the other hand, is more formal in that 
he adopts a method which would have been familiar to the 
classical contract theorists ; indeed, his theory germinates 
in a consideration of Lockean political philosophy. The 
formal character (3) of Nozick*s approach is apparent in his 
insistence that the theory is philosophically valid in that 
it enlarges understanding even though the processes described 
could have, but need not have, a counterpart in reality.
The theorising here is not focussed on an examination of the 
given, but is rather a closely argued theorem based on a
- 6 “
number of axioms themselves grounded in assumptions involving 
human psychology and rights. The philosophic validity derives 
from the extent to which it generates understanding within 
the rules or tradition which delimits that which will count 
as philosophical reasoning within the field of politics.
The point of contact between Nozick*s philosophy 
and scientific theorising may be found by comparing his method 
with that of, say, Einstein*s deductive approach. But 
although both offer blueprints which may be held to have 
explanatory power, the scientific theory carries with it the 
additional requirement that it be testable against experience 
and that it has predictive power. A closer comparison would 
be with Freudian theory which has an undoubted capacity to 
generate explanatory power even though it is not expressed 
in a form which allows it to be subject to the Popperian 
criterion of falsifiability - a characteristic which opens 
it to the charge that it is metaphysical speculation rather 
than scientific theory.
A greater difficulty occurs with Nozick*s theory 
when we consider its relationship with actual social conduct.
Thé difficulty is not, as with Freud*s theory of the 
subconscious, that nothing is excluded where human behaviour 
is concerned and is, hence, unfalsifiable, but, that it is 
not clear to what extent the theory necessarily has to touch 
upon any aspect of the reality in question, that is, the 
social and political milieu. The minimal state as characterised 
by Nozick clearly need have no counterpart in reality as he 
challengingly admits. It would appear that the only point 
at which his formal construction needs to be accepted as
embodying empix’ioal assumptions is in his set of axioms.
But it is by no means obvious that even if these axioms are 
shown to be of doubtful validity in empirical terras that the 
theory would be in any way weakened.
Plato*s * The Republic* offers useful illustrations 
of the various kinds of ambiguity to which theorising in the 
social sphere is subject. In *The Republic* the,myth of the 
men of gold, silver and iron is a myth in the sense that it 
is a consciously devised fabrication intended to achieve a 
social end, namely, the willing popular acceptance of a 
particular social order. It should be noted that for those 
who believe it, the, myth will have the features of an 
acceptable theory to the extent that it has both explanatory 
power and a clear relationship to the actual state of society 
(assuming the existence of Platq* s Republic) . Compare the 
myth with Plato*s developed blueprint for the ideal society 
as delineated in *The Republic*. As an example of philosophical 
theory it remains potent in that it is still regarded as a 
fruitful source of insights and recommendations which have 
contemporary relevance. Yet it embodies many of the features 
of a myth; the theory has no obvious actual counterpart - 
there is no ideal Platonic state; the major presuppositions 
are unacceptable in scientific terms either because an 
underlying epistemology has to be accepted which lacks 
scientific credibility or assumptions within the theory have 
been made which would now be regarded as either mistaken or 
simplisitic in scientific terms (where the inheritance and 
nature of intelligence are concerned).
In what sense, therefore, can Plato*s *The Republic* 
be said to represent a political theory while the myth of the 
men of gold does not? Part of the answer lies in the truth 
condition, As has been noted, the myth, although meant to 
be believed, is proposed for instrumental purposes, not 
because it is held to embody truth. It is a fiction.
•The Republic*, on the other hand, is intended to demonstrate 
some kind of truth - although * truth* here stands in need of 
qualification. Intentions, however, cannot enter into the 
conditions which may be held to guarantee the truth of a 
theoretical structure; what is held to be a fiction may be 
true just as that which is construed in good faith may, in 
fact, be false.
What, then, ensures the continued status of 
* The Republic * as political theory and not myth? As a 
theorem it does maintain an internal coherence ; that is, 
given the particular presuppositions involved, there is 
nothing in Plato * s theorising which is obviously contradictory 
or irrelevant. As such, it may be said to embody truth if 
that truth is understood in terms of its interior structure, 
i.e., in terms of accepting as given the postulates and 
accepting the logical validity of the ensuing theoretical 
reasoning and resulting structure. Stated in these terms, 
the status of the theory may be likened to a mathematical 
theory which is logically valid in terms of its axioms and 
deductions even though it will not bear the weight of any 
attempt to seek confirmation of its conclusions in the 
physical world.
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Two observations are prompted by a comparison of 
this kind. First of all, it is not immediately obvious why 
essentially a priori reasoning of this kind should give rise 
to conclusions or theories which have any illuminative 
validity or use in such an eminently practical area of life 
as politics. Why, to return to Nozick, will the resulting 
theory * serve our explanatory purposes, even if no actual 
state ever arose in this way* ?
Secondly, if the initial postulates are unacceptable 
in terms of their truth, whatever is built upon them will 
have no more validity than a well-constructed fairy, tale,
In such a case it could be argued that the central thesis 
of Plato*s *The Republic* would be indistinguishable from 
the myth of the men of gold in terms of its pretentions to 
theoretical status. It would appear that internal coherence 
is insufficient to rescue a supposed political theory from 
being otiose. However, these two conditions, viz., the 
truth of the axioms and the supposed necessity for some kind 
of correspondence between theory and practical affairs have 
hitherto been presented in limited and, possibly, simplistic 
terms.
The comparison of political theory with mathematical 
system-building usefully allows the above objections to be 
thrown into relief, but there are elements in philosophical 
theory which are not analogous to a mathematical model, or, 
for that matter, to a scientific model without seriously 
misrepresenting the nature of political philosophy. A 
political theory could be a scientific theory about the nature 
of politics, it is even conceivable that it could be political
10
processes understood in terms of mathematical theorising, 
but the present concern is with philosophical theory 
related to politics and this must be located within the 
rule-governed framework which enables philosophy to be 
recognised as a distinctive activity.
Understood in these terms, the mooted objections 
can be resolved or answered. In the first place, the 
relationship between a philosophical model and reality is 
posited in terms of understanding; specifically, philosophical 
understanding. Thus a model within a political theory need 
not offer a description of an existing or past state of 
affairs. What is important is that it explores and elecits 
the implications of its epistemology; while these remain 
fruitful and interesting it is not even necessary to espouse 
the underlying epistemology - Plato*s (Republic* is just 
such a case. So it is that if the model continues to offer 
philosophic illumination of the world of politics, its status, 
qua philosophic model, is secure ; if it is either logically 
or imaginatively stretched to the point where it ceases to 
fulfil this function, this will be the point at which it may 
be considered to be a fairy-tale or fiction. In other words, 
Nozick*s assertion, though ambiguously expressed, is open to 
interpretation in these terms and so may be endorsed.
Secondly, the application of philosophic understanding 
to the examination of political activity implies that the 
resulting arguments, models or principles will be developed 
within parameters established by philosophical concepts and 
their contents on the one hand (such as the particular ontology 
and epistemology adopted by the theorist), and empirical 
evidence and assumptions on the other. What is more, insofar
11
as the presuppositions in which the theory.is grounded are 
metaphysical in character, the theory will remain secure 
against changes in empirical evidence, Plato*s (Republic* 
is not invalidated as the means by which social and political 
questions are illuminated by objections to assumptions of an 
empirical nature, assumptions which are now held to be 
untenable. At most, the theory stands in need of amendment 
or the model in need of adaptation. The metaphysic would 
appear, in fact, to contribute largely to the status of the 
theory both as a philosophical theory and to its depth and 
profundity as a theory within political philosophy.
That said, the role of empirical considerations is 
not negligible. Although, in these terms, a philosophical 
theory and any model which is integral to it is, strictly, 
logically independent of a correspondence with empirical 
situations or considerations, nonetheless it would be strange 
if a philosophically successful theory were divorced from a 
recognisable political reality in any way. The recognition 
of the truth or partial truth of empirical assumptions will 
help to anchor the theory in a context which is recognisably 
political within the bounds of human experience. For example, 
it has already been noted that in classical political 
philosophy assumptions tend to be made concerning what are 
assumed to be self-evident human characteristics. But it may 
legitimately be objected that the basic conditions of person­
hood are more complex and elusive than those picked out as 
being the distinctive characteristics, and, by implication, 
the sufficient conditions of what it is to be a person. In 
other words, it is argued that although the classical
12
philosophers were unjustified in making such universalistic 
assumptions about man * s nature, these assumptions will be 
true descriptions of the nature of some men or they may pick 
out characteristics which are part of the nature of most men. 
Insofar as they are correct to this extent, the theory will 
remain grounded in a recognisable human context. What is 
more, if a model is developed which uses such characteristics 
as axioms, as happens in Thomas Hobbes* philosophy for example, 
then it will be the case that the subsequent theorem will 
embody a corresponding degree of agreement with reality. To 
put the matter in slightly different terms, the theorem*s 
identity as a possible and recognisable reality will be 
guaranteed to some extent by the extent to which the original 
presuppositions themselves reflect reality.*
The other observation which it is appropriate to 
make just now is that in political philosophy theorising is 
not entirely a deductive process. Political philosophers 
develop their theories by importing concepts, assumptions and 
information as required by the theory. It is not an exercise 
in pure logic, rather one of judgment. That being the case, 
the nature of the empirical evidence available to the 
philosopher may well be crucial in influencing the actual
* To say this much is not to deny that it is also possible 
(as may be held to be the case with Plato*s political 
philosophy) that insights, which can be - held to be empirical 
in nature, help to strengthen confidence in the underlying 
epistemology or metaphysic.
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direction in which the theory develops. The underlying 
metaphysic may well limit the approach but it will not 
determine it; that will be a matter for the judgment of 
the philosopher, and in forming such a judgment empirical 
considerations may well be decisive.
3. At one level it is perfectly clear what counts as
political theory and what its function is. The analysis of 
political concepts has been, since Plato, an important and 
continuing preoccupation of political philosophy although 
it is a preoccupation which has grown more intense this 
century with the development of a specific school of 
philosophical thought devoted to the practice of analysis 
as an end in itself and, latterly, much influenced by the 
later writings of Wittgenstein. But while the analysis and 
clarification of concepts is important and must be a 
coneommitant element in any philosophy, it is necessarily 
insufficient as a description of the whole function of political 
philosophy because linguistic analysis as a methodology 
cannot address itself to important philosophical questions 
except to demonstrate ambiguities in the questions themselves. 
For example, where authority is concerned, using the techniques 
of analysis together with the essentially positivistic 
categorisations resulting from sociological interest in 
authority, it is possible to establish, relatively clearly, 
the area of meaning occupied by the concept. The point at 
which this means of enquiry needs to be supplemented is when 
questions are posed such as *What are the limits of authority? * 
or *Under what conditions can authority be legitimately 
challenged?* Answers to such questions will involve reference
14
to values and normative standards embodied in the social 
and political framework within which authority is located.
In other words, the explanation of authority must take place 
Within some wider theoretical context.
It now remains to outline the characteristics of 
such theorising. Certain features have already been 
established. To briefly enumerate them, they are;
(1) that the paradigm for a model of political 
philosophy cannot be that which is appropriate to the purely 
deductive prccesses of mathematics and formal logic (this is 
not to deny, of course, the necessity to adhere to the canons 
of valid reasoning in all forms of political theorising);
(2) that philosophical theorising will be founded 
in a metaphysic which will determine its ontology and 
epistemology in general terms ;
(3) that such theorising will also incorporate 
empirical considerations which will establish the identity 
of the theory or of any integral model as a recognisably 
political state of affairs;
(4) and, that the correspondence of the model with 
reality is further guaranteed by the extent to which axioms 
are grounded in truths about the human condition with the 
likelihood that they will be generalisations concerning human 
nature.
To further elaborate and develop the characteristics 
of a philosophical political theory consider the process of 
theorising. In science the major purpose of a theory is to 
explain phenomena of one kind or another with the additional 
attribute of furnishing grounds on which predictions can be
15 ~
made concerning the phenomena in question. To this end, the 
typical process is one of developing hypotheses which, if 
confirmed by experiment and experience, achieve the status 
of laws and.: so become incorporated into the wider paradigm 
which is accepted as embodying acceptable assumptions on 
which to base further experimentation and research.
It is, however, immediately obvious that if the 
formation of laws or law-like generalisations linked to 
testability and predictive power are the hallmarks of scientific 
theory and if these features generate, pari passu, explanatory, 
power, then political theory is not of the same order. It 
cannot be claimed that either classical or modern theorists 
offer explanations of this order in their various theories 
or models ; in fact, theories which did aspire to such 
characteristics would more properly be found within the 
province of political science.
One way of establishing the qualitative difference 
between scientific and philosophic theorising is to suggest 
that ’ explanatory power* is a misleading phrase ; rather, 
it is the case that the function of philosophy in this area 
is to provide understanding. While the two terms * explanation * 
and * understanding* are often used synonymously in ordinary 
usage, a plausible and (in this context) useful distinction 
can be made. First of all, where an explanation is given it 
does not necessarily follow that understanding has taken place, 
although where understanding is achieved, explanation may be 
involved. The point is that * understanding* has a psychological 
connotation which is absent in * explanation * . ’Explanation* 
implies the existence of objective, publicly available data
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which, in science typically takes the form of a theory, 
while ‘understanding* is what might be called the subjective 
attitude of mind towards data like ‘explanations*, an 
attitude which is intimately connected with the enlargement 
of meaning within a pre-existing framework of reference.
So that to * understand * in scientific terms is to be able 
to accommodate theory to conceptual structures, assumptions, 
and theories already subjectively held.
Given that political philosophic theory is not of 
the same order as scientific theory in that self-evidently 
it does not seek to offer explanations which are causal in 
nature and, as such, are capable of being framed in terms of 
testable laws with accompanying predictive power, it would 
appear that one function of political theory in philosophy 
is to bring about a greater understanding of politics, not to 
offer an explanation of politics in the severe scientific 
sense. It follows that if the furtherance of understanding 
is one of the important functions of political philosophy 
then political theorising as practised by the philosopher 
does not purport to offer explanations, at least not in the 
scientific sense outlined above where the two terms ‘theory* 
and * explanation * become virtually synonymous.
The importance of these distinctions is not that 
they are merely conceptual clarifications, but that they open 
the way to a clear appreciation of the differentiation which 
must be made when we consider the nature and function of 
philosophical theory as opposed to scientific theory or even 
theorising in the social sciences.
- 17
Features in political philosophy such as the partial
validity of those generalisations which form, the basic
assumpticns and the significance of concepts, information
and ideas from the world of practical politics has already
been the subject of comment, It^  remains to delineate the
remaining characteristics of philosophical theorising. To
this end, the notion of theory understood as a metaphor is
productive. In his essay *Does Political Theory Still Exist*
Isiah Berlin points out that:
*The notion that a simile or model, drawn from 
one sphere, is necessarily misleading when 
applied to another, and that it is possible 
to think without such analogies ip some 
direct fashion - ‘face-to-face* with facts - 
will not bear criticism. To think is to 
generalise, to generalise is to compare.
To think of one phenomenon or cluster of 
phenomena is to think in terms of its 
resemblances and differences with others.
This is by now a hoary platitude. It 
follows that without parallels and analogies 
between one sphere and another of thought 
and action, whether conscious or not, the 
unity of our experience - cur experience 
itself - wculd not be possible. All language 
and thought is, in this sense, necessarily 
‘metaphorical*.* (5)
Berlin*s use of the term ‘metaphor* is significant although
it needs to be treated with some caution. The objection is
that ‘metaphor* is too ambiguous a concept to indicate the
peculiar character of those elaborate comparisons which
appear in theories within political philosophy (this ambiguity
is implicitly conceded by the use of the inverted commas in
Berlin*s essay).
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Towards developing this line of thought, it should 
be borne in mind that politics, however defined, as a 
practical activity has no necessary need of theory as a 
prerequisite for the continuing practice of the activity. 
Gilbert Ryle has pointed out that men reasoned intelligently 
long before there was a theory of logic just as men fished 
efficiently before Walton*s theoretical prescriptions were 
developed. (6) The conclusion is that ‘efficient practice 
precedes the theory of it*. (?) This is true of politics, 
and even where theory can be shewn to have affected practice, 
this will be the outcome of peculiar contingent conditions, 
not of logical necessity.
But if the resulting theories do not have explanatory 
power in the scientific sense, that is they do not involve 
the formulation of laws which are logically linked with the 
phenomena which they explain,(8) what is their nature?
The principal function, it has been argued, is to promote 
understanding of the political process; but understanding 
itself is a reflexive process requiring an interpretive 
framework on the part of the individual concerned which is 
brought to bear on the theory and which, if fruitful, enlarges 
the individual*s subjective framework in the form of increased 
understanding. It is this element which has been emphasised 
in the insistence that a philoscphical theory derives its 
validity from the philosophic mode of thought in which it 
claims to be incorporated. But this still leaves the 
objective nature of the theory ambiguous. What kind of 
’explanation* offered by the theory is the subsequent 
understanding grounded in?
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So far, it would appear that political theory 
within philosophy emerges as something like a shadow of 
scientific theory, viz., theory stripped of its strict 
connection with truth, falsifiability and logical connection, 
and so is left open to being characterised as ‘metaphor*, to 
use Berlin*s term. But, as has been objected, ‘metaphor* 
is too ambiguous in that it does not indicate the particular 
characteristics that the ccmparison has to have in order to 
qualify as belonging to the class of ‘political theory*.
Some further delineation is still required.
In ‘Aspects of Scientific Explanation* (9),
Carl Hempel makes an interesting distinction between a true 
explanation and a potential explanation in which the difference 
lies in the possibility of the potential explanation being 
false. This possibility is not open to a political theory 
because its philosophical validity is not to be judged in 
terms of its truth, where truth itself implies some kind of 
correspondence with, or confirmation by an objective reality. 
There is no comparable case in political philosophy to the 
kind found in science in which, for example, a theory such 
as the phlogiston theory has been falsified and has simply 
been discarded.
But the notion of a ‘conditional explanation* is 
useful in this context if Hempel*s notion of ‘potentiality* 
is interpreted in the following terms; by a conditional 
explanation is understood any generalisations, principles 
or models formulated into a coherent theory which represent 
a possible picture of reality in political terms. To say
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this much is to imply more than merely that the theory would 
be true if the practice corresponded to it (which would be 
an empty truism) ; rather it is to, draw attention to the 
nature of politics in which practice is the result of decision­
making. To that extent, philosophical theory in politics 
maps-out possible states of affairs. It is through a 
consideration of the comparison between the present reality 
of politics and what may be termed the potential or 
conditional realities represented by philosophical theory 
that understanding of the nature of politics is engendered, 
Berlin’s argument concerning the necessity for there to be 
the opportunity for analogies to be made before productive 
thought is possible is substantially illustrated by the 
practice of political philosophy.
It follows that although there is no strict logical 
necessity involved in the relationship between a philosophical 
theory and the actuality of politics in the world, insofar 
as the political dimension of human affairs is recognisable 
as a form of life because it is rule-governed in the sense 
that it is expressed in a distinctive language, that it is 
concerned with problems and forms of social organisation and 
institutions which are distinctive, then;it will be the case 
that these features will be reflected in the theory to some 
extent at least for the theory to be recognised as a 
philosophical theory about politics, per se. If political 
theory here presents a picture, then it is a picture of 
possibilities rather than actuality, but the possibilities 
themselves must be capable of being recognised as political 
by the same features which allow recognition of and 
engagement in the political way of life in the first place.
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4. There is one feature which is held to be present
in scientific theory which is a logical condition and which 
may also be held to have validity where the conditional 
theorising of politics is concerned. This is the requirement 
that for a theory to have the greatest explanatory power it 
should ideally, exclude any element of that which requires
explanation. N.R. Hanson in ’Patterns of Discovery* states;
‘One might object; the dynamical behaviour of a 
billiard ball can be explained by the similar 
behaviour of another ball which has just struck 
it. One could explain why a cloud moves by 
referring to the motions of its constituent 
molecules (whose group motion is the cloud*s 
motion). It also explains the redness of the 
blood to say that blood is made up of red particles. 
True, But one cannot explain why any given thing 
is red by saying that all red things contain red 
particles; nor could one explain why anything 
moves by noting that any moving thing contains 
moving particles. In general, though each member 
of a class of events may be explained by other 
members, the totality of the class cannot be 
explained by any member of the class.* (ll)
It follows that a theory of the greatest generality will
have the greatest explanatory power providing it is not a
mere generalisation about particulars. Therefore, universality
should be built into the theories of political philosophy
either implicitly in terms of the universal application of
the theory which is presented, or explicitly, probably in
the form of principles generated by the theory. In other
words, the aim of the political philosopher should be to
produce dniversalistic nomic structures, viz., theory of the
22 -
widest generality which does not require as an integral 
feature reference to the particular social or political 
conditions pertaining to any given society which either 
exists or has existed.
The point can be underlined by returning to 
Isiah Berlin’s notion of political theory as ‘metaphor* in 
which the notion of comparison is central. In such a case, 
the sharper the distinction, the more effective will be 
the metaphor. It would appear that the autonomy of 
philosophic theory and accompanying models in terms of the 
lack of a necessary relationship with actuality, imparts to 
the theory, in principle, greater explanatory power. Possibly 
the most striking example outside science of that which 
requires explanation not figuring in the explanation or theory 
is to be found in the moral philosophy of Kant where the 
principles embodied in the various formulations of the 
categorical imperative do not themselves prescribe moral 
action in any particular instance, rather it is the case 
that criteria are cffered which may be applied to moral 
judgment-making, and the theory itself provides the means 
of greater understanding of moral thought and conduct.
Robert Nozick puts the matter succinctly by insisting that 
the most desirable and complete understanding of the political 
realm is * to fully explain it in terms of the non-political*.(12) 
5* There is, of course, one other important function
of political theory. This is the extent to which - theory 
imparts not only understanding of the political process but 
sets what may be called a normative standard. In other words, 
in so far as a theory can be likened to a blueprint it embodies
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an ideal situation and embedded in this idealisation is the 
implication that the theory represents a state of affairs 
which not only can be brought about but which ought to be 
brought about.
But we have to exercise caution here. The primary 
concerns of political philosophy are not and cannot be 
equated with those of practical politics. Political 
philosophy, as has been argued, is mainly concerned with 
investigating the framework within which categories of 
substantive decisions are reached within society. Both the 
framework and the decisions we recognise as being part and
paroel of that mode of life we call ‘political*. That the
term ‘political* is ambiguous and is, in turn, in need of 
analysis need not concern us here, it is enough to admit 
that there is an admittedly ambiguous form of life called 
‘politics* and that as members of a political society we
are acquainted to a greater or lesser extent with its forms,
language, conventions and procedures. The philosophic 
concern starts with this subjective awareness of the activity 
in question and moves from this to a critical interest in 
questions which can be posed concerning the general framework 
within which political problems are solved, questions which 
cannot be answered in impirical or scientific terms.
The nature of such questions and the characteristics 
of the kinds of answers we are looking for have been the 
subject of the preceding sections. The questions and the 
answers are peculiarly philosophical but the purpose of the 
enquiry is to generate greater understanding and, where it 
can be maintained, truth. In the process of this enquiry
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models are likely to be erected or principles enunciated 
which, have the proper philosophical function of enabling 
a more incisive and critical understanding of actual social 
and political states of affairs. This is the proper normative 
function of political theory, but the more the discourse 
moves away from understanding towards a making of prescriptions 
for change, the greater will be the tendency to move from 
philosophical to overt political discourse. At its most 
extreme can be traced the adoption of a philosophical model 
as a blueprint for an ideal state which is not just a 
theoretical construct but a possible and desirable state of 
affairs worthy of being brought about by political action.
This is the point at which philosophy becomes ideology.
One writer has characterised ‘ideology* as a ‘fighting 
creed* (13). Where the attitude towards a philosophical 
model moves from one of objective and critical scrutiny 
towards belief in it both in terms of its truth and value 
then it has become a ‘fighting creed* and has ceased tc be 
philosophical. The most obvious example which, on the face 
of it at least, appears to meet this case is that of Marxism 
which can be either the object of philosophical scrutiny or 
held in terms of a commitment which is ideological. At this 
point the philosophical has been subsumed by the actively 
pclitical.
The other danger to which political theory may be 
subject is that it, will be interpreted as providing a paradigm 
for an end-state in which either problems can be resolved 
without conflict or, more radically, in which political 
problems, as such, simply cease to exist. Philosophically
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such an interpretation is unacceptable because it would 
involve a contradiction in the view which is appropriate to 
philosophical enquiry in this area.
To expose this requires the beginnings, at least, 
of an analysis of what is meant by ‘politics*. ‘Politics*, 
as has already been argued, is an area of social life which 
is recognisable on the basis of inter-subjective participation 
in a way of life - a distinctive way of life in which 
‘politics* and matters ‘political* gain their intelligibility. 
In crder to show why a particular interpretation of political 
theory is mistaken we must be clear in what respects this 
departs from the philosophically appropriate stance.
By ‘politics* is meant that context of our social 
life in which decisions are made, problems solved, and 
policies generated which regulate society and form society’s 
response to the contingently changing conditions within which 
the society in questicn exists. This context is recognised 
by such features as its distinctive mode of relationships 
manifested in its distinctive vernacular language, procedures, 
institutions and rules. It is also distinguished in both 
practical and philosophical terms by the extent to which it 
generates questions to do with freedom, authority, equality, 
justice and legitimacy to name some of the more obvious areas 
of questioning and conflict. Further, it is difficult to see 
how a society which did not contain these features could be 
described as being in anything but a debased sense ‘political* 
In fact, understood in these terms, the distinctions involved 
begin to substantiate the claim that politics has to being 
an autonomous area of activity.
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It would also appear that, given these features, 
the political context is one which directly or indirectly 
will affect the whole of society, and is a context which is 
recognisable and intelligible in terms of its processes and 
only its processes. To ascribe to it end-states which are 
once-and-for-all in character is to view the political mode 
or way of life as being similar to that which Michael Oakeshott 
has called ‘enterprise association* (l4). The nature of this 
relationship or web of relationships is founded on the 
recognition that there is some predetermined end or outcome 
to be achieved such as is the case in businesses, beaurocracies 
and services of one kind or another. In such a context the 
basic questions which will arise will be managerial in that 
they will be to do with the efficiency or efficacy of 
suggested means to achieving the end(s) - questions concerning 
the ends themselves, or problems to do with freedom, liberty, 
rights, authority etc. will not of necessity arise. It 
follows that there would be a contradiction involved in 
viewing political theory as supplying the goal of political 
endeavour if a necessary presupposition in the identification 
and intelligibility of political life is that it is an area 
which has to be understood in terms of its processes not of 
end—states, as to attempt to construe it as end—directed 
is implicitly to deny politics the very characteristics which 
give it its distinctive dimension in human life.
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Chapter One 
Authority and Rules
1. This work is concerned with a series of problems
which are connected with the freedom of the individual in 
the face of the state*s claim to authority. Such problems 
centre on the nature of authority, its justification, the 
grounds on which it may be limited or challenged, and the 
relationship of the individual to the state’s authority.
The questioning and delineation of freedom and authority 
within the state have occupied political philosophers from 
Plato onwards, and within the model developed in this work 
the theories of three classical philosophers - Kant, Hegel 
and Rousseau — will be fundamental. However, the starting 
point will be based in the contemporary analysis of authority.
Representative of the approach and conclusions of 
modern philosophers is the work of S.I. Benn and R.S. Peters(l) 
in which the exploration is primarily an analysis of meaning.
It is argued in ‘Social Principles and the Democratic State* 
that the concept of ‘authority* has its roots in the notion 
of the ‘auctor*, that is, ‘originators or umpires in the 
realm of rules*(2). Authority is held to reside in the 
decisions, pronouncements and rulings made by the ‘auctors*.
The next step is to enquire into the legitimising agency 
whereby the ‘auctors* are given the right to mal^ e decisions.
Max Weber*s well-known categories (3) of the various sources 
of legitimation are introduced as offering an adequate 
description. The distinction is made between de jure authority 
as implying a set of procedural rules which determine who 
shall be invested with the right to authority, and de facto
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authority involving reference to the person who is successful 
in actually cbtaining cbedience. Finally, it is argued that 
power and authority can be conceptually differentiated. 
Elsewhere (4), Professor Peters argues more fully the 
distinction to be made between being * in authority* and 
being * an authority*, the former indicating authority 
derived from some set of normative rules, the latter indicating 
authority which is derived from proven competence in some 
area of knowledge. Henceforth, the concern will be with 
being * in authority*.
Analysis conducted in these terms suggests that 
authority is to be understood in its exercise, that in order 
to understand the concept all that is necessary is to have a 
positivistic regard to the conditions within which order- 
giving, decision-making and pronouncing take place and that 
this will constitute a valid philosophical explanation.
However, such an approach is limited. For example, it does 
not explain why authority may be thought to be necessary in 
the first place; nor is the relationship of authority to 
its legitimating rules critically examined; also, the 
character and scope of the legitimating rules are left 
obscure. Tttese are examples of questions which are left 
unanswered but which will be the subject of the present 
enquiry.
2, First of all, it is important to establish the nature
of the peculiar quality of authority which makes it worthy 
of philosophical enquiry, viz., the implications which arise 
from authority*s logical connection with the notion of 
legitimacy. In elucidating this relationship, the analysis 
of one writer, D.V.B. Bell (5), provides an initially useful
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insight. Bell attempts to analyse the nature of authority 
through an examination of the prepositional form which seems 
to characterise authority utterances. He draws attention to 
the categorical mode which is typical of authority, * Do X* , 
and which may be contrasted with sentence forms indicating 
pcwer, * If ycu (do not) do X, I will (not) do Y* , and 
influence sentence fcrms, ‘If you (do not) do X, you will 
(not) do (feel, experience, attain, etc.) Y * . The categorical 
mode of the authority sentence form is striking and significant 
when compared with the hypothetical mode which characterises 
the other sentence forms. Implicit in both the influence and 
power prepositional forms is a reference, albeit conditional, 
to some causal consequence(s), and it is this condition which 
informs the imperative element in each proposition. However, 
the authority mode ‘Do X ‘ is devoid of this kind of contingency, 
yet it would be clearly incorrect to say that authoritative 
commands are pow.er statements stripped of their contingent 
element, rather like empty threats. Rather, what is tacit 
within authority‘s categorical mode is the claim that the 
command has a right to be obeyed. To re—formulate the mode, 
it is ‘Do X because this command (order, pronouncement, 
decision, etc.) is rightfully given.*
An approach of this kind to the nature of authority 
invites a comparison with Kant’s distinction between the 
categorical imperative and the hypothetical imperative.
Kant*s categcrical imperative is unconditional in that it 
says simply ‘Do this* - not to achieve some further end or 
purpose but for its own sake. It is directly comparable to 
the authority mode. His hypothetical imperatives are, on
32 -
the other hand, prudential; they enjoin a means to an end, 
they are conditional. ‘Work hard if you want to succeed*.
* Be honest if you want to be respected* are, strictly, modes 
appropriate to advice, not authority.
Put in these terms, authority can be conceptually 
differentiated from power, a distinction which can be 
illustrated in practical terms (6). Althcugh authority is 
not to be confused with power, nonetheless there is often 
a close relationship, even interdependence, between the two. 
In practical terms, authority often has coercive power 
available to it, and, as will be shown shortly, it is even 
possible for power to generate authority. In political 
terms, one of the main problems centres on the extent to 
which, if at all, the state is justified in exercising 
coercive power.
To return to authority in general, it is the 
derivation of the notion of ‘right* or ‘legitimate* implicit 
in the form ‘Do X* which must be examined. What is implied 
by the notion of ‘rightness* which is relevant to the 
understanding of authority? The significant feature is the 
implicit acknowledgement of a rule^governed situation.
What is more, this is the case whether authority is located 
in the area of morality, public conduct or knowledge and 
skill. The significant implication of ‘rightness* is that 
it cannot be an arbitrary matter regardless of the particular 
area in which authority is claimed.
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Moreover, not only is the essential presupposition 
which is expressed by the notion of ‘rightfulness*, or, in 
the political sphere, ‘legitimacy*, to be understood in 
terms of a rule-governed situation, it is a rule-governed 
situation of an implicitly public nature, not merely rule- 
governed in the sense in which any human activity can be held 
to derive its intelligibility from being rule-governed (?)• 
Authority has to find expression in public terms. It is 
indicative of a relationship or mode of association which 
demands not just its embodiment in some person, institution, 
corpus of law or fundamental text, but its recognition by 
others. It is necessarily a public matter.
Such an analysis has a bearing on the terms in 
which de jure and de facto authority are to be understood.
For example, Benn and Peters attempt to differentiate them 
sharply by defining the rule—governed aspect of authority 
in terms of de jure authority (* de jure .... implies a set 
of procedural principles which determine who shall be the 
‘auctor* and about what* (8) ) while couching the definition 
of de facto...authority in terms of successful practice 
(‘it involves reference to a man whose word in fact goes 
in some sphere*(9) )• It would appear that de facto 
authority is analogous to Weber*s charismatic authority in 
which there is no necessary reference tc rules of some 
kind (10).
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But this sharp differentiation cannot be 
maintained. Consider the case of a country whose legitimate 
government has been ousted by a coup and has been replaced 
by, say, a military diotatcrship*. In terms cf the above 
definition, the government in exile will be held to be the 
de jure authority while the ruling junta will be the de facto 
authority. But it is mistaken to imply that in such a 
situation the authority of the ruling party must be arbitrary 
by virtue of its de facto status. If even the most tyrannical 
ruler is exercising authority and not just power he will be 
ruling within the context of a rule-governed situation which 
is both understood and accepted to some extent by the subject 
population. The distinction between de jure and de facto 
authority is, therefore, not to be understood in terms of a 
distinction between theory and practice, between authcrity 
understood in terms of principles or legitimation or 
rightfulness and authority understood in terms of successful 
demonstration only. Rather, the two notions represent
* The situation also illustrates the subtle relationships 
which can exist between authority and power. Here it could 
be argued that authority germinates in power, first of all 
in simple prudential terms (‘Obey, because I have the powerl), 
developing into an acceptance of authority because it is held 
the person with the power should be obeyed, and ending with 
the habitual acceptance of the authority of those who have 
the power. In all this an emerging rule—governed situation 
can be discerned tending to legitimate the government.
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different faces of the same entity, but one stresses the 
rule-governed aspect while the other stresses the successful 
practice, but neither precludes the other and both must be 
present where authority is held to exist.
3. It is now possible to begin to delimit the general
notion of a ‘rule-governed situation* with the end in view 
of discerning the particular characteristics of those rules 
which largely determine the nature of authority and the 
degree of freedom which may pertain within the state.
For the moment it is enough to consider the nature of rules 
and rule-governed situations as disclosed in the context of 
regulating conduct generally. It has already been noted 
that where a claim to authority is made, more is demanded 
in terms of recognition than the mere ability to formulate 
a rationale; there has to be public agreement that the 
governing rule-governed situation is appropriate and 
acceptable. For example, it is possible that a tribal 
society could have its social life regulated by a system |
of rules which is simply traditional and for which no other j
rationale is offered other than to appeal to custom. It I
Imay even be the case that a rule or rules have emerged from j
a formalising of habitual behaviour. It is also possible |
that such a system of order could be challenged either frcm 
within or without as being unsatisfactory and that rules be 
introduced which are capable of being justified in more 
sophisticated rational terms. Nonetheless such a challenge 
may fail to replace the traditional authority even though 
the existing authority*s justification is extremely limited.
In other words, public agreement matters more in determining
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a society’s rules than the rationality of the rules 
themselves. To that extent, an analysis, such as 
Karl Friedrich’s, which concludes that authority is 
ultimately based on the ’potentiality of reasoned 
elaboration* (ll) underestimates the extent to which the 
rules which regulate conduct within a society and the 
accompanying form which authority takes may depend for 
their acceptance on factors over and above those of 
rationality itself. The precise nature of the most important 
subjective elements which engender acceptance of the state’s 
authority will be examined in later chapters.
The other important characteristic of a rule- 
governed situation which is instrumental in regulating 
human conduct is its essentially normative nature. Social 
behaviour may, on occasion, simply be habitual, instinctive, 
or even genetically determined, but any explanation of any 
society or social grouping is likely to concentrate on the 
extent to which it is to be understood in terms of its 
relationship to social norms, rules, customs, traditions - 
all of which are forms of rule-governed situations. To 
posit human behaviour in these terms is not to suggest that 
social rules are capable of being reduced to scientific 
rules in which the activity may be held to be an instance 
of the appropriate law. It is, rather, the case that such 
rules will prescribe standards of conduct, will define what 
is allowed or disallowed, what is legal or illegal, what is 
correct or incorrect. Take the prescriptions which inform 
such rule-governed activities as religious observance, the
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playing of games, heraldry, etiquette, legal practice, 
democratic procedures; there is considerable variety in 
the examples which can be cited but it is clear that in 
each case the activity in question becomes fully intelligible 
only if it is understood that there are appropriate 
prescriptions which may be either implicit or explicit.
In such cases, the rules do not determine behaviour but 
conduct is informed by the rules either in terms of compliance 
or non-compliance. Of even greater significance is the fact 
that prescriptive or normative rules are themselves the 
product of social life in that their inception arises from 
the decisions of men in whatever contingent social situations 
they find themselves and the continued acknowledgement of 
social rules is similarly a matter of decision. There is no 
necessity which determines the specific content of any rule, 
there is only the necessity that there be a rule-governed 
situation of some kind. This does not mean to say that the 
formation of the rules which regulate society, sanction 
authority and determine the extent of individual freedom is 
ultimately an arbitrary matter; on the contrary, it is the 
purpose of philosophic enquiry to demonstrate the essentially 
principled nature of this particular human activity*.
* It is the case that the mcst effective rules will be 
those which arise from a practice, which is the argument 
deplcyed by Professer Oakeshctt. This does not imply 
complete acceptance of the view that rules cannot be 
‘transplanted* from one social context to another.
- 38
4. First of all, consider the elements which may be
held to be present in ru.le~f ormation. This aspect is present 
in John Rawls* paper, ‘Two Concepts of Rules* (l2). Rawls* 
primary concern is to establish two distinct categories 
into which rules fall; the practice and the summary 
conceptions. In the practice ccncepticn the function of the 
rule is to define a practice. In such a conception, rules 
are seen as being logically prier to instances of the 
practice in that it is the existence of the rules which 
defines a particular act as falling within a particular 
category of practice. It is this conception of rules which 
correspcnds to the paradigm cases cf law which determine the 
legality of conduct. The summary conception, on the other 
hand, is understood in terms of rules which guide practice. 
Rawls argues within a utilitarian framework in that when 
faced with a problem, the individual has to decide what to 
do. This decision is made in the light of some general 
principle, in this case the principle of utility. The 
decision is then generalised to cover all similar situations; 
in effect, a rule is fcrmulated. The rule so formulated is 
seen as a rule of thumb, a device which obviates the need 
for a fresh consideration of the consequences of a particular 
act every time a similar situation arises. However, it is 
recognised that the way is still open for a departure from 
this rule if the individual wishes to re-evaluate the 
consequences cf this action.
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The significant feature cf this analysis for this 
work is Rawls* assumption that some kind of rule-governed 
situation is antecedent to the whole process of rule-making 
in that; in the summary conception, the original decision 
which forms the basis for the subsequent rule is itself 
made in the light of a ‘principle*. It is not proposed to 
take issue with Rawls* adoption of utilitarianism as the 
guiding principle, as one of the principal aims of this 
work is to establish, independently, the nature of the 
principles which can be held to govern rule-making in a 
political society. The present importance of Rawls* paper 
is that he draws attention to the nature of the situation 
where rules are concerned, that if it is conceived of as a 
rational activity, it cannot take place in an existential 
vacuum. This will be particularly true of rules which are 
held to be necessary for the regulation of conduct, where 
ethical, political and even epistemological considerations 
are likely to form the principled framework within which 
practical decisions are made. It is also worth noting 
that although Rawls appears to place his summary conception 
within such a framework, there is no reason to exclude the 
practice conception from this, at least where the rules 
concerned are those which affect the authority of the state 
and the freedom of the individual.
The examination of the relationship between rules 
and governing principles within the important social and 
pclitical area cf jurisprudence is continued, by H.L.A. Hart 
in * The Concept of Law* (l3) ia which he attempts to 
establish the legitimating source of the legal framework
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in society. The rules of jurisprudence which make acts 
of killing, stealing, deception, etc. illegal are referred 
to as (primary rules *. Hart then suggests that these derive 
their validity from a system of rules, which he calls 
’secondary rules’, which govern the formation, recognition 
and modification of the primary rules. It is noticable 
that Hart’s argument that the primary rules need to be 
derived from, and justified by, referenoe to some higher 
order system of rules or principles mirrors the implication 
already present in Rawls’ practice conception in that 
specific rules are not formulated in a ruleless void and 
that, indeed, specific rules are not self-justifying - 
reference to some ’higher* set of rules is implied. The 
distinction which is aimed at is of fundamental importance 
to an understanding of a socially rule-governed situation. 
The implication is that where there is a set of explicit 
rules such as those identified in terms of Hart’s primary 
rules, such rules are to be understood as being binding 
where their appropriateness is recognised and, what is 
more, the application of such rules is held to be relatively 
explicit and unambigucus cnce such appropriate conexts have 
been recognised; principles, on the other hand, although 
they share the characteristic of needing to be invoked in 
appropriate situations, are not explicit insofar as they 
are constantly in need of interpretation. There is also 
the significant implication that, where law is concerned, 
such interpretations are embodied in the form of primary 
rules.
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5. At this point it is revealing to examine how
the introduction of authority cuts across this relatively 
straightforward model of law as rules which are governed 
by principles. The matter may be approached by examining 
Hart’s description of a ’pre-legal* society (l4). An 
example of such a society would be a primitive tribal 
organisation which has a system of customary rules or 
taboos comparable to primary rules but 'lacking the 
interpretive framework supplied by secondary rules. Hart 
suggests that a system of primary rules of this kind would 
be subject to the defects of being uncertain, static and 
inefficient. In order to rectify such a state cf affairs, 
and to transform the society from its pre-legal to a fully 
legal state, he recommends the introduction of an appropriate 
set of secondary rules. Thus, where uncertainty is 
engendered by a dispute as to the scope or even existence 
of a specific primary rule, a secondary rule governing these 
contingencies is advocated; where the primary rules are 
held to be static or unalterable even in the light of 
changing circumstances, a secondary rule which enables 
change to take place is recommended, and, where the rules 
are held to be inefficient in that there is no possibility 
of adjudication where there are disputes as to the application 
of a specific rule, once more an appropriate secondary rule 
is recommended.
The characterisation of a pre-legal society is 
convincing with respect to his suggestion that such a scciety 
could not last for long even if its genesis could be 
envisaged. In other words, there is the implication that
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all rules are potentially ambiguous and none more so than 
social rules in which the conditions in which they may be 
applied will change as society changes. Even the most 
apparently clear statement of a rule requires an element 
of perspicuity essential for its successful interpretation, 
successful, that is, in furthering the activities of which 
it is a part of a way of life. The point is this; given 
that ambiguity in the wording of a rule is possible; given 
that even where the formal statement of a rule is clear, 
the understanding of the rule may still be hampered due to 
difficulties in understanding the context within which the 
rule has applicability; given that even where all is 
understood, there is still the possibility of a lack of 
perspicuous agreement on either its interpretation or 
practice by someone within society - given all these, the 
final respcnse must be tc an appeal to authority to decide 
matters. In other words, it is argued that in all rule- 
governed situations of a normative kind, authority is a 
matter of practical necessity if the notions of correctness 
or incorrectness, rightness or wrongness, legality or 
illegality are to be maintained with any degree of 
intelligibility and coherence,
With respect to Hart*s pre-legal society, it is 
significant that although it requires a system of secondary 
rules to transform it into a legal society, it needs merely 
a primary, rule, which commands acceptance, investing one 
person, say an hereditary chief, with the right to resolve 
all disputes and ambiguties which arise and the stability 
of the society would be maintained. Of even greater
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significance, of course, is the fact that although the 
introduction of secondary rules transforms the nature of 
the rule-governed situation which regulates the society, 
it does nothing to diminish the need for authority. If 
anything, the need for authority as the means by which 
ambiguities or disputes concerning the rules are resolved 
is increased if the functioning of society, which the rules 
are meant to serve, is to be maintained. The fact that 
there will be, so to speak, an extra tier of rules requiring 
interpretation in their own right merely underlines the need 
for authoritative decisions. Moreover, ambiguities or 
disputes concerning the primary rules will have to be resolved 
taking the nature of the secondary rules into account. This 
is a problem which, in a complex society, is likely to be 
exacerbated by the tension which will develop between the 
interpretation of rules by individuals seeing them, and 
using them, in the light of their own particular circumstances 
and needs and the interpretation of primary rules in 
accordance with general principles embodied in the system 
of secondary rules. There is even the possibility, 
demonstrated by R.M. Dworkin (l5)> of the need to decide 
between secondary rules as to which to apply, in certain 
circumstances, to the primary rules. This situation takes 
place within the context of a discussion concerning the 
nature and need for judicial discretion, itself an 
illuminating example of authority in practice. Finally, 
the more complex the society and the more sophisticated 
the structure of primary and secondary rules, the greater 
will be the tendency for rules, both primary and secondary.
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to become more *open-textured* (l6). Hart makes use of the 
concept of •open-textured’ in his discussion of legal 
formalism where he attacks the view that it is possible to 
* freeze the meaning of a rule so that its general terms 
must have the same meaning in every case where its application 
is in question* (l?). The condition which introduces 
ambiguity into the process of rule-recognition is the same 
condition which introduces open-texture into concepts, 
namely, the infinite variety of forms which an instance 
can take. Rules have to be applied to an unknown number of 
unforeseen situations; in such a case, the recognition of 
given instances as falling within the definitional parameters 
is a matter which will require investigation and decision, 
and, once more, the need for authority is underlined.
Summary
The chapter begins by focusing on the notion of 
authority in society and by acknowledging the useful 
clarifications which result from contemporary philosophic 
interest in the concept. But such analysis does not allow 
the examination of more fundamental questions to do with 
the justification of authority and its relationship to the 
rules which may be held to regulate society. It is argued 
that the implication of ‘rightfulness* or ‘legitimacy* 
which is present in authority is derived from rules which 
have acceptance within society; in other words, the 
acceptance of authority implies public recognition, either 
implicit or explicit, or a legitimating rule-governed 
situation. It is shown that in social terms, such rule
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systems are of an essentially normative character, which, 
if they are derived from rational considerations, are likely 
to be formulated in the light of principles. It will be the 
elucidation of these principles in philosophic terms which 
will be one .of the main concerns of this work.
It has also been demonstrated that not only is 
authority derived from rules in terms of its legitimation, 
but it is born of a practical necessity created by the 
rule-governed situation in the first place. It is the 
fact that rules can never be completely perspicuous, that 
there will be ambiguities, disputes and changing circumstances 
which require that there be an agency responsible for the 
resolution of these matters. It has been shown that the 
more sophisticated the rule-system in terms of its need 
for governing principles, the greater will be the need for 
authority to adjudicate on the problems created by this 
greater complexity. Rules create the need for authority 
and rules legitimate the same authority.
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Chapter 2
On Politics as a Rule-Governed Situation
1. It is now appropriate to move from a consideration
of the general nature of rule-governed situations and their 
implications in terms of authority to enquire into the 
particular nature of that rule-governed situation which 
is the province of politics. This is the essential pre­
requisite to confronting the central problems of political 
authority, viz., its nature, justification and limitation(s).
The activity of politics, identified by its 
determinate language, procedures and institutions, takes 
place within a particular context of human relationships.
To postulate human relationships is to postulate at least 
a necessary condition of a rule-governed situation, namely 
intelligibility. It is the interaction of intelligent 
human beings we are concerned with and this together with 
the fact that the activity, i.e., politics, is identifiable 
in a variety of ways gives warranty that the relationships 
involved will be productive cf analysis in terms of meaning.
The immediate problem, however, is not one of 
recognition but of delineation. Just as any competent 
language-user may be hard put to it to describe the nature 
of his language, so in a relatively open society a citizen 
may be effective and articulate without necessarily being 
able to characterise the political context, per se.
Indeed, unless the citizen also happened to be interested
in political science or philosophy there is no reason why
he should be capable of this (l). The enquiry in hand is
peculiarly philosophical in that what is offered is a
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critical commentary on aspects of an activity, not an 
engagement in that activity.
What, then, is the nature cf that rule-governed 
situation which is recognised as politics? The answer to 
this question will consist in offering a series of 
characteristics, conditions and qualifications which 
together comprise the criteria by which the political 
may be known. In other words, a recognitional framework 
is offered which is more than a mere description of a given 
state of affairs, but is rather a means of discrimination 
for determining the political frcm the non-political in 
any given state of affairs. To that extent it will be 
ideal, but an idealisation derived as an abstraction from 
what is known historically or is known as a continuing 
dynamic activity, and is capable, reflexively, of application 
to what is known in both of the modes mentioned.
2. The fact is significant that political history
and associated histories of political ideas tend to begin 
with a consideration of the particular developments and 
ideas concerning government which took place in the Greek 
city states of the sixth and fifth centuries B.C. Not 
only is the etymology of the concept ‘politics* rooted in 
the Greek ‘polites* (a citizen) but it is only when 
something like the state of affairs pertaining to the city 
states of the period was realised that the concept begins 
to take on explanatory power. It is clear that whatever 
else politics is about it is centrally concerned with
!jgovernment, but not just government in the narrow sense
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of ‘rule* but government which has become the subject of 
conscious speculation, and government which has become, 
either by necessity or conscious adaptation, complex in 
form mirroring an increasingly complex and sophisticated 
society. Thus the notion of ‘politics* does not sit easily 
within descriptions of social crganisations such as tribes, 
or kingdoms where the royal will is absolute, or theocracies, 
or indeed any kind of totalitarian form of government or 
social organisation. In other words, a political society 
is organically complex in that it is comprised of groups 
with various sectional interests, ideas and aims; and, 
more importantly, that this state of affairs has come to 
be recognised and represented within the procedures of 
government by some process of historical evolution or 
conscious and deliberate action. Characterised in this 
way, a political society or community is an ideal society 
capable of direct Aristotelian—like comparison with other 
possible forms of social organisaticn such as tyranny, 
oligarchy, and the more modern manifestations of dictator­
ship and totalitarianism. In practice, of course,.even 
the most dictatorial form of government will be subject 
to the pressures of other powerful sectional interests 
and to that extent there will be an interplay of interests 
which will be recognisable as political activity. The 
result is that, understood in terms of a comparison 
between practical states of affairs rather than ideal 
models, a political society may be said to express the 
political to the greatest degree. In ‘In Defence of 
Politics*, Bernard Crick characterises politics in these
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terms;
‘Politics arises from accepting the fact of the 
simultaneous existence of different groups, 
hence different interests and different 
traditions, within a territorial unit of 
common rule . ... But the establishing of
political order is not just any order at all; 
it marks the birth, or the recognition of 
freedom. For politics represents at least 
some tolerance of differing truths, some 
recognition that government is possible, 
indeed best conducted, amid the open 
canvassing of rival interests.* (2)
Crick introduces the notion of * freedom* with
some emphasis, but, as always, it needs careful
qualification (3)• It will be the case that if in the
government of any society account is to be taken of a
variety of interest-groups in the decision-making process,
then such groups must have the opportunity to express
their respective points of view; freedom of speech is
required. But government implies more than this.
Government is the process by which thought is translated
into decision, and decision into action. A government
whose function has degenerated into that of being only a
debating chamber has ceased to be a government in any
de facto sense, or, to put it another way, a debating
society is not a political community although the skills
of debate may be useful in the functioning of a political
community. The point is that where freedom of speech may
be held to be an absolute freedom in a political community,
the fact that decisions have to be made within some finite
time-scale, that actions have to be taken with greater or
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lesser urgency means that there will of necessity be 
procedural constraints to enable the practical business of 
government to continue. There will come a point at which 
the concept of * freedom* loses its force as an appropriate 
concept by which to judge the adequacy of particular 
political processes. It must not be forgotten that an 
important feature of a political society is that it is 
directed towards the taking of decisions and action, and 
this is a feature which it shares with other forms of 
government. Freedom is located in the political processes 
which precede decisions and action; the implementation of 
decisions may, in certain circumstances, justify..the use 
of force and in such a justification an appeal to ‘freedom* 
is likely, at best, to be indirect. The brute fact that 
rules and constraints will be necessary was recognised by
Mill when he stated;
‘All that makes existence valuable to anyone, 
depends on the enforcement of restraints upon 
the actions of other people. Some rules Cf 
of conduct, therefore, must be imposed, by 
law in the first place, and by opinion on 
many things which are not fit subjects for 
the operation of law.* (4)
While a consideration of ‘freedom* in principled cr ideal
terms will be appropriate in political discourse culminating
in the justification of specific laws, once such laws are
put into effect it is the actual consequences in the form
of the constraints affecting people*s irves which takes
priority over generalized theorising.
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The notion of ‘freedom* has, however, another 
defining application within politics. If a political 
community requires recognition of the interplay and means 
of conciliation of differing interests within society, 
then the community which allows, in principle, the 
expression of all interests will be the political community 
par excellence. To this end, the ideal political community 
will be that society which embodieiè the notion of citizen­
ship, that is, the particular concept of an individual who 
is the recipient of a determinate set of rights and duties 
in relation to the community of which he is a member.
Most individuals who are members of any state, including 
a pclitical society, governed in any conceivable way, will 
inevitably be subjects within their society in that they 
will be subject to a requirement to obey the specific laws 
or commends issuing from the government. The only 
exceptions will be those privileged members within some 
systems of government whose status or power will remove 
them from this subjection, usually the rulers themselves..
Citizenship is more than mere obedience, however; 
it requires the capacity to understand and accept the 
responsibilities of government. In his discussion of
citizenship, Aristotle states the point in emphatic terms: 
‘Ruling and obeying are two different things,
- but the good citizen ought to be capable of 
both; civic virtue consists in knowing how 
to govern like a freeman and how to obey , 
like a freeman.* (5)
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At the very least, Aristotle*s assertion implies an 
obligation on the individual to participate in the
procedures of government and to be informed on the principal
issues involved in proposed legislation, While the status 
of citizenship ccnfers on the individual the right to have 
his interests taken into account, and this brings with it 
the right to freedom of speech, it also implies that the 
good citizen is capable of making adequate judgments as to 
where the interests of the society as a whole lie. 
Furthermore, insofar as Aristotle recognises notions such 
as*ideal citizens* and ‘ideal ccnstitutions* the implication 
is present that citizenship carries with it not only the 
duty to maintain an existing political society, but that 
there is also a duty to improve or even bring into being
that state of affairs within which citizenship becomes
possible. The case supporting the conception of the 
political community as being a morally desirable society 
will be examined later in this study.
Aristotle‘s dictum also underlines the extent 
to which citizenship embodies functions which require 
skill - a ‘knowing-how‘ to achieve political results.
It is in these terms that citizenship of the highest 
order will be expressed in a knowledge of how to persuade 
men, how to manipulate the machinery of government, and 
how to order the affairs of the state provided that these 
qualities are allied to political wisdom. It is in this
-  33 -
sense that civic virtue, when it appears, is capable of
conceptually uniting the hitherto separate notions of the
ruler and the ruled.*
These are the characteristics which should imbue
those of a political community, and that political community
which most approaches this ideal will be that whose members
are citizens who clearly and demonstrably understand their
role (6). Given citizen-status so-defined it is not overly
persuasive to ascribe tc those who are active members of a
political society the status of free man - free in the
sense that although they are subjects, they are not only
subjects, but have some control over and responsibility
for the very laws by which they live. Professor Crick
expresses the point with aphoristic neatness:
‘Politics are the public actions of free men. 
Freedom is the privacy of men from public 
action.‘ (7)
* Although Aristotle argues that all offices of the state 
should be open to those who display the qualities of a 
‘good citizen*, in fact he envisages the rulers being drawn 
from a relatively small section of the citizenry: ‘Men of
good birth are more truly citizens than the low-born; and 
good birth is always esteemed in one*s own country.
Besides, men of good ancestry are likely to be better in 
themselves, for good birth implies goodness of one's whole 
stock,* (9)
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3. The concept of a political community requires
delimitation in respect of its position vis a vis other
societies which may have similar characteristics tc those
already discussed but which require exclusion on other
grounds. Michael Oakeshott*s notion of 'enterprise
associations* is pertinent in this respect (8). Briefly,
he argues that individuals associated in respect of their
pursuit of some satisfaction, whether it be real, wished
for, or imaginary, may be held to form a community of
interest which is teleological in character. Such aim-
directedness characterises associations such as tennis
clubs, religious sects, businesses and bureaucracies.
Members are bound in a relationship which is founded on
either an explicit or an implicit recognition of some
common purpose(s).
Oakeshott further distinguishes such relationships
by reference to the character of the decision-making process.
An enterprise association exists to fulfil some purpose;
decision-making within such associations will be governed
by the extent to which possible courses of action may be
held to further the aim(s) of the association. Oakeshott
puts it as follows:
*An enterprise is a ‘policy*, and enterprise 
association is a ‘managerial* engagement; 
it is agents related to.one another in the 
substantive activity of choosing performances 
contingently connected with a common purpose 
or interest, or in their acknowledgement of 
such choices and performances as their own.*(lO)
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Because decisions are necessarily related to the aim or 
purpose of the association such decisions have the 
character of being ‘managerial*, the criteria for their 
success or failure, correctness or otherwise, efficiency 
or lack of it being determined by the contingent success 
or otherwise in furthering the association's aims.
Oakeshott makes the further observation which is 
particularly significant to this enquiry that authority 
within enterprise associations is largely a voluntary 
matter in that the individual usually joins such an 
association because its aims are of some interest and 
importance to him and he sees the association as a useful 
means of furthering that interest. The implication is 
that as membership of the association is voluntary the 
individual knowingly understands and accepts the rules or 
constitution which underpins the authority structure within 
the association. In other words, individuals can join or 
resign from enterprise associations and, if needs be, the 
claims of authority on the actions of the individual can 
be rejected by the simple expedient of leaving the 
organisation.
The delimitation of a political community, on 
the other hand, is subject to a different set of criteria, 
Even though there are many contingencies which could bring 
about or have brought about the institution of political 
communities of one kind or another, it is still possible 
to offer a model with characteristics sharp enough to 
distinguish it from association by enterprise.
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First of all, in so far as politics is necessarily 
concerned with government it will embrace all who are 
subject to the government in any given case, whatever form 
the government takes (it may be, for example, a democracy). 
In the contemporary world of nation states this will usually 
also involve a territorial demarcation but this is not a 
necessary condition as it is possible to envisage situations 
in which jurisdiction over the actions of an individual is 
not necessarily accompanied by territorial «claims. (ll)
In these conditions it is clear that membership 
cannot be characterised as voluntary as was the case with 
enterprise associations. The most usual mode of belonging 
to a political community will be by virtue of being born 
into it. This suggests that the political nature of a 
given society will be intimately embedded in those 
characteristics which give the society and its culture an 
identifiable form. This aspect will be explored later, 
for the moment it is enough to argue that membership is 
not based on a voluntary act of association based, in turn, 
on an agreed or supposed identity of interest or aim.
Rather, the individual finds himself a member of a 
political community or not depending on the accident of 
birth. Also, while it is true that individuals may leave 
such a society and obtain membership of another (usually 
by becoming a subject of another state), the existence 
and continuity of a political society does not depend on 
this sum of voluntary acts cf agreement. Again, a 
political community, as with a society subject to any 
other form of government, will contain members whose
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continued association is not nullified by their disagreement 
with either the form of government which pertains or its 
actions. Indeed, in a political community discontent 
with the current state of that society will tend to fuel 
the dynamism for even greater participation in the political 
community with a view to engendering change. Discontent 
or disagreement and the dynamism it promotes are necessarily 
dependent on those involved perceiving themselves as being 
agents for change within the framework offered by the 
political community and committed by virtue of their status 
as citizens to the idea of the community itself.
Of even greater significance is the open-ended 
nature of the political community when its supposed 
teleological status is considered. Enterprise associations 
have discernible ends in view, but a political community 
has no end beyond being a condition which is considered of 
value as an end in itself. Attempts to ascribe to political 
society an aim—directed function are weak in that such 
suggested ends are of an extremely general nature: examples
are the preservation of society or the good of society or 
the promotion of stability and order. But not only are such 
ascribed aims weak, they are not convincing. It may not be 
likely, but given the appropriate circumstances it would 
be neither absurd nor self-contradictory for a political 
community to decide to dissolve itself in favour of some 
other form of government, or to terminate itself by capitula­
tion to some more powerful force, or for order and stability 
to take second place to the pursuit and demonstration of 
political interests. In each case it is the activity of
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politics which is the direct precursor to the states of 
affairs which are each inimical to the examples of possible 
aims.
The distinction may be pressed even further. 
Whereas enterprise association is defined in terms of its 
aim(s), the aim at any given moment of a political society 
will either be contingent on circumstances or may be subject 
to definition by the political society itself. Not only 
the possible means of dealing with problems but how the 
problems are seen or even what counts as a problem will be 
subject to the values, interests, ideologies and historical 
perspective of the constituents of the political community 
itself. For example, changes in the procedures of political 
communities may be proposed and held to be of over-riding 
importance even though there is no compelling state of 
affairs which demands that the procedures be reformed.
There is no discernible goal for a political community 
beyond the value which society places on politics and 
which gives a political community its raison d'etre.
4, The foregoing distinctions carry sufficient
force not only to allow the notion of a political community 
to be distinguished from that of an enterprise association, 
but also allow the notion of a political community to be 
demarcated from other forms of government which are 
inimical to politics defined in terms of citizenship, open 
dialectic and agreed procedures for the resolution of 
conflicts. Dictatorships and other forms of totalitarian 
rule will, of course, share many of the features of a 
political community as outlined above. The necessary
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attribute of government remains as does the general 
conditions of membership. However, such forms of 
political organisation share features more readily 
associated with enterprise associations in that the 
response to problems will not be subject to any kind of 
public scrutiny or accountability, and as a result will 
resemble the essentially managerial forms of decision- 
making typical of enterprise associations. There is the 
constant danger that even a political community will 
degenerate into a managerial society if the community 
itself is not vigilant in protecting its rights and 
responsibilities and if the government fails to perceive 
its political function and conceives of itself as fulfilling 
a managerial role. In extreme forms of totalitarianism, 
rulers may even ascribe to the state a pre-eminent purpose — 
probably, in one form or another, the notion of having a 
pre-ordained mission to rule or convert has been most 
common historically. Even in less aggressive governments 
the establishment of social priorities, the identification 
of problems, and the procedures of rule will be subject to 
the perceptions and ambitions of, at best, a relatively 
small number of individuals. The smaller the group 
concerned with the decision—making process the more 
vestigial will be the claim it has to being considered 
as a political community. In fact, while such forms of 
government cannot be identified in their entirety with 
enterprise association, they can with more accuracy be 
described as managerial forms of government.
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5. Having delimited, the political community with
respect to other groupings within society, it is now 
possible to examine in more detail the character of the 
rules which distinguish politics as being a peculiar mode 
of human association and discourse. If it is accepted 
that the political community is rule—governed then the 
relationship between such a community's discourse and 
one rule—governed situation in particular is obvious. 
Political communityis intimately and necessarily concerned 
with the production of rules, rules which relate one way 
or another with the business of government. From this 
perspective the political community is the source of rules. 
It is possible to categorise such rules although any 
categorisation will be provisional in that it is based on 
an abstraction from current and past practice and is 
contingent on practical developments.
The first category of rules and, possibly, the 
most easily recognised in terms of every-day acquaintance, 
is what is known as 'law*. By law is indicated those 
rules which govern conduct in a society by defining what 
counts as legal or illegal actions, what counts as lawful 
or unlawful; in contradistinction, law is not that corpus 
of rules which specify the rightness or wrongness of 
conduct in a moral sense, neither does it specify what is 
proper or improper conduct in terms of manners or etiquette 
Law is concerned with the regulation of conduct in what 
can be broadly termed the public interest. For example, 
the criminal law may be styled as a category of law
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concerned with the negative public interest in that it is 
primarily proscriptive in its function.* Such a 
characterisation is sufficient for the present purpose 
and although other features of law will be the subject of 
comment it is not necessary to enter into the disputes 
concerning the nature of law.
One feature of law which is relevant to this 
enquiry is its general nature. Unlike a specific command 
which is addressed to a particular person and is exhausted 
by the act of compliance, law is not addressed (l2) to any 
one in particular, rather if defines categories of action 
which apply to anyone whose conduct falls within the 
relevant category. Neither is law exhausted by the 
fulfilment of any legal processes resulting from any 
particular action taken under a particular law; the law 
itself continues to stand even though its interpretation 
may be modified in the course of judgment being given in 
a particular case. Because law is general in these senses, 
political discourse concerned with the formation or 
alteration of law will be characterised by the same sense 
of generality.
* Notwithstanding the ambiguities which surround the 
notion of the 'public interest*, insofar as it is the 
function of the law to further the public interest, the 
extent to which it fulfils this function will be a 
criterion of the law's worth.
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It is also worth noticing at this stage that 
it is the law which, positivistically, defines the extent 
of the state in that the state is that territory which is 
subject to the jurisdiction of the law, and the stage is 
that population which is subject to its jurisdiction. 
Therefore the generality which is a defining characteristic 
of law is limited in its jurisdiction only the extent of 
the particular territory and population to which it applies. 
To put it another way, the state is a de facto association
f
■ on men, a necessary condition of which is a recognition of 
a common obligation to a corpus of law.
The second category of rules is closely related 
to that of law; however, its function within the state 
is of a sufficiently distinctive nature to support a claim 
for it to be considered as a separate category. The area 
indicated is that of the constitution and associated rules, 
conventions and practices which regulate and define the 
government of a state. Sovereign independent countries 
usually embody their constitutions in a single, written, 
codified document, cr a collection of related documents, 
which, in turn, are intimately enmeshed with the law of 
the country concerned. In Britain the situation is that 
there are statutes and declarations which regulate the 
system of government, such as Magna Carta or the Bill of 
Rights, but these and other sources of authority on 
constitutional practice are distinguished by the fact that 
they are not codified, per se. The distinction which 
exists between the law and the constitution is further 
emphasised by the fact that in Britain the constitution is
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manifested through a number of conventions, i.e., rules 
and practices which do not have the force of law but which 
enable the system cf government to work effectively.
Examples here would be the doctrine of Cabinet responsibility 
or acceptance that the Prime Minister should sit in the 
Commons, not the Lords. In practice, it can be seen that 
although a constitution may be considered to be part and 
parcel of the body of law of a particular country, there 
is no necessity for this to be so.
What is beyond doubt are the far-reaching 
consequences for everyone who is subject to a government 
when changes or amendments to the constitution are made. 
Unlike law which generates rules of one kind or another 
with which the individual may or may not find himself 
directly concerned, the constitution of a country affects, 
to some extent, everyone who is subject tc the jurisdiction 
of that state. In other words, constitutional change 
carries with it implications, in terms of application and 
effects, which for any individual is not merely the 
possibility of involvement, but the certainty of 
involvement. To that extent the discourse which 
characterises the political community will reflect this 
intensified generality when constitutional matters are the 
subject of such discussion (13).
The next category of rules is that area of govern­
mental concern which may be characterised as 'policy*.
Here, the concern is with executive action on matters 
such as the economy, defence, social services, education 
and so on. The formulation of law is not a necessary
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feature in these matters although new legislation may 
occasionally be required. There is a sense in which 
decision-making of this kind may approximate to the 
managerial mode discussed in connection with enterprise 
association (l4). What will characterise pclitical 
discourse concerned with non—legislative areas of 
legislative action will be a concern, often implicit, 
with that which is held to be in the public interest.
In spite of the fact that political discourse to do with 
policy is likely to be a mixture of contingent facts, 
future expectations, values and ideology, the element 
which is purely political is the insistent need for 
justification that the recommended course of action is 
beneficial to society generally, that it is in the public 
interest. It will be an indication of the maturity of a 
political community by the extent to which it can 
independently judge where the public interest actually lies 
as opposed to merely accepting the invocation of the notion 
of the tpublic interest* as a means to gain support for a 
particular course of action. Nonetheless, it is the implied 
generality of the admittedly obscure notion of the public 
interest which imbues and characterises both the discourse 
and the resulting policies in this category of political 
rule-making.
Finally, and briefly, there is that category of 
political rule-making which is, in Western democracies at 
any rate, least tangible and identifiable in positivistic 
terms: that is political concern with the propogation of
values and ideology. The rule-governed situation is that
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of social norms, and politics is the means by which the 
proponents of a given point of view seek to obtain some 
general acceptance within society at large. The importance 
of gaining an ascendency in this area where public opinion 
is concerned will obviously affect the extent to which 
changes in the law, the constitution or general policy 
gain a measure of public approval and, hence, effectiveness. 
Again, the characteristic which discourse of this kind will 
exhibit will be that of extreme generality of a persuasive 
quality derived from the heavily value—laden nature of the 
competing points of view. The rightness, say, of 
individualistic or collectivist ideologies as the governing 
rationales for changes in the law or innovations in policy 
will be recommended within political discourse as meriting 
adoption as fundamental and universal value positions.
This sketch of the categories of rule-governed 
situation which it is the province of the political 
community to produce is offered both to emphasise the 
fact that the mode of political association is what 
Michael Oakeshott described as essentially *rule^articulated 
association* (l5)j and to insist that the nature of the 
rules produced will clearly- affect the nature of the discourse 
which produces them. In particular, the character of 
generality which is present in each of the categories will, 
of necessity, characterise the language of political 
discourse from which the rules originate. But more is 
implied, particularly if the attributes of a political 
community discussed earlier are introduced as affecting and 
adding to the presence of * generality*.
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6, It has been argued that for a community to
warrant the epithet Apolitical* it must be a community of 
citizens with all that this means in terms of freedom 
and participation. So far, the notion of citizenship has 
only been lightly sketched; now more attention must be 
paid to it. If citizenship is to be differentiated from 
the state of being a subject on the grounds that a citizen 
is the recipient of rights and the inheritor of duties, 
then it is clear that citizenship is grounded in a legal 
state of affairs. Subjects within a state may be held to 
possess natural or human rights, moral or even customary 
rights; in none of these cases will the claim to rights 
be sufficient to establish a claim to citizenship. The 
citizen’s rights are enshrined in law which gives them the 
character of being substantive rights, not merely, as may 
be argued where other kinds of rights are involved, 
putative rights. To this extent, citizenship can be held 
to be a legal terrn^ capable of definition in terms of those 
rights and even those duties which are legally binding on 
the individual with that status. To posit citizenship in 
these terms is not to weaken the claim which any individual 
has to natural or moral rights; indeed, it is conceivable 
that an appeal to such rights may be made to widen the 
existing rights of citizenship. But to say this much is 
merely to emphasise the importance for citizenship to be 
based in substantive rights.
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But citizenship is more than a legal status; 
it has a moral and, of course, a political dimension.
The value placed on citizenship derives from the status 
it gives to an individual as a member of the political 
community, that is, the opportunity to participate in 
the decision-making processes of government either 
directly through participation in the procedures and 
machinery of government by being, for example, an elector 
or a politician, or indirectly, by simply taking advantage 
of the right to freedom of speech in a community which, 
ideally, is wedded to the principle that all interests 
should be taken into account before decisions are reached.
In other words, citizenship is the embodiment of the value 
placed on the individual as a participant in society, on 
the respect afforded to him as a legitimate source of 
interests within society, and the recipient,in real terms, 
that is legal terms, of these attributes of status within 
society^ In short, citizenship is a badge of respect, it 
proclaims the individual as being a member of a political 
community and worthy of respect as such.
7. ' But the implications of citizenship go further.
To be a citizen, to be a member of a political community 
is to be placed in a particular mode of social relationship 
to other members of that community. It is this mode which 
Oakeshott has explores in * On the Civil Condition*. He 
makes the point that civil association is not, as with 
enterprise association, engaged in for the procuring of 
either substantive satisfactions or purposes, but that it 
is a continuing relationship defined in terms of its
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practice and identified by its language:
*As a practice, the civil condition is an 
enactment of human beings; a continuous, 
not a once-and-for-all enactment. And 
what is enacted and continuously re-enacted 
is a vernacular language of civil under­
standing and intercourse; that is some 
historic version of what I have called 
the language of civility.* (l6)
Because it is a continuous mode of relationship which
individuals enter into as it respects what might be called
the political personhood of the individual, it is a mode
which will inevitably have a moral dimension. To begin
with, it is a mode of relationship which is permeated
with moral considerations in which both freedom and
equality figure (l7). Freedom emerges in that each
individual is held to be worthy of respect as a rational
being with interests, points of view and values ail worthy
of being taken into account and hence being a free agent
capable of reaching decisions rationally and entering
into the political process responsibly. It is the freedom,
to use an expression with Kantian overtones, to be a member
of a kingdom of ends, to be a co-determinant of the general
rules, policies and values of the community of which the
citizen is a member.
Implicit in this relationship is the assumption
of equality in terms of both status and consideration.
A community of citizens is of necessity a community of equals
if the interests of all are to be taken into account with
anything like equity. To recognise that within a given
community there are various interests which, if possible.
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have to be reconciled, within the decision-making process
is to recognise that there must be some principle of
equity which has to be introduced if the status of .the
citizen as a person worthy of respect for his political
views is not to be undermined. Aristotle recommends those
constitutions which rest * on a basis of equality and
likeness as between citizens* (l8) and argues,
uncompromisingly:
•Those forms of government which have regard 
to the common good are right constitutions, 
judged by the norm of absolute justice.
But those which take account only of the 
rulers* interest are all perversions, all 
deviation forms; they are despotic, whereas 
the state is a society of freemen.* (19)
In other words, in the ideal political community matters
should be decided by reference to the weight of good
reasons which underpin the various interests to be
accommodated and not by reference to such arbitrary
considerations as power, wealth, charisma or status.
Equality results not only from the conditions
of citizenship but from the nature of political discourse.
Attention has already been paid to the role of the political
community as a source of rules which fall into various
categories, and emphasis has been placed on the varying . ,
degrees of generality which attach to rules. It follows
that a necessary characteristic of political discourse
will be the extent to which it is continuously reflecting
an awareness of this generality. The citizen is a rule-
maker in a kingdom of ends and the language of politics
will be imbued with an implicit universality which embraces
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the whole, at least, of the political community in the 
scope of its arguments and conclusions. Further, to 
conceive of rules which are to apply not only to oneself 
but to all members of a community is necessarily to 
accept a real commitment to equality of status. To 
accept that all men are equal under the law is necessarily 
to imply that there must be equality of consideration in 
the framing of the rules. Whatever may be the private 
wealth or power or status of the individual, his status 
qua citizen is one of equality inter homines and political 
discourse will reflect this equality with respect to its 
rule-producing function.
8. Finally, political discourse will be characterised
by a regard for justice or fairness. Once more this stems 
from its generative function as a source of rules. Without 
embarking on a lengthy examination of the nature of 
justice, it is' sufficient for this enquiry to assert as 
self-evident that judgments concerning justice are the 
outcome of rule-governed situations of one kind or 
another whether it is the intuitive judgment of a child 
who complains of a lack of fairness in his treatment to 
the sophisticated structure of argument which culminates 
in the formulation of principles held to govern justice 
such as John Rawls has offered. Certainly the concept of 
legal justice pre-supposes a codified body of law which 
is operative within a society. It is also commonplace to 
note that judgments concerning justice are not only 
appropriate in terms of the operation or application of 
rules within society, but that the rules or laws are
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themselves open to judgment in these terms based on an 
appeal to a further set of principles or rules. In other 
words, the simple point which is being made is that when a 
community is concerned with the framing of laws, principles, 
values and policies, that community is intimately and 
necessarily concerned with the justice of these rules, 
laws etc.
This connection between justice and rule-governed 
situations of one kind or another within a political 
community is not only a logical and conceptual matter, but 
will also arise from the contingencies of life as a matter 
of practical necessity. Even if we admit the hypothesis 
of an ideal community, there is no need to carry the 
idealisation any further. Politics, whatever form it takes, 
will exist within the general forms of life of a society, 
and rules, laws and policies will have to be applied to 
people who vary morally, intellectually and physically and 
who vary in their economic and social circumstances.
Given the infinite variety of individual circumstances it 
will be inevitable that the application of any given rule 
to a given situation is likely to meet with a challenge 
based on the perceived justice of its application to that 
situation. Given both the practical and logical inter­
relationship between rule-governed behaviour and justice, 
it follows that, as before, this implication will find 
expression within and will tend to characterise the 
discourse of the rule-making, i.e. the political,community.
-However, given the ambiguities and contingencies 
which will cloud actual situations, whether political or 
not, the clear delineation of the logical and conceptual 
inter-relationships between the ideal model of a political 
community and the imperatives of justice and equality 
establishes a standpoint from which other actual communities 
may be subjected to critical scrutiny. It is even 
conceivable that the ideal model, insofar as it may be held 
to embody’Values and principles which permeate the life 
of the state, could be used as a vehicle to criticise the 
practices of non-political communities within the state.
Summary
The political community is characterised by its 
composition in that it is a community of citizens, free in 
terms of recognition of their individual worth as political 
agents, equal in status, qua citizens. Both the freedom 
and the equality are given additional weight by the status 
of citizenship being subject to definition in legal terms, 
that is, being the subject of specific rights and duties. 
Secondly, political community is association for no other 
purpose than that of governance to be understood 
particularly as the source of rules; the rule of law, 
constitution, policy and social norms. Thirdly, political 
community is characterised in terms of political discourse. 
In particular, the specific character of its discourse is 
a concern with rule-governed behaviour of the greatest 
generality possible within the state. The formation of 
rules with this degree of generality implies also equality
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of considération for all and a concern with justice.
These are the features which, it is maintained, differentiate 
political community from other possible modes of human 
association such as enterprise or moral association.
Itds within this context that authority has its place.
It is also timely to restate the point that in political 
philosophy it does not matter that there has never been a 
society which has worked purely in this way, it is through 
an understanding of the validity of an ideal model that 
understanding and criticism of the ambiguous goings-on of 
actual political societies is increased.
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Chapter 3 
Authority and the State
1. The notion of a * political community* in the
sense elaborated on in the previous chapter is a community 
of rule—makers bound together in a reflexive mode of 
association by conditions which are dictated by the language 
and logic of rule-making. Also, it has already been 
argued that authority emanates from rules insofar as 
authority means the right to command and any such right 
is located within some rule or system of rules. Rule­
making can therefore be seen as authority-producing and 
authority-legitimating insofar as the enforcement, 
arbitration and interpretation of rules has to be embodied 
in some one. It would also appear, although this will be 
challenged in due course, that the rules which are the 
outcome of the political process will have a special claim 
on the allegiance of the political community; the political 
community is alone responsible for the rules, it is a free 
association of meu bound together by a common realisation 
that their individual freedom is founded on the self- 
determined nature of the rules by which they live, and there 
is the further implication that where rules are found to be 
attended by unforeseen difficulties it is within the 
political community*s powers to change such rules.
Such an ideal model, as has been noted, is 
illustrative of the conditions which rule—making places 
upon men whose conception of and desire for freedom and 
justice is dependent on the establishing of a rule-ordered
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society. However, such a model is incomplete in that it 
relies on an essentially legalistically defined concept of 
a person as a citizen, and it misses completely another 
source of authority where rules are concerned, namely, 
society as a whole. Perhaps the case which most clearly 
exemplifies the area to be considered is that of Socrates 
and his attitude towards the state under whose laws he met 
his death. ¥e are not concerned at this stage with 
Socrates* actions which led to his trial and their 
implications concerning the grounds on which the individual 
may or may not dissent from and attempt to undermine the 
law, rather the relevant aspect is to do with the reasons 
why Socrates went to his death willingly acknowledging his 
allegiance to those very laws with which he appeared to be 
at odds. To put the matter in slightly different terms, 
the death of Socrates illustrates that it is possible to 
acknowledge the legitimacy of the authority of the law 
even though it is possible to dissent from the content of 
the law .
Now the model, as it has been presented so far, 
cannot accommodate the case of Socrates. In presenting a 
member of a political community as a contributor to a 
kingdom of ends there is the implication that the 
individual is autonomous in that he is the author or 
originator of interests, opinions and judgments which his 
privileged position as a citizen gives him right to express 
Secondly, there is the implication that the political 
community is to be regarded as no more than the sum of such 
individuals, and, hence, the only rules which have a call
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upon their allegiance are those in which they have had 
some hand in making. The model appears to be essentially 
individualistic and atomistic in its assumptions. These 
attributes are characteristic of the underlying pre­
suppositions of much English political philosophy from 
Thomas Hobbes onward, but the models which result tend to 
be deficient in that they do not sufficiently account for 
the phenomenon of authority as it emerges from that network 
of social relationships which goes beyond the purely 
political in the terms used so far. Such models may, in 
this context, be held to mark important stages in the 
development of a more deeply-based understanding of political 
authority.
That Socrates* sense of allegiance to the state 
transcends the objective and definable obligations and 
duties of citizenship as described so far will be demonstrated. 
The problem is as follows; why should the individual who 
is at odds with the laws of his society, and who knows that 
his actions will sooner or later bring him into conflict 
with the established authority, acknowledge that the claims 
of that society to try, judge and punish him are greater 
than the need to preserve his own life by whatever means 
are available (in Socrates* case, legally by the possibility 
of accepting banishment or illegally by escape to another 
city)? In the model of a political community presented 
so far, an obligation of this kind is not required. The 
rational course for the individual who finds his society 
both uncongenial and dangerous would be to leave it; the 
obligation to obey the law exists while he chooses to remain
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a member of the political community, but escape or exile 
remain possibilities which, though inconvenient, are 
ethically and politically without taint. In other words, 
the claims of law on the members of a political community 
appear to have force only while the individual chooses to 
remain within the community. The propriety of any decision 
to stay or leave is essentially an area within which 
individual freedom of choice may be exercised; it is an 
area of decision-making which is delimited by the model 
as being of individual, not civil, concern, but when it 
comes to the propriety of decisions such as that of 
Socrates, the model is silent.
2. Before preceding to enquire into this area there
is one other feature of the model of a political community 
which needs to be clarified. So far, apart from noticing 
that the jurisdiction of the law is a defining characteristic 
of the state, nothing has been said about the relationship 
between the political community and any other, possibly 
wider, grouping or society of which the political community 
is either an aspect or a part. A difficulty arises in 
selecting the term to characterise this wider society as 
there are a number of possibilities which are not quite 
synonymous with each other. A.P. d*Entreves indicates
the nature of the problem;
* I have been deliberately ambiguous in using 
a modemword, * State* , to describe a 
condition of affairs which, to be precise,
Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and St. Augustine.... 
have quite different names; polis, res publics, 
civitas, regnum.* (l)
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There are also other possibilities such as * common'wea 1th* ,
* nation*; *country* or *people*. All these terms either 
have or have had. differing connotations either in that 
they signify differing social and governmental arrangements 
or in terms of the evaluative connotations with which they 
are used (2). To short-circuit the possibility of being 
involved in a lengthy analysis of all the neologisms 
indicated; it is proposed to take a short way with the 
problem and to follow d*Entreves by accepting that the 
term * state.* is to be adopted as the appropriate concept 
to be used in indicating the social context within which 
a political community may be embedded. By * state* is 
meant that population and territory which is finite in 
that it is subject to a system of law and to the will and 
authority of government. The state is also finite to the 
extent to which it is possible to discern a measure of 
social cohesion engendered by shared institutions, a 
willingness to defend itself, and a common, if tacit, 
commitment to maintaining the way of life which supports 
the wider cultural life of the people even where that 
cultural life is pluralistic. Features such as a common 
language, a common ethnic background or a common religion 
would be likely to strengthen the cohesion of the state 
but they cannot be necessary conditions of statehood.
The construction of an ideal model is dependent on 
conceptual and logical coherence but such coherence is 
bought too dearlyif its characteristics cease to bear any 
resemblance to the world of politics on which it is a 
commentary. In a world in which a plurality of language.
—  83 —
backgrounds and religions is the rule rather than the 
exception in statehood, such features must be contingent 
matters only.
The state is, therefore, the vehicle, so to speak, 
which carries the political community. In a perfect model, 
the state and the political community would be one and the 
same in the sense that the populations indicated by each 
terra would be identical. In practice, all states which may 
be considered to have a political community contain classes 
or groups which are not members of the community: in
classical Athens the political community was limited to 
the freemen - foreigners, slaves, women and children being 
excluded; and all modern states contain groups which are 
ineligible for the full status of citizenship such as 
children, convicted criminals and the insane.
3* : It is significant that when Socrates decides not
to try and escape from the death sentence hanging over him 
that the focus of his allegiance is to the state and not 
just the political community, per se. He personifies the 
laws and constitution of Athens as his imaginary inter­
locutor and judge and is himself apostrophized in the
following terms:
*Are you so wise as to have forgotten that compared 
with your mother and father and all the rest of 
your ancestors your country is something far 
more precious, more venerable, more precious, 
more sacred, and held in greater honour both 
among gods and among all reasonable men?
Do you not realise that you are even more bound 
to respect and placate the anger of your country 
than your father*s anger? That if you cannot 
persuade your country you must do whatever it
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orders, and patiently submit to any punishment 
that it imposes, whether it be flogging or 
imprisonment? And if it leads you out to war, 
to be wounded or killed, you must comply, and 
it is right that you should do so. You must 
not give way or retreat or abondon your position. 
Both in war and in the law courts and everywhere 
else you must do what your city and your country 
command or else persuade them in accordance with 
universal justice .,...* (3)
This passage from the Crito is remarkable for the •ategoric
mood in which Socrates states his position. It would
appear that Socrates is enunciating a principle something
like *My country, right or wrong* which if accepted without
qualification would underpin the authority of the state in
absolute terms. However, before examining the status of
any possible governing principle which the passage contains
it is first necessary to enquire into the source of
Socrates* allegiance.
Although it is the laws which are personified
above, as the argument develops it is clear that the object
of Socrates* obligation is wider than just the laws and
constitution. The appeal which is made, is made to * your
(Socrates*) city* and, more often, to * your country*.
The implication is that Socrates is expressing his
obligation not just to the laws of his city but to the
society as a whole within which the laws are embedded.
This society we will call the state.
There is the further suggestion that the
relationship between the individual and the state is to be
likened to that between a child and his parents. The
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parallel is present throughout the speech. The implication 
is that the obligation is born oiit of a condition of 
dependence based on the need for love, care and education 
as well as an acknowledgement of the superior wisdom and 
experience of the parent. It is a state of tutelage.
But useful though such an analogy is in highlighting the 
nature of the emotional ties which may bind the individual 
to the state, they do not supply a principled or rational 
framework within which to account for the individual's 
obligation. The relationship between parent and child 
is, essentially, not one of reciprocation in the sense that 
it is not a bargain. It is the responsibility of the parent 
to bring the child to adulthood, a pattern to be repeated 
in due course; but although there may well be a strong 
reciprocation of emotions during the period of childhood, 
there are no reciprocal duties which the child has accepted 
in return for the discharging of parental responsibilities.
In fact, Socrates attempts to extend the grounds 
on which obligation is based by introducing additional 
arguments :
* If you leave the city, Socrates, you shall 
return wrong for wrong and evil for evil, 
breaking your agreements and convenants with 
us, and injuring those whom you least ought 
to injure - yourself, your friends, your 
country, and us (the laws) ..... * (4)
Although there is a strong moral tenor to Socrates*
language here, the passage contains a mixture of moral
and legal arguments. However, they are all obscure.
In legal terms, the nature of the * agreements and covenants*
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to which Socrates is supposed to be party is not made 
clear, neither, in moral terms, is the nature of the 
wrongs, evils or injuries which Socrates* exile would 
incur. Yet although the arguments will not stand the test 
of detailed analysis, they are not to be dismissed as mere 
rhetoric. Undoubtedly, the strong sense of attachment to 
his native state is a sentiment which is readily recognisable 
in actuality. It is, for example, intimately related to 
the more easily identifiable notion of patriotism. If 
this much is allowed, then at least there would appear 
to be prima facie grounds for supposing that the relationship 
between the individual and the state has a moral, though 
subjective, character which contains within it a possible 
aspect of the state*s authority and the individual*s sense 
of obligation, and, as such, is worthy of examination.
4.  The significant feature of man*s relationship
to a wider society such as the state, which both Aristotle 
and Plato understood very well, is the extent to which y 
personhood is an achievement within the context of an 
existing society. How societies first came into being is 
not a question that is of importance here; what can be 
argued with conviction is that in the absence of society 
the individual will achieve the attributes of personhood 
only in a physical sense — morally, Emotionally, and 
intellectually he will remain undeveloped. In practical 
terms there are the documented examples of feral children 
which indicate how limited the development of personhood 
can be when children survive in such strange circumstances. 
Also, the implications of Wittgenstein *s demonstration(3)
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of language as a public activity underpins the need for the 
child to be born into a language community for it to learn 
how to speak and hence develop towards being a person in 
any meaningful sense. A congenital Robinson Crusoe would 
be little more than an animal in his actions.
It is also pertinent to point out that however 
those philosophers who postulated a state of nature are 
to be understood, it is self—contradictory to suggest that 
men who are and always have been divorced from any society 
can be good or evil, altruistic or acquistive, hostile 
or benevolent as these are concepts whose function as 
judgments on aspects of human behaviour require a social 
context for any kind of meaning to be possible. The 
* state of nature* functions as a potent metaphor whose 
meaning has to be elucidated or interpreted, it is not a 
description of an actual state of affairs because men, as 
the term is ordinarily understood, would not be men in 
such conditions.*
5 . The idea that the relationship between the
individual and the state is comparable, in some figurative 
sense, to that between child and parent, and that, moreover, 
it is a relationship to be understood in terms of moral 
considerations is strengthened both by the device of 
personification in the Crito and also in The Republic by 
the frequent comparisons made between the individual and
* It is of interest that Hobbes implicitly recognises 
this in *Leviathan', but by attributing to man the ability 
to learn to reason is then able to develop a theory of 
natural rights from such foundations.
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the state which carry the implication that the state, 
for Plato, is the individual writ large (6). The Republic 
contains, perhaps, the best known ideal model, but because 
it is grounded in unacceptable assumptions which are made 
concerning the nature and inheritance of human characteristics, 
and because the ultimately mystical nature of Platonic 
idealism presents too many difficulties, Plato*s ideal 
society is an inappropriate model within which to find 
elucidation of the source of social obligation of the kind 
expressed in the Crito.
What Socrates does express in the Crito in terms 
of a profound and categoric sense of moral obligation to 
the state is a spirit which finds its counterpart in thè 
Hegelian notion of *Sittlichkeit*. This is a notoriously 
difficult term to translate, but for the purposes of this 
study it is proposed to adopt that sense used by 
Charles Taylor in his sympathetic commentary on Hegelian 
philosophy *Hegel*. His extended interpretation is as 
follows :
*'Sittlichkeit* refers to the moral obligations 
I have to an ongoing community of which I am a 
part. These obligations are based on established 
norms and uses and this is why the etymological 
root in *Sitten* is importantibr Hegel's use.
The crucial characteristic of Sittlichkeit is 
that it enjoins us to bring about what already 
is. This is a paradoxical way of putting it, 
but in fact the common life which is the basis 
of my sittlich obligation is already there in 
existence. It is in virtue of it being an 
ongoing affair that I have these obligations; 
and my fulfilment of these obligations is what 
sustains it and keeps it in being.* (?)
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The presuppositions which give Sittlichkeit its 
substance are of the following order; first, the 
relationship between man and society is entirely reflexive.
The state does not exist for the individual nor the individual 
for the state, each is a necessary precondition of the other.
As has been argued, man only achieves personhood, individuality, 
through his participation in a society. To that extent we 
may endorse Marx's dictum that * It is not men's consciousness 
which determines their existence, but on the contrary their 
social existence which determines their consciousness* (8).
On the other hand, society is composed of individuals, but 
not individualsjwho have come together expressly for the 
purpose of creating a society r there is no overt 'contract*. 
Even those occasions in history on which constitutions 
have been adopted, such as the American Declaration of 
Independence, tend to mark what is merely a significant 
stage in a process of dynamic change. It is a formalisation 
of an already existing state of affairs, even though the 
formalising act itself may further that state of affairs.
In other words, societies or states do not come into 
existence like committees by virtue of an agreement between 
individuals, but rather as part and parcel of a process of 
historical evolution - they are the development of states 
of affairs inherited from previous societies. The complete 
mode of association between man and society is reflexive, 
it is a state of symbiosis in which each enriches the other.
Secondly, if it is accepted that the state is the 
most complete unit which comprises a self-sufficient reality 
within which the individual develops, it follows that the
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values, beliefs, assumptions, patterns of behaviour, 
response to ideal types, even standards of emotional 
response which find expression in the larger society will, 
in turn, be reflected in aspects of what can be called 
the personhood of the individual, that is, in his 
intellectual, emotional and even physical characteristics, 
in the values, beliefs and modes of conduct he adopts.
To posit this much is not to suggest that personhood is 
to be explained entirely in terms of social determinism; 
rather the weaker claim is made that human consciousness 
and behaviour will necessarily be influenced by the society 
within which the individual develops. Personhood is at 
least partly a matter of social conditioning.
It also follows that the more homogeneous a 
society is in its social norms, beliefs, etc., the greater 
will be the likelihood that the individual will conform 
in both thought and action to the mores of the host 
society in a direct and observable manner. What is more, 
this propensity to comply with the existing social mores, 
what Bertrand de Jouvenal calls *otherdom*, will usually 
be considered to be a social virtue in that the individual 
who complies will not be seen as a threat. Such a general 
judgment on individual conduct will inevitably strengthen 
the de facto exercise of authority. This is more likely 
to be the case in, say, a remote and primitive tribal 
society than in a more pluralistic modern industrial 
state in which it may be more difficult to trace the 
particular influences which help to shape the conscious­
ness and behaviour of a given individual. To say this
91
much is not to diminish the effect of social conditioning
on the individual, it merely makes it more difficult to
observe and analyse, de Jouvenal makes the point in
these terms:
'Each man's character is very much his own; 
it is not given once for all but grows up 
as the fruit of his confrontation with 
Otherdom and consultation with himself.
But we do reasonably expect a man of a 
given society, of a given standing of 
occupying a given office, to display the 
character pertaining to this society, 
standing or office.* (9)
One qualification which should be mentioned 
at this stage is that the society or state within which 
there is a plurality of languages, beliefs and customs 
does have implications for the development of autonomy 
in the individual which will be explored when the claims 
of the autonomous person with respect to authority are 
considered. The present concern is with the nature of 
the relationship of the individual to the state.
6. So far, the description offered has been couched
in quasi-psychologica1 and sociological terms. In order 
to extend the explanatory power of the philosophical 
model into this area it is desirable to transpose those 
features of the relationship into* a more acceptable 
philosophical language. This can be achieved by positing 
the relationship in terms of rule-governed situations.
In so far as human behaviour is intelligible it may be 
held to be rule—governed in the weak sense argued by 
Professor Minch in his essay *The Idea of a Social Science*
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in which he suggests that where explanations of conduct 
are available, no matter how weak they be in terms of the 
treasons* offered, the conduct in question can be 
characterised as being intelligible and on the basis of 
this judgment of intelligibility, * rule-governed*,
Winch concludes *1 have claimed that the analysis of 
all behaviour which is meaningful (therefore all 
specifically human behaviour) is ipso facto rule-governed.*
(lO) It follows that the greater the extent to which 
conduct is influenced by the existence of a specific 
rule, law or custom, the stronger will be the sense in 
which the nature of the rule—governed situation may be 
understood.
If personhood is to be, partly at least, 
understood as an achievement engendered by interaction 
with a society or state, it follows that the individual 
may be understood to that extent as an extension of the 
complex of rule-governed situations present within the 
state. For example, in that the language spoken by the 
individual is that which he learns by being reared in 
the state, it can be held that insofar as language-use 
is an aspect of personhood it is attributable to a 
definable rule-governed situation to be identified and 
located within a finite population. The same can be 
held for the more obviously normative facets of an 
individual*s beliefs and behaviour. It is likely that 
the range and content of the individual*s moral 
perceptions, for example, will be heavily influenced by 
those pertaining to his own society, and, again, this
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relevant aspect of personhood is at least partly to be 
understood in terms of his participation in a pre-existing 
rule-governed situation.
7« The existence of a moral perspective and
content within the state and, hence, within the individual 
is particularly significant in understanding the 
individual's Sittlichkeit. In the first place the quasi— 
legal notion of being obligated which results from an 
acceptance of contract theory on the grounds that its 
explanatory power is vitiated by the inherent implausibility 
of that account. If that approach is discounted, it 
becomes possible to postulate that without a moral 
dimension the relationship between individual and state 
would be one of either self-interest or fear. The only 
bond would be that of maintaining that the association 
is preferable to the consequences of dissolving or 
challenging the association. Also, it is the case that 
the notion of * being obligated* itself has a moral 
component built into it unless this is cancelled by some 
specific qualification.* * Obligation *, which throughout 
this work is used in the sense of *being obligated* not
* In *The Merchant of Venice*, Antonio is legally 
obligated to submit to Shylock*s knife. There can be 
no moral obligation to lend oneself to a morally monstrous 
act. In such a case the obligation requires the limiting 
epithet * legal* to nullify the moral component . The 
nature of Antonio*s obligation to the laws of Venice is 
another matter — the matter which is one of the prime 
concerns of this work.
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the more ambiguous *being obliged*, implies * legitimacy* 
or *rightfulness*; it is not only *that which is owed*
but *that which is rightfully or legitimately owed*.
However, the argument developed in the previous 
section that the moral development of the individual is 
likely to be largely dependent on the extent to which the 
state itself is expressive of a moral language and 
perspective does not, in itself, explain why the individual 
should possess a sense of obligation to the state or accept
that the state has any kind of moral authority in its claim
to his obedience. The difficulty is embedded in the nature
of morality itself which is centrally concerned with 
problems of conduct between individuals; morality is 
characteristically personal and inter-personal. Where the 
association is between the individual and an organisation 
of one kind or another, problems of a specifically moral 
nature are unlikely to arise unless the individual or the 
organisation has entered into some specific contractual 
obligation which by its very nature contains a moral 
element. In other words, where the individual is in 
association with largely impersonal groupings within 
society there is a loosening of the requirement to construe 
the relationship in actual or potential moral terms. If 
this is the case with organisations within society, then 
the lack of a moral dimension is likely to be even 
greater where the association with the state is concerned, 
particularly if the possibility of a * contract* between 
individual and state is discounted.
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The problem needs to be stated clearly. Moral 
obligation is transactional in character; that is, it 
is indicative of a relationship, most usually between two 
individuals, when one party to the transaction is held 
to owe something or some service to the other party not 
in terms of a legal commitment but in terms of the trans­
action falling under some relevant moral rule or principle. 
Moral obligations may be held to obtain, albeit more 
problematically, between individuals and organisations, 
between organisations and individuals, and between 
organisations. It can be seen that moral obligation 
entails that there be a recipient or object of the . 
obligation. Between individuals it is the moral status 
of the object as being worthy of respect which contributes 
to the moral character of the obligation, e.g., a promise, 
say, to meet someone at an agreed time and place derives 
its specifically moral character partly from the recognition 
that the promisecis worthy of consideration as a matter 
of moral principle, and that to break the promise is to 
demonstrate an instrumental attitude to others.
The difficulty is that the state, as with any 
other largely impersonal organisation, is not recognisable 
as an entity worthy of such respect. Respect for persons 
is born of a recognition that to claim rights for one is 
to acknowledge the validity of a claim to similar rights 
for all. But the state is not another individual in spite 
of the popular personification of it as the (motherland* 
or the (fatherland*; it is not even the sum of all its 
constituent individuals; it is a social unity with all
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that is implied in terms of government, institutions, 
procedures, laws, customs and traditions. The state is a 
polymorphous concept.
Finally the problem is compounded by the fact 
that the nature of the obligation involved is not of a 
kind which can be discharged in any one particular act; 
the obligation is to accept the authority of the state 
as a continuing claim on the actions of the individual 
even to the extent of acknowledging the state*s authority 
in matters of life and death.
8. The first stage in the resolution of this
problem is to return to the notion of Sittlichkeit, the 
moral obligation which the individual has towards the 
state. In his interpretation of the concept, Professor 
Taylor also notes the adjunct to this which is that the 
obligation is to * an ongoing community of which I am a 
part*; that is, the moral obligation is not to bring 
about a state of affairs which is demanded by the imperative 
element in the use of the concept * ought* characteristic 
of Kantian personal morality, rather the obligation in 
Sittlichkeit is towards the maintenance of an existing 
state of affairs, viz., the larger community life of the 
state. Hegel, in fact, distinguishes the two kinds of 
morality by making use of two separate terms; Sittlichkeit, 
the meaning of which has been discussed, and Moralit#at 
which is to be identified with personal ethics. The 
confusion which in English is unavoidable because the 
epithet *moral* is used in both senses is, to a certain 
extent, avoided in German usage. In *Hegel*s Theory of
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the Modern State*, Shlomo Avineri suggests that in one 
of his early unpublishedworks Hegel defines Sittlichkeit 
as * the identification of the individual with the totality 
of his social life* (ll). The use of *identification* 
neatly sidesteps the difficulty caused by the introduction 
of * moral* but it is doubtful if it solves the problem 
entirely as obligation is still implied with all its moral 
overtones, and in *The Philosophy of Right* Hegel equates 
Sittlichkeit with * ethical life* (12) which underlines 
the moral dimension.
To compare explicitly the two categories of 
meaning, it can be held that where Moralitjâ'at is concerned 
it is the atomistic individual which is emphasised 
concerned to bring about that which ought to be in terms 
of his moral perspective; Sittlichkeit recognises the 
social nature of man by positing the nature of his 
obligation to the ongoing society to which he owes his 
personhood. Hegel implies a further distinction between 
the vacuous formalism of Kantian morality and the real 
content of Sittlichkeit as it is to be identified in the 
life of the state. Such apdistinction is too extreme in 
that it can be held that Kantian ethics are to be under­
stood as more than merely producing formal principles, 
and, particularly in modern societies, that which 
constitutes the life of the state may be difficult to 
identify without encountering contradictions and ambiguities. 
Nonetheless the distinction which resolves itself into a 
duty to bring about that—which—ought-to-be as opposed to 
a duty to that-which-is is valid and significant.
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Where Moralitaat and Sittlichkeit converge is 
in the subjective element within the individual which 
informs the rational perspective of his situation and 
requires fulfilment of the moral obligation of each.
This requirement is discarded or negated only at the cost 
of personhood or humanity; extreme cases would be the 
psycopathic state of the man without a sense of Moralitaat, 
and the desolate alienation of the man devoid of Sittlichkeit.
9. Before attempting to characterise what might
appear to be the more subjective element in the individual's 
obligation to the state, it is necessary to examine the 
difficulty created by the conceptual entailment that just 
as authority must have a subject so obligation must have 
an object. So far, the object of obligation or, in this
respect, the embodiment of authority, has simply been
characterised as the state both as a formal definition 
in terms of laws, constitution and governaunce, and in 
terms of it as a way of life. If the state, like Athens,
were small, homogeneous and clearly defined, the object
of Sittlichkeit becomes intelligible as an identifiable 
entity. A modern state will rarely meet these conditions 
and a plurality of beliefs, customs, languages and ethnic 
backgrounds is likely to be the rule. In such an amorphous 
and possibly contradictory set of conditions and states 
of affairs the objectification of authority or obligation 
is too diffuse to be intelligible in positivistic terms.
Of course, the option open to Hobbes* sovereign, who is 
the fountain-head of all authority, to personify the state 
in terms of himself as enunciated by Louis XIV, *L*etat, 
c*est moi*, is not available to the model presented here.
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In strict Hegelian terms, the difficulty could 
be resolved, at least partly, by interpreting him as 
allowing to the state what might be called personified 
status in that he attributes to the state Spirit or Geist. 
With the introduction of Geist a considerable difficulty 
arises as Hegel*s arguments which intend to show the 
ontological necessity of Cosmic Spirit both as positing 
the universe and being embodied in the state are of a 
complexity which defies any brief rehearsal. Moreover, 
although the metaphysic of Geist with its theological 
background is necessary for the symmetry and cohesion 
of Hegel*s model of the state, by its very nature it is 
the most contestable part of his political philosophy; 
also, as this study is not predicated on purely Hegelian 
presuppositions, it is neither necessary to endorse nor 
to accommodate the metaphysic.
Of greater significance to this work is another 
Hegelian notion, that of Volksgeist or national mind, 
interpreted by Charles Taylor as * the spirit of a people, 
whose ideas are expressed in their common institutions, 
by which they define their identity.* (l3) Volksgeist 
is intelligible in that what is indicated is what is 
often called the national character of a country expressed 
through its culture and institutions. Just as it is 
intelligible enough to differentiate the national character 
of militaristic Sparta from the democratic and intellectual 
spirit of Athens, so the Volksgeist of the United States 
of America as expressed through notions like * the American 
way of life * can be differentiated from that of the 
U.S.S.R. or France or Iraq or Mexico.
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The nature of the constituent elements in the 
Volksgeist of a particular state are objective in that 
they are to be identified in terms of the prevailing 
features, institutions and ideals by reference to which 
individuals define their sense of identification with 
the state. That such features are singled out in the 
consciousness of individuals as being significant in 
this respect does not detract from their objectivity 
although it may make for difficulty in establishing them 
with precision. What will characterise these objects of 
consciousness will be their generality, i.e., they will 
be held to be pervasive in that they will not just be 
the opinion of any given individual, but will be, so to 
speak, common property in that there will be a measure of 
general recognition. An awareness close to pride in the 
special nature of the countryside, attitudes to food and 
wine, the republican tradition, and the superiority of 
its intellectual life may be aspects of the French 
Volksgeist even though there may be individuals or even 
groups to whom any or all of these mean nothing.
The idea of patriotism, for example, is an 
expression of the individual's sense of Volksgeist, an 
acknowledgement of the bond between individual and state 
in which the state is conceived of, not in terms of any 
one feature such as government or even constitution, but 
in terms of a sense of identity. Hegel conceives of 
patriotism as follows;
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*The sentiment is., in general, trust (which 
may pass over into a greater or lesser degree 
of educated insight), or the consciousness 
that my interest, both subjective and particular, 
is contained and preserved in another's (i.e. in 
the state's) interest and end, i.e., in the 
other's relation to me as an individual.' (l4)
The introduction of the notion of 'trust' into the analysis
is significant. It has already been argued (in section 5)
that there will be a propensity on the part of the
individual to comply with the social mores of his native
society. This propensity will be reinforced by the extent
to which such compliance is perceived as a virtue, it isPi', ,
also a propensity which will act in favour of the state's 
authority - that is, so long as the trust is retained.
The trust of a populace can significantly strengthen a 
government's claim to legitimacy; by the same token, a 
loss or withdrawal of trust can undermine that same 
legitimacy.
The factors which influence individual conduct 
in these terms derive from the inter-relationship between 
the personhood of the individual and his native society.
It is upon this foundation that the notions of Sittlichkeit 
and Volksgeist are built. Volksgeist represents the terms 
in which the individual recognises this relationship 
between himself, as a person with a specific identity, 
and the state, the source of that identity, in part at 
least. It is this sharing of identity which informs the 
individual's Sittlichkeit, the subjective sense of 
obligation that the individual has to his native society - 
a sense of obligation which is strengthened, where it
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exists, by the extent to which it subsumes an element of 
trust founded, in turn, in a community of identity and 
interest. What is more, it is in these terms that 
Socrates* sense of moral obligation to the laws and 
constitution of Athens becomes intelligible and is only 
partially expressed through the metaphor of family 
relationships, because it is more than this. The 
obligation arises, most fundamentally, fromihe extent to 
which the individual, either tacitly or consciously, 
recognises a subjective obligation on his part to 
contribute to and support that state of affairs, viz., 
the state, which is, in part, the source of his own 
identity. It is the implicit sense of 'rightness* in 
this sentiment which imparts to it its moral complexion, 
although, as Hegel rightly distinguishes, it is a moral 
sense peculiarly conceived of in terms of maintaining 
that which is, rather that bringing about that which 
ought to be. Although this by no means exhausts the 
investigation of the relationship between state and 
individual, it is in the terms outlined above that the 
notion of Sittlichkeit finds expression.
Summary
In this chapter the concern has been to extend 
the model of the individual and his relationship with the 
political community into the character of his relationship 
with the wider society of which the political community 
may be only a part. In other words, it is the nature of
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the individual's obligation to and implicit acceptance 
of the authority of the state as a whole which is 
examined. To this end, the rationale underlying Socrates* 
acceptance of the death penalty has been analysed as 
focusing attention on the individual's relationship with 
the state. In the course of this analysis, the Hegelian 
notions of Sittlichkeit and Volksgeist have been 
introduced as concepts which have explanatory power both 
with regard to the nature of the individual's obligation 
and the object of his obligation in social terms. Of 
particular importance to this work, the argument has 
been endorsed that individuality or personhood is to be 
understood, partly at least, in terms of being a social 
achievement where the individual is seen as an element 
in a reflexive rule&governed situation which embraces 
both him and the state. It is argued that the sentiment 
of Sittlichkeit arises from this relationship insofar 
as it is an acknowledgement by the individual of his 
debt to and trust in the society which shares its identity 
with him.
— io4 —
References
(1) d'Entreves, A.P. The Notion of the State, 196?,-
0 • U , P , , Oxf ord, p . 28 ,  , .
(2) ibid, pp. 33/4 d'Entreves comments on the reluctance
in Britain and America to use the word * state* , a
reluctance which is absent on the continent. -
(3) Plato *Crito* in The Collected Dialogues of Plato,
(Hamilton, E.-& Cairns, H. eds,), Princeton University
Press, Princeton, I96I, p. 36,
(4) ibid. p. 39.
(5) Wittgenstein, L, Philosophical Investigations,
Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1958, pp. 92e-95e* ,
(6) See, for example, 'The Republic', p. 637 ia the 
above bdition of The Collected Dialogues of Plato.
(7) Taylor, C . Hegel, C.U.P., Cambridge, 1975, p. 376.
(8) Marx, IC. Author's preface to 'A Contribution to 
the Critique of Political Economy* in Marx Engels, 
Selected Works, Vol. 1, Foreign Languages Publishing 
House, Moscow, I962, p. 363*
(9) de Jouvenal, B, The Pure Theory of Politics,
C.U.P., Cambridge, I963, p . 88.
(10) Winch, P. The Idea of a Social Science and its 
Relation to Philosophy, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. 
London and Henley, 1958, p. 52.
(11) Avineri, S. Hegel's Theory of the Modern State, 
C.U.P., Cambridge,-1972, p. 87.
(12) Hegel, G.W. Philosophy of Right, (Knox, T.M. trs.) 
C.U.P., New York, I967. p. IO3.
(13) op. cit. p. 387.
(14) op. cit. p. l64.
- 105 -
Chapter 4 
Obligation, Freedom and the Self
1. Of all the concepts central to the study of
political philosophy none is more treacherous than 
‘freedom* carrying with it, as it does, an emotive 
loading, an inherent ambiguity, and a propensity to 
persuasive definition. But it is the only concept which 
at all adequately catches the vital feature which lies 
at the heart of the individual's subjective sense of 
obligation to accept the authority of the state. The 
only corrective available is to make explicit at every 
stage the particular sense of 'freedom* which is being 
used.
It is helpful to open with some straightforward 
analytical comments on the meaning of 'freedom* as the 
concept is used in the context of political philosophy.
First of all, freedom is usually claimed in relation to 
the existence or absence of constraints. The constraints 
from which freedom is won or sought will be of a character 
amenable to human action; it is intelligible to talk of 
'freedom from want* or 'freedom from oppressive laws'; 
it is nonsensical to complain of the lack of a freedom 
to fly because humans do not have wings or because 
gravity obliges one to be earth-bound. Implicit in the 
linking of freedom with constraints are two notions;
(a) the freedom from constraints of one kind or another,what 
is termed the negative concept of freedom, and (b) the 
freedom to act in the way one chooses, the positive
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concept of freedom. The negative concept draws attention 
to the nature of the constraints which are complained of, 
that is, their justification is called into question; 
the positive concept emphasises the status of the 
individual not only as an adequate judge of which actions 
are in his own best interests but, ultimately, as the 
only one who has the right to make such choices (l).
The Janus-faced relationship between freedom 
and constraint leads to the so-called paradox of freedom 
which may be stated in the following way: as men are
less than perfect, a state of affairs which, left 
unregulated, would result in the domination of the weaker 
and more trusting by the stronger and more unscrupulous.
In other words, what may be a state of freedom for some 
would be likely to be one of servitude for the many.
It follows that in order to guarantee to all protection 
from the arbitrary interference of others, and so to 
guarantee to all a measure of freedom within which to 
pursue their own interests, a system of laws or rules is 
necessary. So it is that the conditions in which freedom 
to act become possible are bought at the price of accepting 
constraints of one kind or another — the apparent antithesis 
of that which is sought.
One of the assumptions on which this work is 
based is that the moral qualities of men are as various 
■as their physical and intellectual qualities. It follows 
that while the uniformly bleak Hobbesian psychology is 
rejected, the brute facts of life in terms of this moral
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diversity lead inescapably towards acceptance of the 
paradox as enshrining a principle expressing the conditions 
for individual freedom in society. This principle is that 
human freedom is the outcome of a rule-governed situation.
It is the implications of this principle in its various 
social ? contexts to which we now turn.
2. The immediate context is that of the individual's
obligation to accept the authority of the state, a 
description of which was offered in the previous chapter.
The problem now is to account for the subjective will to 
accept the state's authority as exemplified by Socrates* 
quietistic acceptance of the death sentence. To put the 
matter in different terms, the matter to be explored is 
the ontological basis of Sittlichkeit, and to offer a 
philosophical, not psychological, explanation.
To this end a more developed concept of person­
hood than that so far offered is required. The starting 
point is the assumption that the individual is to be 
understood in terms of his personhood being partly 
attributable to the society in which he is a member.
The concept of personhood adopted here is one which 
departs from the traditional reductionist model in which 
it becomes isolated as a single attribute such as 
'rationality' or 'reason* which, it is argued, distinguishes 
man from the animal world. Such * testimonia1-notions*(2) 
are inadequate in that, among a number of possible 
criticisms, they do not do justice to the real complexity 
of human personhood or to the variety of content within 
which rationality itself is evidenced. Instead, we may
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view personhood in terms of individuality as a 'notion 
(which) is much more than that of an assertive point of 
view; of judgments, appraisals, intentions and decisions 
that shape events.* (3) The contente of such judgments, 
appraisals, etc. being informed by the mores of the 
society or state within which the invididual lives.
The concession which may be granted to a 
reductionist viewpoint is to characterise the individual 
in terms of 'subjective will*. Even this concept is 
indicative of complexity rather than simplicity. In 
the first place, it implies rational self-awareness; 
but rational self-awareness is a concept akin to the 
Kantian 'rational will* in which the ego is positied as 
being aware of itself only in the purely formal terms 
appropriate to the criteria of logical consistency and 
universality. In other words, it is a notion not only 
of mind disembodied, but it is a concept of mind devoid 
of content other than formal criteria and aware of 
itself only in these terms.
But subjective will is to be taken as a concept 
indicative of real people, actual or prospective citizens, 
the populations of states. To be conceived of in these 
terms the subjective will must be determinate, that is, 
it must have embodiment both in terms of the particularity 
of personhood and of rational content. By particularity 
is meant that self awareness which is based in personhood 
realised in terms of historical moments: that whatever
judgments, appraisals, intentions and decisions are made 
are themselves the outcome of previous states of affairs
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in which the continuity is expressed by the formation 
of dispositions, traits, habits and assumptions. Further, 
the assumption of subjective particularity is necessitated 
by the awareness of that which is objective, i.e., that 
which is not—ego and which will include the perception 
of other subjective wills as particularities. So it can 
be argued that the finite subjective will is itself the 
product of its position vis-a-vis other finite particular­
ities. By rational will is meant that the purely formal 
notion of Kantian rational will is fleshed—out in terms 
of the specific judgments within which the logical and 
universal find expression. Those judgments characteristic 
of rational will would be the implicitly universe listic 
moral judgments and the explicitly universelistio, at 
least relative to the state, political judgments.
Personhood conceived of as subjective will is 
therefore analysed into qualities of mind yielding two 
categories of experience: that which is assertive and
is centred on, and is an outcome of self-consciousness; 
and that which is other—directed in that it is rationality 
focused on what may be called objective ends. These 
categories are not mutually exclusive but are, rather, 
categories indicative of stresses of interest — the former 
mainly concerned with the satisfaction of self, the latter 
more concerned with making judgments in which ego— 
consciousness is necessarily a subordinate matter. In 
each category the element of self is present, in each 
category rational capacities will be brought to bear, 
but the distinction indicated remains.
- 110 -
Such a description, as it stands, is compatible 
with Kantian rational autonomy where the individual's 
position as originator and judge of right actions is 
informed by formal, rational criteria. Where the 
description departs from the Kantian conception of autonomy 
is in the insistence that the individual is at least partly 
to be understood in terms of social determinism to the 
extent that the categories are not purely formal in 
character. The conception of the particularity of self­
hood, and the rational appraisal of otherhood involving 
universality, are themselves the products of mind which 
is informed by the mores of society and, as such, may 
be said to have its origin in society or state. The terms 
in which the ego is the object of self-awareness and the 
nature of the relationship between self and otherness, 
as well as the terms in which that which is other or 
objective is understood will all be products of the social 
dimension within which the self has existence. Put in 
these terms, the formal Kantian rational criteria are 
transposed into abstractions from what is:known or 
understood in experience rather than being a priori 
categories applicable to understanding and experience.
An example of the way in which a difference in 
social mores can affect the individual's apperception and 
social pereception is provided by Hegel in one of his 
early works in which he suggests that;
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*As free men the Greeks and Romans obeyed laws 
laid down by themselves, obeyed men whom they 
had themselves appointed to office, waged wars 
on which they themselves had decided, gave 
their property, exhausted their passions, and 
sacrificed their lives by thousands for an end 
which was their own. They neither learned nor 
taught (a moral system) but evinced by their 
own actions the moral maxims which they could 
call their very own. In public as well as in 
private and domestic life, every individual was 
a free man, one who lived by his own laws.
The idea of his country or his state was the 
invisible and higher reality for which he 
strove, which impelled him to effort .....
Only in moments,of inactivity or lethargy 
could he feel the growing strength of a purely 
self—regarding wish.* (4)
This passage;;.is particularly interesting because it is
open to two interpretations. In the Hegelian view, life
in the ancient world was characterised by the extent to
which * the body politic lived in every individual's
consciousness and in the collective imagination* (5)«
In such a milieu, Kantian autonomy has no place and must
wait its turn on the advent of social developments in
which a more developed and radical sense of individuality
has its place. Hegel held that the historical ascendency
of Christianity provided the decisive element within which
such a change in self-consciousness could take place,
Hegel's example is pertinent in that it illustrates the
nature of possible paradigmatic revolutions in the nature
of consciousness and self—consciousness which are required
to achieve the incorporation of radical autonomy into the
world.
- 112
On the other hand, there is a sense in which 
the model presented by Hegel could be held to represent 
a society in which the Kantian ideal is. already realised. 
The Kantian notion of the categorical imperative proposes 
that man can achieve freedom by forsaking prejudice and 
appetite to realise his duty in the light of pure reason. 
The implication is that the categorical imperative is 
required as a criterion of right judgments and right 
action because men are not purely rational beings - they 
are ignorant, or unenlightened, or the slaves of passion 
and desire. The assumption is that men do not know that 
which is right; hence the need for a criterion. But in 
the ancient world described by Hegel, the Greeks and the 
Romans were free men in these terms. They were the 
originators of their own laws, the laws were the embodiment 
of universality, and the authority of the laws was 
unquestioned.
What is missing from this second interpretation 
as far as both Kantian and Hegelian philosophies are 
concerned is a recognition of a conscious awareness of 
individuality which has to come to terms with a striving 
for the universal in both political and moral life.
What is missing from the first interpretation is a 
recognition that, as a matter of fact just such an 
awareness of individuality could exist at that time.
The example is, of course, that of Socrates. Even though 
Socrates eventually acknowledges his Sittlichkeit to 
Athens and through this his recognition of obligation 
to the universal, i.e., the laws, nonetheless he considers
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a variety of individualistic arguments which, if accepted,
would have saved his life. Perhaps, in this Hegelian
sense, Socrates has a claim to being the first Christian.
The likelihood is that Hegel overstates the
case. In terms of the categories of personhood adopted,
although the emphasis in the ancient world may have been
on the individual's other—directed responsibilities
towards his civic life, it is difficult to see how such
other-directedness could exist in the absence of, at
least, a vestigial self-awareness or ego-consciousness.
History may demonstrate the progressive development of
this aspect of personhood but its genesis is likely to
be found in pre-history not in Christianity.
3. The next important characteristic of the
subjective will to be considered is that of freedom.
There are, in fact, two concepts of freedom to be isolated
inithis context; these are the freedom of the will and
the freedom of action. The former is centred on the
subjective will of the individual, the latter on the
individual seen as a social and political agent. Once
more, categories of experience are offered in which the
distinctions will blur as the interdependence emerges.
First of all, consider the freedom of the will
qua will. Hegel puts it in these terms:
'The will contains the element of pure 
indeterminancy or that pure reflection 
of the ego into itself which involves the 
dissipation of every restriction and every 
content immediately presented by nature, by
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needs, desires, and impulses, or given and 
determined by any.means whatever. This is 
the unrestricted infinity of absolute 
abstraction or universality, the pure thought 
of oneself.* (6)
For Hegel, such a freedom is the 'freedom of the void'(7), 
negative freedom, freedom unconstrained and hence absolute 
in that its source is the ego, its^direction ego-determined ( 
and,hence, absolute in that its source is the ego, its^j 
direction ego-determined and subject to no restraint 
beyond the thinking which informs the will. It is such 
a concept of freedom which, if translated into action, 
can only be destructive and which, for Hegel, found 
expression in the revolutionary Terror of 1783/4. The 
reason is that it is entirely abstract, incapable of 
realising anything which would bring with it the require­
ment that a consideration of men and organisations be 
taken into account — it would then be forced into 
objectivity.
However, this account of the nature of the 
free will masks an ambiguity. This concerns the terms 
in which the act of willing is to be understood. Hegel 
appears to envisage the will as a priori in the sense 
that it is subject to no restriction founded in experience; 
it is the self conceived of in terms of pure rationality, 
something like a rational id in its destructive potentiality. 
The difficulty is that such a conception appears to be 
unintelligible. It is one thing to posit, as Kant does, 
the notion of pure reason as a priori categories, such as 
universality, which can be applied as criteria to the 
contents of consciousness. It is quite another, as Hegel
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appears to suggest, that the contents of consciousness 
can c'onsist of* the pure thought of oneself*. The level 
of abstraction required, for the state of * that pure 
reflection of the ego into itself* itself leads to the 
charge of vacuity.
On the other hand, it can be maintained that 
the necessary conditions for the freedom of the will are 
that the will is a thinking will and that the ends in 
view are informed by rationality and not merely by 
appetite. In other words, there is no freedom of the 
will where that which is willed is dictated by bodily 
or psychic contingency. The madman's thoughts may range 
far and wide but he has no freedom of will in any sense, 
and neither does the starving man whose thoughts are 
conditioned by his need. The will is free in the sense 
that that which is willed is not restricted by contingent 
features which effectively determine the content of the 
will. This much is consistent with the Hegelian view.
However, the view of the nature of personhood 
adopted in this work has stressed the extent to which 
personhood and its concomitant expression of rationality 
finds embodiment and intelligibility in social terms.
The self has to be understood not as an abstracted pure 
ego, but as the ego of a determinate individual with all 
which that implies; rationality and the will must have 
ends in view, that which is willed, and such an awareness 
of ends will be limited to some extent by the experiences 
of the individual and the cultural milieu in which he has 
been socialised. In other words, the notion of the will
116 -
which is adopted here is that, of the embodied will; it 
is will based in one person's judgment vis a vis another's.
However, the state of negative freedom does 
have significance in that it conceptualises intelligibly 
the notion of the will as being inherently freedom- 
seeking. Pure thought will be limited only by the extent 
to which thinking itself is either developed or rudimentary; 
this, in turn, being limited by factors such as intelligence, 
experience, and the extent to which the contents of 
consciousness are limited by the paradigms present in 
society at any given time. But the freedom so gained may 
be termed a false freedom, because its destructive 
conclusion can only result in the elimination of every­
thing which imparts to the self both the necessary 
conditions for its being and its continuing raison d'etre, 
that is, the continuation of society. To put it another 
way, it is a self-negating freedom because it results in 
the self denying its own nature. The freedom of man in 
a world reduced to anarchy as a result of such a will 
would be little more than the freedom of the individual 
in a Hobbesian state of nature. The concept of absolute 
freedom of will resolves into a complete absence of 
liberty*.
*A comparison with Hobbes is illuminating. In Hobbes' 
state of nature, insecurity or anarchy is created by the 
free expression of the individual's instinct for self- 
preservation, The inseourity of this state is resolved 
by the development of prudence which, in turn, develops 
into reason and, ultimately, the creation of rules.
In Kantian terms, the whole process is short-circuited 
in that the will is a rational will to begin with, and, as 
such, it limits and tries to control the irrational world 
rather than growing out of it in Hobbesian terras.
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To talk of the self denying its own nature is 
significant in that what is meant is that in terms of 
personhood the notion of the indeterminate will is only 
one aspect of the developed notion of the self. Person^ 
hood itself is only intelligible if the subjective will 
is manifested in action, but once action is admitted 
then the individual is committed to having to take 
account of the context within which the action is capable 
of fulfilment. The negative freedom of the will to 
destroy is self—negating because, as it is incapable of 
willing constructively, incthe very exercise of the 
freedom to destroy is the negation of the conditions 
within which even a negative freedom is possible. The 
negation of society is the negation of those rule- 
governed situations which contribute to the formation 
of personhood. To that extent, the subjective will 
conceived of in terms of negative freedom and finding 
fulfilment in action is self—contradictory and, ultimately, 
irrational.
It also follows that negative freedom is 
incapable of being realised in action as the whole concept 
dissolves into unintelligibility. Action itself is only 
intelligible within a rule-governed context. If, as has 
been argued, the realisation of negative freedom involves 
the destruction of the social context, its culmination 
lies in incoherence as action in theiresulting void will 
have no significance. Action has no meaning in a rule- 
less vacuum.
- 118
¥h.at does emerge is the logical connection 
between the freedom of the will and freedom of action, 
both components of personhood. Freedom of the will 
without any resulting action, pure contemplative 
freedom, has its place within human life but in itself 
it scarcely touches the problem of the nature of 
individuality, particularly as it relates to the 
individual in a social context. It is the subjective 
will as evidenced in action which is central to the 
understanding of personhood in social terms; in fact, 
it is not overstating the case to suggest that person- 
hood is completed through action. The point is that 
freedom in a social context, i.e. liberty, is the 
logical extension of freedom of the will, but the 
freedom of the will exercised towards the^fulfilment of 
ends which at the very least do not decrease the 
possibilities within which freedom of action is possible* 
It is in this sense that Isaiah Berlin*s notion of 
* positive freedom* is deeply rooted in the concept of 
the self.
4. There is one consideration which needs to be
made explicit in this enquiry into the nature of the 
subjective will, and that is the extent to which choice 
is a necessary condition for the exercise of freedom.
A will which is constrained to the extent that only one 
line of thought is possible, in which there is no room 
for any consideration of other possibilities, loses its 
claim to freedom and becomes, instead, a determined will. 
Such a will would merely be the outcome of whatever
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constraints prevent the consideration of other possibilities, 
whether these constraints be extrinsic to the mind, such 
as hunger or physical illness, or intrinsic, such as 
insanity or extreme poverty of thought engendered by, 
say, deprivation.
Similarly, where action is concerned, constraints 
which effectively limit the possibility of action to : the 
extent that no choice is possible remove the possibility 
of the subjective will fulfilling itself, and in these 
conditions personhood itself is diminished. The prisoner 
may retain his value as a person worthy of respect in 
moral terms but he is diminished in terms of actual 
personhood insofar as his opportunities for demonstrating 
and developing individuality are diminished. The 
conditions of imprisonment may impose on the individual 
the necessity to maintain rather than develop personhood 
which in itself may require the development of appropriate 
aspects of character. This, however, does not affect the 
central point which is that it is the liberty of the 
individual which is at stake here, and liberty involves 
not only the attainment of desired ends but the expression 
of self in the subjective willing of these ends and this 
cannot be in circumstances where the ends are effectively 
dictated by others.
Finally, as far as choice is concerned, it is 
possible to go beyond the contention that choice is a 
necessary condition of freedom and to maintain that 
human freedom is engendered by choice. In the individual's 
moral life, a particular course of action may have become
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habitual until it is challenged by a different moral 
viewpoint; in social terms, a pluralistic society 
requires a reconsideration of current values and beliefs 
where differences occur. Plurality or choice engenders 
autonomy even though the conflicts involved may seem 
threatening to the extent that many people find them 
difficult to tolerate and seek psychological refuge in, 
say, a kind of conformity (?)• The corollary of this is 
that the greater the degree of choice which is open to 
the individual in terms of his understanding and capacity 
to conceive ends, together with greater opportunities 
for fulfilling ends in actuality, the greater will be 
the degree of freedom of thought and social liberty 
which,can be claimed.
5« One feature of the relationship between
individual and state which has been insisted upon has 
been its reflexive nature. It is now appropriate to 
examine this in more detail with particular reference 
to the concept of personhood. If the will is grounded 
in thought, then even the pure thought of the negatively 
free will must have a content. The contents of 
consciousness are not the creation of consciousness 
itself: language is necessary, presuppositions are
required which form the paradigmatic framework which 
supports understanding, values and morality require a 
social initiation before the individual is able to
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acquire autonomy in these areas. In short, independent 
thought is the outcome of, not the originator of social 
experience,*
Further, for the subjective will to reach 
fulfilment in the striving for or achievement of ends, 
the relationship with social experience becomes stronger. 
Another way of putting this is to say that the more the 
subjective will requires the use of rational capacities 
for objective ends, the greater will be its dependence 
on an understanding of the social milieu for its success. 
Nowhere will this be greater than in the spheres of 
morality and politics where there is the implication of 
universality in the reasoning of the former and the 
possible actuality of universality in the rule-making 
of the latter.
So it can be posited that the self, understood 
in terms of its conception of its own individuality and 
expressed in terms of its determinate aims, wishes, 
wants, desires and needs, has its powers of conceptualising, 
its rationality informed, by the nature of the social 
milieu within which it itself is a contributory member. 
Similarly, to adopt the second part of the Hegelian
* Such a view implicitly supports distrust of attempts j
to impose foreign or 'rational* constitutions on a I
people in the name of liberty. Freedom stands in need |
of interpretation, and how it is interpreted will depend I
on the traditions, values and beliefs of the people
concerned. This is a point of view to which both Burke i
and Oakeshott subscribe. !
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dichotomy of will, the self in its perceptions which 
tend to universality and objectivity is also informed 
by that which is the content of the objective in its 
lived experience. Put in terms of rule-governed 
situations, it is the case that there will be a degree 
of congruence between society and the individual where 
the rules that inform the character of a particular 
society are reflected in the personhood of any given 
individual.
The most obvious example is that of language 
acquisition. The individual who is born and develops 
within a particular language community learns and masters 
the language relatively effortlessly as part of his 
participation in a form of life. Transactions within 
that community will be under-pinned in terms of their 
efficiency and effectiveness by a secure, subtle and 
probably tacit understanding of the community* s 
language. Compare this with the problems faced by a 
stranger unfamiliar with the language trying to conduct 
his transactions, of with the degree of effort needed by 
a foreigner to acquire even a rudimentary understanding 
of the language. The point is that to posit the notion 
of the state is to posit a complex of rule-governed 
situations of enormous intricacy, a form of life in 
fact. The individual who is native to a society absorbs 
an understanding of this complexity, but such an under­
standing, whichnay be either explicit or tacit, is not 
to be itself understood entirely in terms of a relation­
ship between an agent and an object; rather, it is the
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case that the understanding of the agent, the individual, 
is derived from the extent to which this complexity is 
assimilated into the subjective will of the individual, 
that is his mind. In other words, that complex of rule- 
governed situations which is expressed in the way of 
life of a society becomes to a certain extent part and 
parcel of the personhood of those who are born and 
develop within the society in question. To posit this 
much is not to suggest that the whole of personhood is 
to be explained in these terms, but to suggest that this 
is a necessary and important element within the concept 
of a person. Once more the state of affairs is most 
easily exemplified by citing the case of the stranger 
in a society, the emigre, the ex—patriate, and to note 
the difficulties which usually attend such exiles who 
may never be able to identify with the host society 
because the process of attunement to a society's mores ‘ 
is extremely difficult unless the person is young enough 
to absorb the complexities as part of the general process 
of maturation.
6. It is now possible to incorporate as assumptions
the arguments which have been offered in terms of freedom,, 
choice, personhood and the nature of the subjective will, 
and to reach conclusions with regard to the nature of the 
subjective impulse which lies at the root of Sittlichkeit. 
It has been argued that the mind is inherently freedom- 
seeking in the sense that thought is only limited by 
the framework which is available to it in terms of the 
conceptual sophistication of the language and the nature
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of the explanatory paradigm which is culturally derived* 
Further, the more pluralistic the composition of society, 
the more there is a diversity of viewpoints, the more 
extensive the opportunities for the satisfaction of 
possible goals, then the greater will be the confidence 
with which the subjective will can be characterised as 
free as a matter of logical necessity. ■ This applies to 
the freedom of the will conceived of as purely negative 
freedom arid also, more significantly, in terms of the 
positive freedom of the will which finds expression in 
fulfilment through action.
Given, also, that human freedom typically 
requires a social context within which to find expression, 
it follows that the expression of such freedom becomes 
dependent on the existence of a rule—governed situation. 
The fulfilment of the subjective will implies acceptance 
of the paradox of freedom as a necessary condition for 
both its expression and for the intelligibility of the 
notion of liberty. This remains true even when the end 
in view is to change the nature of the order or the rules.
However, the rules with which society is imbued 
are highly complex. Even the system of law which pertains 
is unlikely to be capable of being understood as a formal 
set of rules because the constant need for interpretation 
and arbitration will ensure a degree of fluidity. The 
customary and traditional rules which inform the mores 
of society are even more difficult to apprehend by anyone 
who is not native to the society in question and has not 
been initiated in childhood to the complexities of the
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way of life. This being so, it follows that if the 
fulfilment of the subjective will in its impulse towards 
freedom of, expression requires that there be an 
appropriate social context for this to be possible, then 
that society whose complete and complex rule-governed 
situation is best understood will be the context which 
is most conducive to the expression of freedom. The 
society most likely to.offer the facility of being fully 
understood will inevitably be the society into which 
the individual is born and in which he develops. Given 
that for present purposes it is the state which is the 
social unit appropriate to this enquiry, the conclusion 
is that in terms of the individual's need for an understood 
social context for the expression of his subjective will, 
the individual's parent state will most completely offer 
such a context, not only because it is understood both 
consciously and tacitly, but because the mores of the 
state will be reflected in the personhood of the 
individual. Another way of making the point which is 
consistent with the analysis of the subjective will is 
to suggest that it is within the rule-governed situation 
which is that of the parent society that the particularity 
of personhood expressive of personal wants, desires, 
hopes and ends will find satisfaction; also the rationality 
of personhood expressed in terms of consistency and 
universality in,law or rule-making will be imbued with a 
content and basis for further judgment-making and an
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arena within which such judgment—making may find adequate 
expression. In these terms the subjective impulse which 
informs the obligation within the individual's Sittlichkeit 
is analysed in terms of the subjective will's freedom- 
seeking propensity.
Summary
The initial concern in this chapter has been 
to develop the concept of personhood in order to make 
explicit the nature of the reflexive relationship between 
man and society. It has been>argued that the content 
of thought, of rationality, is derived from the cultural 
environment, and that this content reflects back into 
society in terms of either the satisfaction of particular 
wants, needs or desires, or in the expression of the 
individual's rational capacity for forming universal 
judgments particularly in the areas of morals and politics. 
It is in these terms that the notion of the subjective 
will has been analysed.
Human personhood posited in these terms has 
then been shown to be essentially freedom-seeking, an 
enterprise which both logically and contingently is only 
intelligible within a rule—governed situation. That 
being so, it is argued that there will be a strong 
propensity for man as a social being to find the liberty 
he needs within that rule-governed environment which he 
best understands, viz., his native state or society.
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Finally it has been suggested that the inherent impulse 
of the subjective will to freedom which finds fulfilment 
within the state is the subjective basis for the sense of 
Sittlichkeit delineated in the previous chapter.
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Chapter 5 
Authority and Stability
1, The model of the state has now been extended
from a conception of it as that self-conscious, legally- 
defined and sophisticated population which comprises 
the political community to include that dimension of the 
state which may or may not be conterminous ’tyith the 
political community, viz., that population the totality 
of which forms the society which is the complete 
embodiment of the state. At the same time, the concept 
of personhood has been extended from the essentially 
legally-defined concept of a citizen to include that 
aspect of personhood which may be characterised as being 
socially-derived, and which also may or may not be 
conterminous with citizenship. Although care has been 
taken to avoid suggesting that the individual is to be 
understood as being totally a product of his social 
environment, it should be remembered that the individual 
considered as being autonomous or self-directed has yet 
to be explored. It follows that although the model 
presented so far is capable of offering insights into 
a range of social and political phenomena, there will be 
matters which will, of necessity, have to wait upon a 
further elaboration of the model before comment and 
explanation become profitable. In general, the kind of 
conduct which is open to explanation so far will be that 
typified by compliance with authority; conduct typified 
by non-conformity and the justification of such conduct
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will be considered later.
It has also been argued, that the mores of the 
state, understood as a complex of rule—governed 
situations, are reflected in the consciousness of the 
individual contributing to the content of his hopes, 
desires, needs, wants, judgments and values. The 
further contention is that as the state is, partly at 
least, the source of the contents of the individual's 
consciousness, it will be within the rule—governed 
complexities of the reality of the state that the 
individual will be most likely to find that milieu 
which, both tacitly and consciously, is most fully 
understood and within which he can most rewardingly 
pursue his objective goals. In other words, it is within 
the state that the sense of freedom can be realised.
To posit the connection between individual 
and state as being one grounded in understanding or 
meaning is to posit the connection as being logical or 
conceptual in character. For.example, among the Pueblo 
Indians of New Mexico, one, the Zuni, has no concept of 
'sin* (l). This means that not only are attitudes to 
sex free from the element of moral censure familiar to 
the Puritan mind,not only are guilt complexes unknown, 
but the metaphysical basis of the concept 'sin*, in 
terms of belief in a struggle between good and evil, 
is absent in Zuni culture. It follows that in order to 
understand Zuni attitudes to sex it is necessary for a 
Western anthropologist to disburden himself of a 
conceptual perspective which he would normally haYe
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taken for granted in his own culture. Conversely, for 
a member of the Zuni to appreciate Western attitudes he 
would have to learn not only the term *sin* but also 
the assumptions and implications which attach as a 
matter of logical necessity to the concept. In each 
case the visitor to the foreign environment has to learn 
an appropriate language, that is, not just a different 
grammar and vocabulary but a different set of beliefs, 
assumptions and priorities. To suggest this much is 
not to insist, as with the more extreme relativists in 
this field, that the different way of life must be 
adopted for it to be understood, but simply to argue 
that the act of understanding the unfamiliar society 
will require a shift of perspective to the extent that 
the assumptions which form the basis for any understanding 
have to be entertained. To put the matter in terms 
familiar to this enquiry, a different rule-governed 
situation has to be understood and this is primarily a 
logical matter in the sense that a new way of 
conceptualising the situation is required.
It is peculiarly important to establish the 
exact sense in which there can be said to be a logical 
connection between the individual and the state or 
society of which he is a member because this is only 
one aspect of the relationship, a relationship which, 
in full, is characterised by a variety of contingent 
features. The logical aspect is significant as it is 
this aspect which can be pursued with confidence in a
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philosophical enquiry, whereas other aspects, such as 
the temperament with which an individual is born or 
the peculiar complexities of any given society, are 
matters to be explained in psychological, sociological 
or historical terms.
2. That a logical relationship of this kind can be
held to be the case is essential to the philosophical 
analysis of Sittlichkeit as it is expressive of the 
subjective tie which demands of the individual his 
adherence to the state as the most-favoured milieu 
within which the freedom-seeking subjective will can 
find expression. One implication of this analysis is 
that there will be in any society a strong predisposition 
to maintain the status quo and resist change which is 
imposed and iS not a reflection of changes already 
inherent within society. Another symptom of the 
Sittlichkeit bond between individual and society is the 
fact that it will normally require some pressing reasons 
to induce a person to leave his native land and adapt 
to life in a foreign country.
It is the function and a strength of a political 
community that proposed changes are discussed in terms 
of their desirability and future practical implications; 
in other words, the procedures of a political community 
will, ideally, prepare the ground so that change is not 
only willed but understood. But the fact that it is 
necessary to legitimise and institutionalise the 
procedures whereby change takes place in no way detracts 
from the contention that the rules which order society
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are inherently resistant to change. It is also the case 
that those rules for which the political community is 
primarily responsible, both for formulation and amend­
ment, are the rules of law and government, areas which 
are explicitly recorded within statutes and are, as such, 
the object of conscious appraisal. But within the state 
such explicit and codified rules form only part of the 
total complex of rules which permeate society; there are 
many other rules of a customary or traditional kind which 
serve to guide conduct. Such rules may be learnt 
consciously or they may be part and parcel of the social­
isation process. However they are learnt, rules of this 
character will not be susceptible to change by the 
conventional processes of the political community except 
to the extent to which the introduction of a law can 
help to create a climate of opinion favourable to more 
deep-seated changes in public behaviour; it is more 
likely that change, when it does occur, will be attendant 
on social or economic developments which carry with them 
their own imperatives. An example of this kind is to be 
found in that area of normative standards which give 
expression to those attitudes governing the role of 
women in society. It is arguable, at least, that what­
ever changes have been achieved in recent years in this 
matter have been mainly brought about as a result of 
social and economic influences together with direct 
social action associated with the rise of feminism 
rather than as a result of attempts to legislate for 
greater equality.
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One qualification is required to the general 
argument that effective change emanates from within 
society and that is in the case in which the division 
between ruled and rulers is so great that there is little 
or no interaction between the two. In such a case, 
change is likely to be brought about with revolutionary 
force with all the unpredictability which is involved.
Both the Russian and French revolutions are examples of 
the extent to which change from within may, under these 
conditions, disrupt if not destroy the social structure.
It is a merit of a political community that, by its very 
nature, such a situation should not arise if participation 
is wholehearted and the procedures have general acceptance
3. It is the case that as a necessary condition
for its being, the notion of 'society* implies stability. 
While the contingencies of life will probably ensure that 
no society will remain completely static in respect of 
the rules which inform it, none the less change which 
becomes too rapid, and especially change which succeeds 
change to the extent that periods of stability bebomep 
infrequent, will be likely to threaten the existence of 
the society concerned. Rules which are quickly super- 
ceded by new rules and in which the process is repeated 
will begin to lose any practical force which a rule must 
have as a guide to action. If rules cease to: fulfil 
their purpose, the notion of society as indicative of 
a rule-governed state of affairs dissolves. What is 
more, as the notion of the state is understood to be
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that of a society delimited by law and rule, then the 
notion of the state is even more dependent both practically 
and conceptually on the maintenance of stability and 
continuity as a necessary state of affairs for the 
existence of a rule-governed situation.
If, as has been argued, there are good reasons 
for suggesting that a society or state will be inherently 
resistant to change in its rule-governed practices, and 
that the very notion of the state implies that stability 
and continuity will be the rule rather than the exception, 
then with these features built into the model of the state 
the phenomenon of violent change apparently co-existing 
with stability becomes explicable. The phenomenon 
centres on the situation which arises from time to time 
in which a legitimate government is overthrown by a 
coup d'etat or revolution and is replaced by a governing 
body with no claim to legitimacy other than the possession 
of coercive power and the control of the machinery of 
government. If legitimacy or right is built into the 
concept of authority, there would be no reason why the 
population of the country should obey the dictates of 
the new regime unless the people are coerced into 
obedience. Yet it is not uncommon in states which are 
plagued by such abrupt changes in government for life 
to continue in a relatively normal way: the government
functions, the laws are obeyed. To suggest that what 
before was enacted willingly in deference to the 
legitimacy of the ruling body is now changed to 
unwilling coercion does not appear an altogether
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satisfactory explanation. The instruments of coercion 
cannot be available everywhere and on all possible 
occasions when the law could be broken or defied, and 
anyway the apparently normal nature of day-to-day life 
would seem to belie this possibility. The problem is 
to account for the effectiveness of authority when it 
would appear that the right to exercise it no longer 
exists.
A number of hypotheses present themselves as 
responses to a situation of this kind. In the first 
place, changes in government, whether brought about 
legitimately or otherwise, may make little difference 
to the life of the population at large. States in which 
the political community is vestigial are likely to be 
composed of populations which regard the organs of 
government as remote and, possibly, incomprehensible.
In such situations it is possible that the rules which 
most immediately govern the nature of the social order 
and within which people arrange their lives are customary 
or traditional, or that the local authorities responsible 
for the administration of law and the decrees of 
government are perceived in this way. This is likely 
to be the case where the society is predominantly tribal 
or peasant in character and where the central government 
is sufficiently acute to engage the services of individuals 
holding locally accepted positions of authority to
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administer the law. In such situations the authority 
of the local headman or elder will invest the laws with 
the required legitimacy; the government, unless it 
intrudes, may not be considered,*
Secondly, there is the argument, already 
considered, that within the state there will be an 
inherent tendency towards stability as the freedom- 
seeking subjective will requires, as a matter of practical 
necessity, a rule-governed state of affairs within which 
to realise its objectives. Put more simply, people tend 
to be apprehensive of upsetting the social order, 
preferring that which is known to the possibility of 
anarchy. This attitude can be posited of a sophisticated 
political community as well as of the politically immature 
societies of the kinds already mentioned. In such a 
state of affairs, what may be termed the constitutional 
legality of the new government may be of less actual 
importance than the legitimacy which the government is 
accorded simply by the degree of public acceptance it 
enjoys. This particular situation illustrates the 
importance for authority of its actual effectiveness 
because it is usually the case that where a regime comes
* The example of India presents itself as a case which 
fits many of the conditions outlined above, particularly 
in respect of the extent to which the government has 
apparently been successfully integrated with a varied 
and largely peasant population.
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to power by illegal means and manages to retain authority 
in these terms, it will ultimately create its own 
legality, possibly by enacting a ne\w constitution.
In other words, in political affairs de jure authority 
alone may well be insubstantial having to wait upon de 
facto authority to bring it into being.
Such a state of affairs serves not only to 
emphasise the distinction between state or society and 
government, but to underline the importance of traditional 
or known rules and patterns of behaviour which may inhere 
within society but which may not be sufficiently 
recognised by government. Not only may an otherwise 
illegitimate regime benefit from the desire for security 
which is grounded in an acceptance of customary or 
traditional rule-governed patterns existing within society, 
but the actions of a legitimate but radical government 
may be open to the charge that they are a departure from 
accepted tradition. It is possible for an astute 
politician, in other words, to undermine the legitimacy 
of government by arguing thàt it is departing from the 
traditions which legitimised it in the first place.
The contention that de facto authority is a 
matter of acceptance or obedience for reasons of security 
rather than a matter of coercion or power has inescapable 
Hobbesian connotations. But for Hobbes, acceptance of 
the sovereign's authority is attendant upon a transfer 
of rights in that the individual, in concert with the 
others who form the society, authorise the sovereign to
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take what actions are required to procure the benefit 
of peace (2). It is within this canalising of the 
exercise of free will from the individual to the 
sovereign in terms of a transfer of rights that the 
'contract* exists. However, in this study the situation 
under examination does not represent a transfer of rights, 
per se, because at no stage has it been argued that 
personhood is to be construed in these terms. Rather, 
the emphasis so far has been on the extent to which the 
person is a product of his society and that in these terms 
the freedom which the individual seeks has a specific 
construction or content which will be imparted to it by 
the nature of the society in which he lives, and that 
society, as being the most completely understood society, 
will present itself to the individual as the most- 
favoured milieu within which such freedom can be realised. 
In other words, the present analysis rests on a basis of 
a concept of personhood already integrated into a society 
and dependent on it, to some extent, for its continuing 
status. Understood in these terms, authority is granted 
even to an illegitimate government by virtue of the 
necessity for the subjective will not only of a milieu 
within which it can aspire to freedom but within which 
its identity will remain secure - and both of these are 
threatened by change. There is no contract, only the 
logical and practical imperatives issuing from the 
nature of man as a social being.
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Finally, the condition in which a society 
accepts the authority of even an illegitimate government 
is indicative of one factor which helps to promote the 
stability of any society, viz., a tendency for the 
acceptance of authority to become habitual. This is 
not surprising. It has already been argued (3) that in 
any situation concerned with the application or acceptance 
of rules, authority is required as a matter of practical 
necessity in order to resolve disputes, offer definitive 
interpretations, and decide between apparently conflicting 
rules. The practical necessity involved derives from the 
need for there to be some curtailment of discussion so 
that there can be a time limit on the resolution of 
disputes and the affairs of men can continue. It follows 
that if authority is inevitable in the conduct of social 
and political affairs, it may well be the case that, as 
a contingent fact, men will prefer to accept the authority 
of an illegitimate government simply because the need 
for authority in day-to-day social life remains whatever 
the political upheavals, and in such day-to-day life it 
is the attainment of immediate ends which is uppermost 
in men's minds rather than questions to do with legitimacy.*
* Both the need for authority and the existing habitual 
acceptance of authority help to account for the 
necessity of social life to return to normality as 
soon as possible in the wake of a revolutionary 
convulsion. Also, these factors together with the 
importance of tradition within a society suggest why 
even a revolution inspired by a foreign ideology quickly 
adapts to take account of national or traditional 
characteristics in its actual operation.
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Where authority is perceived in such purely instrumental 
terms there is unlikely to be concern for its genesis 
with the result that its acceptance may become habitual. 
Although such habitual acceptance of authority is a 
contingent attitude, the full analysis of which would 
require a sociological/psychological dimension, the 
fact is that everyone does, habitually, accept the authority
of others in everyday concerns, be it catching a train,
being directed in traffic, or passing through customs 
after a visit abroad. But such an attitude of habitual 
acceptance becomes politically significant when it 
underpins the authority of a regime after, say, a 
coup d'etat, as acceptance itself not only demonstrates 
the existence of de facto authority but it also contributes 
evidence to the claim of the authority in question to 
legitimacy — that acceptance implies tacit approval.
4, The distinction which is revealed by this
situation is that the legitimacy of government and the
rightfulness which is implied by authority are not
necessarily one and the same, even though it may be in 
the interests of a new regime to blur the distinction.
But it is by no means easy to make the distinction clear.
The reason for the difficulty is twofold: in the first
place, both concepts, authority and legitimacy, share 
the central notion of 'rightfulness', and, secondly, 
the notion of * legitimacy' as applied to government is 
an inherently ambiguous concept.
- 142
One writer suggests that the most fundamental
distinction between the two is *....  to see authority
as an alternative to coercion whereas legitimacy is a 
justification for the use of coercion and therefore a 
concept rightly applied to governments.: (4) To try to
locate the distinction in the use of force does not 
offer a convincing criterion as authority may have 
recourse to coercive force without endangering its status 
as authority. It may well be the function of authority 
to authorise the use of force in certain situations in 
which case there is little to choose between the 
legitimacy of a government:s use of force and authority 
of a government to use force. Authority is to do with 
the right to command or order ; there is no necessary 
qualification excluding force from that which may be 
ordered. It is also the case that legitimacy itself 
has no necessary connection with the use of force even 
though it may provide an explanation of why force is 
accepted if it is attached, so to speak, to certain arms 
of government.
In his discussion of legitimacy, d*Entreves(5) 
reviews the arguments which have attempted to locate 
legitimacy in legality, but here the arguments founder 
on one or other of the twin rocks of positivist or 
normative legal theory. A positivistic view of law 
can locate the legitimacy of a government in a law or 
legally valid constitution but has no means of analysing 
the legitimacy of the law or constitution other than by 
emphasising its existence; it has already been noticed
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how a revolutionary government may transmute its status 
to that of Rechstaat, government under law, simply by 
creating self-validating law. Normative legal theory, 
however, brings with it the unresolved problems of 
elucidating those principles which will inform law 
with legitimacy by giving it an ethical basis. Here, 
even if such principles could be discerned the problem 
would not be solved because although ethical principles 
might provide the touchstone for pronouncing on the 
nature of a just law, they will not necessarily touch 
the practical problems of legitimacy in the world of 
politics. There are at least prima facie grounds for 
supposing that the legitimacy of a government is not, 
at root, an ethical matter. The legitimacy of 
governments may go unquestioned even though they may 
be condemned as corrupt, oppressive or evil.
The distinction between * authority* and 
* legitimacy* can be clarified to some extent if 
attention is paid not to legitimacy, per se, but to 
the notion of * legitimation*. It is possible to refer 
intelligibly either to the legitimation of government 
or to the legitimation of authority. In each case, 
that on which attention is focussed is the nature of 
the rule(s) or rule-governed situation(s) which inform 
government or authority with rightfulness. There is no 
implication that the same rule(s) or rule—governed 
situation(s) must be the same for each. In the example 
which has been at the centre of this discussion it has 
been argued that as far as authority is concerned, the
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legitimation of the government's authority may well be 
completely unconnected with any prior recognition of the 
legitimation of government, and may be more to do with 
a desire for stability or just a matter of sheer habit. 
Indeed, it is likely to be the case that it is the 
acceptance of authority which forms one of the states 
of affairs which contributes towards the legitimation of 
a government. Other contributory situations would be 
the enactment of a constitution, the possibility of 
holding elections, or the recognition afforded by 
foreign governments.
The distinction can be further strengthened 
by extending the situation in which there has been a 
coup d'etat by envisaging that the ousted and presumably 
legitimate government has sought refuge in a neighbouring 
country. If this government in exile is still accorded . 
international recognition, if it attracts adherents, 
if it retains the sympathy of the population of the 
state it claims to govern, then, even though the authority 
of the new regime may be unquestioned in de facto terms, 
its legitimacy may still be suspect. The essence of the 
distinction between the legitimacy of government and the 
authority of government resides in the contention that 
the source of the inherent 'rightness* in each case is 
unlikely to be one and the same rule-governed situation 
or set of rules. This distinction is strengthened when 
it is remembered that not only can a government have 
legitimacy and authority, but also legitimacy without 
authority and authority without legitimacy.
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In practical terms, the distinction is strengthened 
by the extent to which the notion of legitimacy lays 
stress on a de jure condition, viz., the right of the 
government to govern and legislate, while authority is 
expressive of a de facto condition, viz., the effective­
ness with which the government functions in these terms.
This polarisation is a matter of stress only, because 
once the element of 'right* implicit within the concept 
of authority is admitted, then, once more, enquiry must 
lead to an examination of the particular rule—governed 
situations which impart to the respective concepts the 
element of 'rightfulness^.
Summary
It has been argued that the connection between 
the individual and society, an aspect of Sittlichkeit, 
is based in meaning or understanding. The individual 
understands his own society because he is both an extension 
of it and an integral element within it. The implication 
is that there will be resistance to change within the 
rule—governed complexity which comprises society; 
particularly affected will be those rules, which are not 
subject to conscious appraisal, and that where change in 
customary practices or rules does occur it will probably^ 
be attendant on social or economic changes rather than 
being a consequence of legal innovation.
— l4 6 —
Insofar as the state is a rule—governed 
situation, stability is implied. Rules which change 
too rapidly lose their force as guides to conduct or 
action, and, as such, lose their effectiveness, qua 
rules. The stability which results is evidenced in 
those states which have been subject to frequent changes 
of government by revolution or coup d'etat, but in which 
the normal life of society has continued in spite of 
governmental upheavals. Such states of affairs emphasise 
the extent to which stability is assured by traditional 
practices and rules which, in turn, affect the population 
directly, particularly if the population is peasant or 
tribal in character. Also contributing towards the 
general requirement for stability is the condition in 
which authority is acoepted as a matter of habit, a 
condition engendered by the practical need for authority 
in day-to-day life. This phenomenon suggests that the 
legitimacy of government and the notion of authority are 
not necessarily one and the same. It is argued that 
although both concepts imply 'rightfulness', the rule- 
governed situation(s) which impart rightfuiness in each 
case are not necessarily one and the same. Also, the 
notion of 'legitimacy* stresses the de jure aspect of 
government, whereas authority is primarily a concept 
indicative of a de facto relationship.
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Chapter 6
Tradition
1, Any consideration of those factors which might
be held to contribute to the stability of the state and 
which also may have a claim to be possible sources of 
authority must include some reflection on the role of 
tradition, the influence of which it has already been 
impossible to ignore. The first difficulty with tradition 
is that both as a concept descriptive of a state of 
affairs within society and as a concept, in the form of 
'Traditionalism*, indicative of a political ideology, 
it has a number of variants within each category. These 
variants will be the subject of critical commentary in 
conjunction with a consideration of the more specific 
problems associated with tradition and authority in 
society.
In the most general terms, tradition is to do 
with the broad notion that past practice in one form or 
another is the source from which principles or precedents 
can be derived which can be applied to and which can 
guide present and future practice. Such a formulation is 
intentionally general and, as a result, is ambiguous 
because the more refined and unequivocal the attempt to 
define it, the more it will tend to bifurcate into one 
of two theoretical viewpoints, the first of which may be 
called 'historical traditionalism* and the second 
'presumptive traditionalism*.
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Historical traditionalism is already implicit 
in the model of the state so far delineated and may be 
stated in the following terms. The model of the state 
and of the individual as a constituent member have been 
conceived of as abstractions which are necessarily 
arbitrary in some respects. To summarise the position, 
the state has been defined as a finite grouping of 
people coupled with a finite expanse of territory 
delimited in terms of rule and law. Moreover, the 
people whose totality is the embodiment of the state 
have not been presented, so far, as discrete individuals, 
but as an entity generative of that volksgeist which is 
itself another defining characteristic of the state. 
Moreover, it hasbeen argued that the individuality, the 
personhood, of the state's population is itself 
necessarily a partial reflection, at least, of the mores 
of the parent state. Finally, the state is conceived of 
as a society likely to be composed of a number of 
smaller groupings which interact, interlock, overlap or are 
conterminous with each other depending on the defining 
characteristics of each subsidiary society. In this 
respect, and of prime importance in this work, the state 
on which attention is focussed is that which contains as 
an integral feature ofa political community. For the 
purposes of the model, the ideal state will be that in 
which the state as a whole and the political community 
are one and the same.
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It can be seen that the individual, the state 
and the political community understood in these terms 
are an abstraction not to be confused with the actuality 
of any given state or even any existing form of 
government or social organisation. But as an abstraction 
it is clearly related to and draws its characteristics 
from existing states; and, further, its function, qua 
model, is to facilitate understanding of political 
authority and freedom when and where they exist. In 
other words, the model is understood as being capable 
of application to actual situations. It is at this 
interface, so to speak, between the model and its 
application to, or derivation from, an actual society 
that the notion of historical traditionalism is a crucial 
concept.
The fact is that the social complex which 
comprises an actual state is not born in any single 
moment; rather, states as they exist are the result 
of the social usages, modes, practices and institutions 
which have gone before. The state as it exists at any 
given moment is the result of a process of evolution, 
aIthoughevolution here carries with it no implication, 
a^ with Hegel, of a moral progression. Even where states 
have undergone revolutionary change, as with either the 
French or Russian revolution^,such change cannot be 
complete in the sense that an entirely new way of life 
has been brought into being. Change may be engendered 
in specific institutions, laws, political organisations.
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ownership of land or means of production, but such 
change cannot amount to a transformation of the state 
in all respects. Even revolutionary change has its 
social and historical antecedents.
Even those aspects of the life of the state 
which have been the specific targets of revolutionary 
change bear evidence of a continuity which predates the 
revolutionary period. It is commonly remarked that the 
interests and conduct of Russian foreign policy are still 
dictated by the factors which were present in czarist 
Russia; similarly such features of Russian life as the 
functioning of bureaucracy and the use of secret police 
have a continuity which stretches back beyond the events 
of 1917» Newly introduced secular ceremonies such as 
marriage and funerals contain elements whioh have their 
roots in traditional practices. It is even arguable 
that the success which an ideology such as Communism has 
in establishing itself in a state will be dependent on 
the extent to which existing, traditional beliefs and 
practices embody or imply broadly collectivist principles. 
It is also significant in this respect that in the French 
revolution comparatively rootless innovations such as the 
attempt to establish a Jacobin religion complete with 
Festivals of the Supreme Being or the renaming of the 
months of the year did not survive, although each in 
turn has now the status of an historical precedent if 
not a tradition.
152 -
Such examples are Introduced merely to support 
and demonstrate the meaning of historical traditionalism, 
not to introduce a developed theory of history. Clearly, 
any adequate account of change, particularly revolutionary 
change, must include elements which cannot be termed 
traditional without rendering the notion of tradition so 
elastic as to be useless. The emergence of ideas, the 
impact of individual self-consciousness and autonomous 
action all suggest modes of social behaviour and influence 
in which the element of tradition may be minimal. However, 
even with this qualification, it is worth noting that if 
change involves, to some extent, the working out of 
dynamic social forces which have, in turn, their own 
social precedents, then Hegel's attack on the French 
revclution as being the outcome of an attempt to alter 
society by means of the imposition of a priori, socially 
rootless ideas (Hegelian negative freedom in action) can 
be criticised as being an overstatement of the case.
It is now possible to relate historical 
traditionalism to the model of the state and the individual. 
Although the model has been presented as an abstraction, 
it is an abstraction capable of application to the reality 
of politics and the state. Furthermore, it has already 
been made clear that such elements as the contents of 
individual consciousness, the content of volksgeist, 
the concerns which find expression in political discourse 
are not to be established a priori but must be established 
by examining actual states at moments in their history.
But if the states of affairs which exist at any such
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moments in the history of a state are largely the outcome 
of antecedent moments, then historical traditionalism 
is a necessary component of the model. Immediately the 
model ceases to be an abstraction and is given any kind 
of content then such a content must necessarily include 
a historical dimension if it is to be understood.
The difficulty which emerges from this oonclusion 
is mainly terminological. If 'tradition* is to be 
understood so broadly as to include all the significant 
antecedent events which have led to whatever aspect of 
the present state of affairs is now under examination 
then it ceases to differentiate those practices or beliefs 
which in ordinary usage are picked out as 'traditional* 
from any other event, practice, belief etc., which has 
antecedent events. There would be little that could 
not be claimed as being traditional.
2. It is now appropriate to consider a more
restricted definition of tradition and its implications 
in terms of the model. .First of all, tradition may be 
understood in terms of repetition and continuity; that 
is, in so far as people have a conscious awareness that 
present practices, institutions and modes of behaviour 
are repetitions of that which has gone before, then 
there is the essential characteristic of tradition.
But it is worthwhile noting the presumptive nature of 
this consciousness. The important factor is* the belief 
that a practice, institution or mode of conduct is 
authorised by repetition over a period of time, not that 
it must necessarily be the case that the rationale in
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which the tradition is based in true or even that the 
tradition is understood in terms of its original rationale 
The celebration of Guy Fawkes day has now little or 
nothing to do with the events in which the practice is 
founded. It may well, as a matter of fact, be impossible 
to check the reliability of the evidence which supports 
a given belief which supports a tradition. What is more, 
even when it is established that a belief which supports 
a tradition is false, this in itself is no guarantee 
that the practice which the belief supported will be 
undermined or that its status as being traditional will 
be affected. The veracity of the presumption is not the 
nub of the matter; it is, rather, a matter of self­
perception. As was argued earlier, the way of life of a 
state cannot be re—born, re-structured, revolutionised in 
its entirety at any given moment ; the character of the 
state, including its institutions, will in large measure 
be inherited from the past. Not only this, but the 
perception that the population of a state has both in 
terms of each individual's self-consciousness and in 
terms of general beliefs, values and attitudes will, 
again, in large measure be determined by the historical 
legacy of the particular state. It follows that where 
self-perception is the matter at issue, it is the image 
of self, whether it be individual or collective, which 
will,have the dominant force as this is lived and acted 
on in daily life, not the veracity of beliefs about long 
past events. For example, the knowledge of the fact that 
many of the practices which are built into the so-called
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traditions which govern the celebration of Christmas 
may be of recent origin or may never have existed in any 
customary form will do little to alter either the 
perception of Christmas in traditional terms or the 
practices involved in the celebration,
3 . To state this much leads directly to the second
major characteristic of presumptive tradition which is 
its prescriptive force. Commentators tend to accept as 
self-evident that tradition has prescriptive force and 
that this imparts to tradition the quality of authority. 
J.G.A. Pocoolc's analysis makes this assumption and 
introduces the idea that, ideally, it is the immemorial 
repetition of an action which underpins the tradition's 
authority;
*A tradition, in its simplest form, may be 
thought of as an indefinite series of 
repetitions of an action, which on each 
occasion is performed on the assumption 
that it has been performed before; its 
performance is authorised — though the 
nature of the authorisation may vary 
widely — by the knowledge, or the 
assumption of previous performance.
In the pure state, as it were, such a 
tradition is without conceivable beginning; 
each performance presupposes a previous 
performance, in infinite regress.' (l)
While the assumption of immemorial repetition may be
entailed by the need for the internal consistency of an
ideal model of the nature of tradition, tradition as it
is manifested in reality does not need to be immemorial
for its status as tradition to be maintained. In the
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United States, for example, traditions which attach to
the office of the presidency can scarcely be held to
extend beyond the late eighteenth century. More pointedly,
however, the. mere inclusion of repetition does nothing
to explain why repetition should be accorded prescriptive
force in the eyes of men.
Traditionalist writers have attempted to offer
rationales which purport to explain the phenomenon.
Burke, for example, suggests that:
*.....we are generally men of untaught feelings; 
that is instead of casting away all our old 
prejudices, we cherish them to a very 
considerable degree, and, to take more shame 
to ourselves, we cherish them because they 
are prejudices; and the longer they have 
lasted, and the more generally they have 
prevailed, the more we cherish them. We are 
afraid to put men to live and trade each upon 
his own private stock of reason; because we 
suspect that this stock in each man is small, 
and that individuals would do better to avail 
themselves of the general bank and capital of 
nations, and of ages.' (2)
Elsewhere he succinctly makes the same point:
'The individual is foolish; the multitude, 
for the moment: is foolish, when they act 
without deliberation; but the species is 
wise.' (3)
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Burke's justification of tradition is culturally 
pragmatic* — we should revere that which has been 
bequeathed us from the past because it works, it has 
stood the test of time. But whether or not it is the 
case that what is traditional must be considered superior 
to that which is innovative or even revolutionary is open 
to dispute. In fact, as will be shown, even Burke does 
not endorse an unquestioning acceptance of tradition.
Indeed, when it happens that a traditional 
praotice is held up to scrutiny in terms of its utility 
as compared with, say, some proposed innovation, it begins 
to lose its prescriptive force qua tradition in that its 
continuance over a period may not be of significance 
within the present circumstances. A tradition only 
maintains its force as a tradition when it is accepted 
as such, and, seen in this light, Burke's argument is 
justificatory, possibly even polemical in its context, 
not explanatory in character. This point will surface 
again later.
* .Burke's distrust of the judgment of individuals is 
echoed in Aristotle's implied criticism of Plato's rule 
of the wise;
'....sovereignty should lie with the people at large 
rather than with a few persons of very high quality.... 
The many, when taken individually may be quite 
ordinary fellows; but when they meet together they 
may well be found collectively better than the few.
A feast to which many have contributed is better than 
one provided from a single purse.' (4)
Although not an explicit endorsement of tradition,
Aristotle is suggesting a mode of government in which 
tradition can make its influence felt.
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Burke approaches the heart of the matter when
he introduces the notion of 'prejudice':
'Prejudice is of ready application in the 
emergency; it previously engages the mind 
in a steady course of wisdom and virtue, and 
does not leave the man hesitating in the 
moment of decision, sceptical, puzzled, and 
unresolved. Prejudice renders a man's virtue 
his habit; and not a series of unconnected 
acts. Through just prejudice, his duty 
becomes part of his nature ...,.' (5)
'Prejudices' to Burke were the 'untaught feelings' which 
men hold in favour of the institutions under which they 
have lived for many years and are to be contrasted with 
the dictates of individual reason divorced from practical 
experience of the institutions or procedures under 
consideration (6). For Burke, the proper use of reason 
in political philosophy was to enlist it as supportive 
of prejudice - hence the justificatory nature of his 
arguments. But by introducing the qualifying epithet 
'just' into his defence of prejudice, Burk© effectively 
undermines the prescriptive force of tradition or 
prejudice insofar as the notion of 'just' implies the 
appropriateness of independence of mind and the availability 
of criteria or principles which may or may not be traditional 
in judging prejudice.
That said, the notion of 'prejudice* is 
significant. To interpret it into a modern idiom, it 
appears legitimate to suggest that what Burke means is 
comparable to the notion of a tacit acceptance or pre­
disposition to favour a tradition which is not grounded
159
in a conscious conceptualisation of whatever is the 
object of the sentiment. To tacitly understand or accept 
or favour in the political sphere is to have internalised, 
as a result of socialisation, certain procedures, values, 
and understanding of the functioning of institutions.
But such a tacit acceptance of those social usages which 
have passed from generation to generation cannot be said 
to be traditional in quite the same way as presumptive 
traditionalism. The individual or the society which 
values, say, a particular traditional procedure in 
presumptive terms will be conscious of being the inheritors 
of a procedure presumed to have been continuously repeated 
in the past. This awareness cannot be available to 
those who tacitly accept a given procedure as we are 
here dealing with 'untaught feelings' not states of 
conceptual awareness and understanding. It requires a 
shift in viewpoint to see the object of the tacit 
acceptance, viz., the tradition, in traditional terms.
The anthropologist who studies the behaviour of a tribe 
may well describe them as being traditional in their 
conduct and attitudes; if attitudes and conduct are 
tacitly held there is no reason why, even if the tribe 
possesses the concept of 'tradition', members of the 
tribe should perceive their society as being traditional 
in character. The appellation 'traditional* is only 
open to third person accounts where traditions are 
tacitly adhered-to.
- 160 -
4. At this point it is appropriate to comment on
Max Weber's model of authority, particularly as it has
been influential within modern analyses of authority.
Traditional authority forms one of the ideal types in
his model of authority's legitimation:
'A system of imperative co-ordination will be 
called 'traditional* if legitimacy is claimed 
for it and believed in on the basis of the 
sanctity of the order and the attendant powers 
of control as they have been handed down from 
the past, 'have always existed*. The person 
or persons exercising authority are designated 
according to traditionally transmitted rules.
The object of obedience is the personal 
authority of the individual which he enjoys 
by virtue of his traditional status. The 
organized group exercising authority is, in 
the simplest case , primarily based on relations 
of personal loyalty, cultivated through a 
common process of education. The person 
exercising authority is not a 'superior*, 
but a personal 'chief*. (7)
Weber's classification contains a number of significant
features in terms of this study. First of all his use
of the term 'tradition* is ambiguous as between the
categories of tradition so far noted, i.e., presumptive
traditionalism and tacit traditionalism, although the
implications of his analysis lean towards the latter.
The notion of 'tradition* which is employed is restricted
to a belief in the sanctity of that which is perceived
to have been handed down from the past. Such an acceptance
of customary practice is not derived from a considered
view of the worth of the practice involved, but is
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essentially irrational in the unquestioning acceptance 
demanded of its adherents - a form of tacit acceptance. 
Furthermore, given the need for such acceptance, the 
authority which emanates from it will be dependent on the 
existance of a society in which the central tradition 
takes a specific form, namely, that important decision­
making is the prerogative of its chief(s). Presumably, 
such a society, in order to maintain itself in terms of 
these traditions, is and has been continuously stable 
in the sense that it has not been subject to ideological, 
social or economic upheavals which have seriously challenged 
the basis on which authority is founded.
The Weberian notion of tradition would appear 
to take the form of a settled attitude towards an .existing 
state of affairs where authority is concerned, and, as 
an attitude of mind, it is fostered and maintained by 
a predominantly unquestioning society, that is a non­
political or pre—political society of, say, a tribal or 
feudal kind. Moreover, in so far as it derives from an 
established and stable society it cannot be held to be 
an independent factor imparting stability to the society 
in which it is found; although Weber uses the term 
'education* it is, rather, the outcome of a socialising 
process which is, in turn, dependent on the particular 
kind of society indicated above. As an attitude engendered 
by socialising influences it will be deeply embedded in 
the personhood of the individuals who comprise the 
society, and, as such, will further contribute to the
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general stability, even to the extent of offering to
some degree effective resistance to ideological or other
challenges which may arise. But such an attitude will
be contingent on specific social circumstances and is to
be viewed as evidence of the success a society may have
in achieving a particular kind of stability rather than
as a factor which is logically related to the maintenance
of rule-governed situations in any society.
The point may be reinforced by considering the
distinction between tradition and habit. In his paper
'Is There Reason in Tradition?’, Samuel Coleman contrasts
the social aspect of the former with the personal nature
of the latter:
* habit, (which) is personal and singular,
whereas tradition is social and cultural.
Even if a tradition regulates the behaviour 
of only a single person, e.g., the President 
of the United States, the tradition is 
socially known. The President’s conduct 
has been handed down to him; it is regular 
and predictable conduct within defining 
circumstances. Traditions attach to roles, 
rather than to individuals apart from their 
roles. Habits belong to the individual apart 
from his role.* (8)
Weber’s classification of traditional authority is
intended as a description, albeit ideal, of a major
means by which authority is legitimated. In fact,
due to its inherent irrationality and its dependence on
a particular social context, tradition understood in
these terms has virtually no place in a model of society
which contains a political community responsible for its
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own decision-making. This remains true even though in 
actual societies such attitudes may be found in relatively 
isolated pockets.
Because the Weberian notion of tradition is 
indicative of an attitude, its meaning is properly 
anchored in an exploration of the particular mores of 
particular kinds of society. It may form part of a 
sociological description, but such a concept of tradition 
cannot be used to either explain or justify authority, 
obligation or order.in society as an integral character­
istic of a philosophical model. Habit, on the other hand, 
has its place as part of an explanatory scheme because 
even though, as Coleman points out, it is personal 
rather than cultural, none the less it is argued that 
habit will be a factor in the maintenance of order and 
the acceptance of authority in any society, even a 
political society, because it is born of practical 
necessity - the need for individuals to assume order and 
authority as they go about their everyday business.
5» There is one other aspect of tradition which
requires comment, if only because it tends to be accepted 
as self-evident and, consequently, is not submitted to 
examination; that is the authority of tradition - its 
prescriptive force. First of all, it is the case that 
traditions are normative in character, that is they not 
only prescribe modes of conduct or practices but, either 
implicitly or explicitly, they imply standards to be 
achieved if the conduct or practice is adhered-to.
Insofar as the traditional mode implies the correct mode
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so there will be the further implication that any 
deviation will be incorrect. What is more, the standards 
implied by the tradition will be internal to the tradition 
itself in the sense that the validity of the tradition 
in question must be accepted on its own terms if its 
prescriptive force qua tradition is to be maintained.
If a tradition is compared with other possible modes of 
conduct or procedure, that is, if there is a predisposition 
to be open-minded as to the supposed merits or demerits 
of all possible modes, then the tradition begins to 
lose its prescriptive force. As it begins to shed 
or weaken an important characteristic of its status in 
social usage, so its meaning suffers a diminution to that 
of a practice which has a presumed continuity in time 
but has now no particular sanctity for that reason.
The point has surfaced as something of a by- , 
product in the philosophic discussion concerning the 
extent to which tradition is compatible with reason or 
rationality. In one such discussion, Karl Popper suggests 
that it is possible to accept a tradition critically, 
but he distorts the case by claiming that all that is
lost by such a critical acceptance are ’taboos’;
’But we can free ourselves from the taboos 
of a tradition; and we can do that not only 
by rejecting it, but also by critically 
accepting it. We free ourselves from the 
taboo if we think about it, and if we ask 
ourselves whether we should accept or reject
it.’ (9)
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Traditions are maintained by states of belief in which 
taboos may or may not be present; what is essential is 
that the assumptions whioh support and validate the 
tradition are subscribed-to either consciously or tacitly. 
In ’Personal Knowledge’, Michael Polanyi quotes the 
example of the capacity of the Zande tribe in Africa to 
justify their traditional practices, which are grounded 
in a belief in witchcraft, in their ability to produce 
arguments which are proof against the scientific and 
logical objections of Western observers (lO). What is 
at stake is not a matter of taboos, but the acceptance 
of a system of belief, and, in particular, the acceptance 
of those basic assumptions which by their very nature 
are likely to remain resistant to criticism or disproof(ll)
However, it is not the supposed rationality or 
lack of it or even the character of any rationalisation 
which may be produced to justify a tradition which is of 
importance here; what is important is the nature of the 
tradition’s prescriptive force and this has been shown 
to reside in a rule-governed situation, viz., the beliefs, 
either tacitly or consciously held, which impart to the 
traditional practice its prescriptive quality. Once 
scepticism is induced, it is the tradition’s prescriptive 
force which is diminished.
This analysis allows some further illumination 
of what is usually referred to as the authority of 
tradition. Where traditions are dynamic realities in 
a society or state, that is where the tradition is 
maintained with its prescriptive force intact, the
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suggestion is that authority resides in the tradition.
This is inconsistent with the conclusions reached, so 
far, in this study. The analysis of authority has 
revealed the social nature of the concept’s meaning as 
being indicative of a relationship between two or more 
people, one standing in the relationship of being the 
rightful or legitimate giver of commands, orders, 
pronouncements or rules to the other(s). Because the 
function of authority within a society is born of the 
practical necessity for there to be those who are entrusted 
with the right to enforce rules and laws, to interpret 
rules and laws, and to arbitrate between conflicting 
rules and laws, it is clear that authority must be 
embodied in some person or group of persons whose role 
contains all or some of these functions. There is no 
suggestion that authority itself can reside in any given 
rule-governed situation somehow characterised as being 
conceptually or practically distinct from such specific 
embodiments. Authority is the product of a rule-governed 
situation not its nexus.
Understood in these terras, the phrase ’the 
authority of tradition’ is misleading in its implication 
that a tradition itself is the locus of authority; 
rather, it is the case that tradition understood as a 
rule-governed situation is a possible source for the 
legitimation of authority. In other words, it is possible 
to distinguish between the prescriptive force which a 
tradition may have which derives from its basis as a rule- 
governed situation and the authority which devolves on
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those persons whose role is bound up with the continuance
of the tradition* . The craftsman who instructs his 
apprentice in his craft is an authority on the craft as 
far as .the apprentice is concerned, and if he is a 
traditional craftsman that authority will be exercised 
in the light of his traditional convictions and training. 
The confusion which is engendered by the occlusion of
the tradition with its embodiment in authority figures
is also likely to be reinforced by the fact that many 
traditional authoritative figures are also authorities 
in other respects. The judge who upholds traditional 
practices in a court of law is helped in his transmission 
of tradition because the authority invested in him as a 
judge transcends the merely traditional elements in his 
role, but by so doing reinforces them in the eyes of 
those subject to his authority.
The presumptive nature of tradition itself 
provides a further argument that authority cannot be 
located in the tradition itself but must find expression 
in what are accepted as the authoritative pronouncements 
of some person or group. Due to its inherently 
presumptive character, tradition will be in continual 
need of interpretation and, as has been argued, this is 
exactly a function of authority. Also, as Professor 
Pocock has shown (l2) there is a division in traditionalist 
thought between those who, like Burke, see tradition as 
a mode of bahaviour or practice which is sanctioned by 
the past but which may and should be altered in the light 
of present exigencies, and those who value tradition in
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terms of the possibility it offers in providing an 
unchanging standard against which present practice should 
be judged and guided - a school of thought which tends 
to revere the words of * founding fathers* or the status 
of sacred texts. In practical circumstances of conflict 
the resolution of which view should prevail will again 
be a likely function of authority ~ tradition itself 
cannot take into itself this function.
6. Finally there is the question of the place
that outright Traditionalism has in any analysis of 
authority and the state. By Traditionalism is meant 
the interpretation of an analysis and justification of 
tradition as being generative of a theory which, it is 
recommended, should govern the conduct of the state.
In other words, we are concerned with the transformation 
of analysis into ideology.
While the content of a given ideology can be 
a legitimate focus of philosophical interest and while 
ideology certainly informs the language of political 
discourse, the place of any particular ideology in the 
history of the state will be a matter of historical 
contingency and not a characteristic of either the state 
or the political community Which is dictated by logical 
or practical necessity. So it is that although 
Traditionalism has been and remains an important s;trand 
of thought in the practical politics of this country, 
it can have no place within an objective analysis of 
politics which aims to remain neutral with respect to 
ideological persuasion.
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One philosophical difficulty with Traditionalist 
theory, as with other ideologies, lies in the extent to 
which such theories appear to be offering descriptive 
analyses productive of theoretical insights, but which 
at some stage undergo a sea-^change into prescriptive 
theories. This is true of both Oakeshott (l3) and 
Burke, although with Burke there would appear to be 
ambiguity as to the nature of those principles or 
assumptions which lie at the root of his preference for 
the traditions he espouses. Various writers have seen 
either or both a moral and a religious basis for his 
Traditionalism while recently it has been argued that 
Burke's Traditionalism is an apologia for the then 
developing capitalist economic order (l4). It is 
certainly likely to be the case that any Traditionalist 
ideology will not be content to accept all possible 
traditions in society as of equal worth and will be 
likely to offer a rationale which will be the basis of 
special pleading with regard to those traditions which 
are preferred.
Summary
Tradition has been examined and analysed into 
the various categories of historical, presumptive and 
tacit notions of tradition. It is the concept of 
presumptive tradition with its implications■of continuity 
and repetition which is central to tradition as it is 
understood in this study. Arising from this enquiry,
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Weber*s model of the ideal types of authority 
legitimation is criticized for its ambiguity and lack 
of explanatory power in philosophical terms. Finally, 
it is argued that the prescriptive force which tradition 
has, derives from the extent to which there is an 
acceptance of the assumptions and beliefs in which the 
tradition is grounded, but that it is through the 
embodiment of tradition in someone, an authority, that 
it lives and through which it is continually re­
interpreted.
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Chapter 7 
IndividuaIxsm
1. The model of the state and the individual
elaborated so far is one which presents no inherent tension 
between the individual and the authority of the state.
Both state and individual are conceived of in 
predominantly Hegelian terms in which the content of the 
individuelle consciousness is derived primarily from 
the mores of the state of which he is a constituent 
member; and the character of the state is, in turn, a 
dynamic reflection of its citizens* values, beliefs, 
concerns and institutions — a character which finds 
unique expression in the volksgeist of its population.
The reflexive nature of this association between 
individual and state means that in terms of identifica­
tion and self-consciousness the individual is necessarily 
a fully integrated social being. In such a conception, 
life apart from the state would be almost unthinkable 
as is illustrated by Socrates* contemplation of the 
miseries of exile in the Grito; also the pursuit of 
individual concerns would offer no grounds for opposing 
the authority of the state or the calls which the state 
might make upon the individual. The prime examples of 
societies enjoying this mode of complete identification 
was, for Hegel, to be found in ancient Greece and Rome, 
particularly the former. An eloquent expression of 
this mode of association is to be found in Pericles* 
funeral oration where it imbues the speech and is made 
explicit when he exclaims:
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*It lies with all to superintend home life and 
state affairs alike, while despite our varied 
concerns we keep an adequate acquaintance 
with politics. ¥e alone regard the man who 
takes no part in it, not as unobtrusive, but 
as useless, and we all give much thought to 
an action, if we do not rightly originate it, 
supposing not that it is debate which is the 
undoing of action, but rather the absence of 
debate to warn us before it.* (l)
Hegel describes this conception of the state and invididual
at one with each other in classical times in the following
terms :
*As free men the Greeks and Romans obeyed laws 
laid down by themselves, obeyed men whom they 
had themselves appointed to office, waged 
wars on which they had themselves decided, 
gave their property, exhausted their passions, 
and sacrificed their lives by thousands for an 
end which was their own. They neither taught 
(a moral system) but evinced by their actions 
the moral maxims which they could call their 
own. In public as well as in private and 
domestic life, every individual was a free 
man, one who lived by his own laws. The idea 
of his country or his state was the invisible 
and higher reality for which he strove, which
impelled him to effort   Only in moments
of inactivity or lethargy could he feel the 
growing strength of a purely self-regarding 
wish.* (2)
In general, such descriptions of, or examples drawn from 
particular historical circumstances should not be under­
stood as an attempt to assimilate into philosophical 
theory a contingent condition. The historical examples 
are used to illustrate states of affairs which allow
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insights into those necessary conditions embodied in a 
mode of association in the reality of its historical 
setting.
That said; there is one aspect of the historical 
examples which calls for comment, and that is the apparent 
conflict occasioned by the introduction of the individual, 
conceived of in individualist terms, i.e., the individual 
aware of his own individuality, his own uniqueness. In 
the examples, chosen, both Pericles and Hegel acknowledge 
the possibility of the individual following his own 
interests which may be inimical to those of the state: 
Pericles calls such a man ‘useless*, Hegel mentions the 
* self—regarding wish* arising in ‘moments of inactivity 
or lethargy*. The difficulty which this gives rise to 
is the extent to which the concept of the self-regarding 
individual can be integrated into the model without 
disturbing the assumptions on which the model has, so 
far, been based. Obviously, much will depend on the 
terms in which individuality is to be understood and this 
is an aspect of the model which will be developed in this 
and in the succeeding chapter. For the moment, it is 
enough to admit, that the free society as envisaged 
within the model is fragile in that it demands of the 
individual a willingness to accept the responsibilities 
of citizenship with the possibility that these will take 
priority over the demands of personal inclination. To 
that extent, the model may be conceived of as an attempt 
to erect within society the mechanisms which can control 
movement away from the civic and political areas of life
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in the direction of purely individual goals and effort. 
Such a view, however, misses the extent to which the 
existence of the free society is in the interests of 
the self-regarding individual and, as such, it is in the 
interests of suc|i an individual to bring it about.
In other words, there is no contradiction in these terms 
between the self—regarding individual and a society 
dedicated to the realisation of freedom, and there is no 
contradiction involved in the self-regarding individual 
taking upon himself the role of political man to bring 
about or maintain the kind of society in which his 
individuality may be most fully expressed.
2. It is now appropriate to consider the terms
in which individuality is to be understood. On 
examination, concepts such as ‘individual*, ‘person*, 
*personhood* and ‘self* all carry implications of an 
atomistic view of humanity insofar as they are all 
concepts which allow a variety of distinctions to be 
made which point in that direction. To take ‘self* as 
an example, the notion of ‘self*, eo ipso, implies the 
possibility of distinguishing between ‘self* and * not— 
self*. Furthermore, the notion of ‘not—self* can, in 
turn, be organised into categories which are significant 
in social terms (3)« There is, to begin with, the self 
as opposed to that which is nature. Nature here embraces 
all that is not conscious in the world, that is, all that 
is not capable of reflecting on the world or its own 
existence. Consciousness, as R.M. Unger puts it, is a 
‘sign of the self*s distance from the world* (4), and
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such a distancing is a prime characteristic of differentia­
tion. Secondly, ‘self* allows of the distinction between 
‘self* and ‘others*; the notion of a personal, atomistic 
differentiation from the rest of society would break 
down and become redundant if, for example, humanity 
belonged to a species characterised by some kind of group 
mind. To insist that personhood is to be understood at 
least partly in terms of it as being consciousness with 
its content determined by society is not to imply that 
the consciousness of any particular consciousness is to 
be equated with what is anyway the highly questionable 
notion of the ‘state of consciousness of society* at any 
given moment. Neither does it imply that the contents 
of consciousness are in any sense uniform among members 
of society. On the contrary, the notion of ‘self* in 
a social context carries with it the implication of a 
uniqueness of personhood understood in terms of the 
contents of consciousness on the part of any member of 
society, and, what is more, an awareness of that unique­
ness vis a vis the other constituent members of that 
society.
Finally, in so far as consiousness itself is 
indicative of the capacity to reflect on its own 
existence, so ‘selfhood* is defined by its own necessary 
characteristic. This is not so much a circularity of 
argument, rather a case of a concept containing within 
itself elements of meaning which, once understood, are 
revealed as defining characteristics. So that to suggest 
that ‘selfhood* is defined by its own necessary
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characteristic is to do no more than to analyse, in terms 
of meaning, the concept ‘self* into ‘consciousness* and 
•self-awareness*.
What it is to be self-conscious may be described 
using the terminology of the objective and subjective in 
relation to the self. Following Hegel (3)> the subjective 
self may be characterised as determinate in that it 
includes personal caprices, desires, impulses, wants, 
as well as the contents of consciousness derived from 
the social context - in short, every element in a person*s 
physical, emotional and intellectual composition which 
differentiates the individual as unique. Self-conscious­
ness is the extent to which the subjective self, so 
understood, is objectified and capable of being appraised 
within the consciousness of the self-same individual.
Such a capacity presupposes a vantage point, so to speak, 
from which the appraisal may be taken, and.ithe only 
possible position which cannot be subsumed into the 
subjective self is that of the universality of reason.
It is the knowledge of logical possibilities, categories, 
ideals, potentialities and indeterminances which stretch 
beyond the particular elements which are embodied in any 
one self which enable comparison, and hence, appraisal 
to be made. Awareness of the particularity of self is 
made possible by the universality of reason. The point 
may be illustrated in terms of moral self-consciousness.
In so far as a self-regarding judgment such as an appraisal 
of oneself in terms of self-respect includes such 
elements as the requirement to be dealt with fairly and
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justly, so a conception of the universal categories of 
justice and fairness will be entailed.*
It can be seen that although this sketch of 
the nature of self-consciousness is carried out in terms 
of subjectivity and objectivity, it could be completed 
in terms such as particularity and universality, 
concrete and abstract, finite and infinite. The implica­
tions of the resolution of this duality will be examined 
later, for the moment it is enough to establish that 
self-consciousness itself is one of the major categories 
of experience by which the human being individuates 
himseIf•
The immediate conclusion is that in the construc­
tion of the philosophical model of the individual and the 
state, in so far as central concepts such as ‘individual*, 
‘person* and ‘self* have been used more or less synonymously, 
they have been employed with full recognition of their 
implications for individuality itself even though, to 
this point, it has been one particular aspect of person­
hood (its relationship to society) which has been stressed.
To that extent, there is no contradiction between the 
stress on what may be called the inter-subjectivity of 
man and state and the implicit potentiality for individual 
self-consciousness.
* What is more, a rational awareness of what it is to 
be fair and just carries with it the implication that as 
universal categories they are worthy of universal applica­
tion. In so far as they are acted on, the resulting 
concern for other people could be held to be the universal 
aspect of individualism.
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3. Having demonstrated the individualist assumptions
built into the model in terms of the logical implications 
of the concepts employed, the way is now open to complete 
the description of the individual conceived of in 
individualistic terms and by so-doing complete the main 
elements in the model as a whole. Allowing that the 
concept of a person understood in individualistic terms 
is built into the terms ‘individual*, ‘person*, ‘self* 
etc., there are two further sets of considerations which 
strengthen the individualist case: although they are
by no means discrete categories, one is predominantly 
philosophical in origin, the other historical.
To deal with the philosophical element first, 
individualism, in which the element stressed is the 
responsibility which the individual has for his own 
actions with particular reference to moral conduct, is 
underpinned by the formidable foundations of Kantian 
philosophy. Kant's exploration of the nature of moral 
reasoning reaches its culmination in an acceptance of 
the notion of autonomy as expressive of the state in 
which it is the individual, and the individual alone, 
who is responsible for his own moral judgments, judgments 
based on^a process of reasoning which divulges which 
practical maxims are in accordance with the moral law.
If it is accepted that man's moral capacity is most fully 
expressed when he takes upon himself to be his own rule- 
maker in moral matters as opposed to being the mere 
recipient of rules in a heteronomous acceptance of authority 
in these matters, then man's moral autonomy - a logically
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necessary attribute in so far as it is derived from the
nature of reason itself - becomes a powerful factor in
support of an individualistic view of man's nature.
It is significant in this context that Hegel's
attacks on Kant are directed at what Hegel considered
to be the vacuous nature of Kant's criteria for moral
judgments, criteria which, in Hegel's view, would allow
the justification of any moral stance. This is a matter
for continuing controversy, although it is reasonable to
suggest that Hegel takes too severe a view and does not
allow sufficient discriminatory force to all the
formulations of the categorical imperative which Kant
proposes. Of more importance here is the fact that
although Hegel was critical of Kant's criteria of
rationality, he accepts the notion of autonomy as a
necessary stage in man's historical development. In
the following passage Hegel's culminating phrase
'self-determining universality* is autonomy under
another guise:
*20. When reflection is brought to bear on 
impulses, they are imaged, estimated, compared 
with one another, with their means of 
satisfaction and their consequences, etc., 
and with a sum of satisfaction (i.e. with 
happiness)• In this way reflection invests 
this material with abstract universality and 
in this external manner purifies it from its 
crudity and barbarity. This growth of the 
universality of thought is the absolute value 
in education, 21. The truth, however, of 
this abstract universality, which is 
indeterminate in itself and finds its determin-
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ancy in the material mentioned in Paragraph 20 
is self-determining universality, the will, 
freedom. In having universality, or itself
qua infinite form, for its object, content,
and aim, the will is free not only itself 
but for itself also; it is the Idea in its 
truth.* (3)
In Hegel's terms, autonomy is a necessary condition for 
freedom, simpliciter, and so it is a broader concept 
than the more limited moral notion of Kant; also, 
Hegel's state of autonomy is not vacuous in that the 
'abstract universality* of thought is imbued with a 
necessary content, the content of Geist as embodied in 
the state and in its institutions and, through this 
social context, into the consciousness of man. For 
Hegel, the Idea is human understanding imbued with the 
cosmic spirit (Geist) so that what is viewed in concrete 
terms is released from its inner contradictions and is 
revealed as truth. For example, the admired state of 
harmony in ancient Greece was subject to contradictions 
as it was dependent on the unreflective acceptance of
the individual's prior duty towards the state, but when
this was challenged by rational questioning on the 
part of the individual, as it was by Socrates, then the 
harmony faces disruption and eventual decay. The idea 
of Greek democracy becomes a phase in the progress of 
the cosmic spirit towards the embodiment of the Idea.
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It can be seen that Hegel's conception of 
autonomy in terms of 'self-determining universality' 
becomes part and parcel of the general historical 
progression, and this leads naturally to what can be 
termed the practical imperative which individualism 
posits for the model. Without subscribing in any way 
to the Hegelian metaphysic of history understood in 
terms of the realisation of the Idea, it is the case 
that the growth of individualism since, say, classical 
times has been such that it is now part of modern 
consciousness. The previously discussed implications 
of the concepts associated with personhood bear witness 
to the extent to which such assumptions are embedded, 
through language, in consciousness. Evidence of the 
ready acceptance of individualistic assumptions is 
evinced by the philosophical tradition which can be 
traced at least from Hobbes to contemporary writers 
such as Robert Nozick whose works are all characterised 
by atomistic assumptions concerning human nature or 
human rights even though the conclusions or subsequent 
models of society differ markedly.
Furthermore, the fact of individualistic 
assumptions within the intellectual consciousness of 
the times is supported by political doctrines such as 
liberalism which places explicit value on the individual 
and his argued rights in opposition to the possible
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demands of the state as initiated or expressed by 
government*. The minimalist state philosophies of 
John l/ooke and Robert Nozick as well as the political 
philosophy of John Stuart Mill evidence the extent to 
which the growth of individualistic political doctrine 
has been partnered by individualistic political 
philosophy. While it is neither necessary nor desirable 
to subscribe to the overt value placed on the individual 
in ideological terms, yet in practical terms the force of 
individualism is such that any model of the state and 
citizen would be unreal and incomplete without allowing 
individualism its place, and acknowledging the problem 
which is created within politics by the rational 
questioning of the ocritical individual,
4. It is now appropriate to assemble in all its
essentials the model of the state and the individual, the 
components of which have been constructed in this and in 
the preceding chapters. The starting point is the 
assumption that man is a social being in that it is 
recognised at the outset that human personhood is an 
achievement only possible within a social context (6).
* It is of interest that wherever individualism appears, 
whether it be in philosophy or in social life generally, 
there is a tendency for it to be accompanied by the 
notion of the state as an entity to be opposed. Whether 
it be the actual personification of the state ('Big 
Brother*) in the public mind, or Hobbes* constant stress 
on the artificial nature of the state, the effect is to 
set up an opposition or polarity between state, or more 
properly government, and individual. It is a dichotomy 
which the present study attempts to bridge in theoretical 
terms.
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It is an assumption diameterically opposite to 'state 
of nature' theorists who initially posit man in 
isolation from society.*
Out of the many possible categories of social 
milieu which it is possible to identify as being contexts 
significant in the development of personhood, the state 
has been chosen as the most appropriate. It not only 
tends to be all-embracing, covering such significant 
units as the family, the work environment, the religious 
community and most other social groupings, but also, as 
this work is primarily concerned with political authority 
and freedom, it is within the context of the state that 
problems to do with political authority find their most 
characteristic expression. It is also the case that the 
state embraces, and may be conterminus with, a political 
community which is itself a necessary pre-requisite for 
any discussion of political authority. Given the state 
as being the significant unit within which the individual's 
development is conceived, it is to be identified primarily 
in terms of territory and population subject to government 
and the rule of law. It is to these features, government 
and law, that politics is primarily addressed, and it is 
in relation to these features that political authority 
exists.
* This does not include Rousseau who readily acknowledged 
man as a social being. But, then, it is doubtful that 
Rousseau qualifies as a 'state of nature' theorist anyway.
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Within that society which is the state is 
situated the individual. The concept of a person which 
is developed is predicated on the assumption that it is 
within consciousness and the contents of consciousness 
that the significant characteristics of individuality 
are located. Two main elements or defining characteristics 
are identified as being of particular relevance to the 
analysis of the central predicaments of man in society.
The first is that element of personhood which is derived 
from and which, reflexively, contributes to the character 
of the state. Here it is argued that the contents of 
consciousness are partly at least derived from the mores 
of the state of which the individual is a constituent 
member, so that, to that extent, the individual is a 
determined and determinate reflection of the society in 
which he lives. This inter-relationship between individual 
and state has been analysed in terms of the Hegelian 
notions of Sittlichkeit and volksgeist.
The other element, delineated primarily in this 
chapter, is the state of autonomy which is engendered by 
rationality and self-awareness. Rational self-awareness 
carries with it the capacity for the individual to 
consider and value his own uniqueness, an independant 
valuation which is most forcefully expressed in the 
autonomous rule-making demanded in man's ethical life. 
Individualism in this sense implies that the individual 
cannot be subsumed in his totality within society either 
conceptually or practically and so any developed politioal 
philosophy must take this into account.
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Although the concept of the individual has 
been presented as consisting of two relatively distinct 
categories, i.e., consciousness derived from society and 
rational autonomy, it is not the case that these are 
discrete categories in the total consciousness of the 
individual. In particular, as a result of socialisation 
and education the subjective contents of individual 
consciousness must necessarily be derived from some 
social context, even if that context is not wholly to 
be located within the parent state. Even the value which 
is placed upon autonomous judgment-making is derived 
from the social context as the previously explored contrast 
between the mores of the modern state and those of ancient 
Greece demonstrate. So the force which individualism 
may have in both philosophical and political rationales 
is in itself contingent on the mores of society at any 
given time. On the other hand, it could be plausibly 
argued that the development from latent to expressive 
individualism in political history has been one of the 
major forces for dynamic change within societies, change 
which is attributable to the capacity of the individual 
for independent judgment-making and action. One way of 
putting it would be to say that dynamic individualism 
is the return which the individual makes to the state for 
the gift of his own instinctive consciousness or person­
hood ,
Of course, it is precisely at this point where 
the individual's obligations as a member of a society 
and his capacity and moral requirement for autonomous
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judgment meet that the central problems of authority 
are located and it is this which must be considered 
next.
Summary
The principal concern in this chapter has been 
to introduce to the model the notion of the individual 
conceived of in individualistic terms. To this end,, 
the self-regarding individual has been delineated in 
terms of self-consciousness - self-conscious in relation 
to three categories of experience; (a) the objects of 
the natural world, (b) an awareness of other self-conscious 
individuals, and (c) an awareness of self made possible 
by the possession of rationality. The analysis concludes 
by espousing the notion of autonomy as indicative of the 
relevant aspect of individuality to which the model must 
accommodate, as it is autonomy which encapsulates the 
idea of the individual as not only a self-regarding but 
self-determining entity whose freedom is to be realised 
within the political community in spite of the possible 
threat which critical autonomy poses. The chapter ends 
with a resume of the main features of the model as 
developed so far, including the notion of personhood 
developed in this chapter.
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Chapter 8 
The Challenge of Anarchism
1. The Kantian aspect of individualism, which
posits the individual as his own arbiter of rightness 
where moral conduct is concerned, would appear to pose
an immediate challenge to the authority of the state or
to any authority external to the individual which seeks 
to limit the individual's conduct in any way. It is a 
challenge which is primarily concerned with a denial 
that the legitimacy of the state's authority, howsoever 
that legitimacy is conceived, can over-ride the authority 
vested in the individual as a moral agent and, hence, 
the author of the rightness of his own conduct. The form 
in which this case has been most forcefully articulated 
is in R.P, Wolff's 'In Defense of Anarchism* where 
Wolff states the objection to accepting the state's
authority in the following terms;
'The defining mark of the state is authority, 
the right to rule. The primary obligation 
of man is autonomy, the refusal to be ruled.
It would seem, then, that there can be no 
resolution of the conflict between the 
autonomy of the individual and the putative 
authority of the state. Insofar as man 
fulfills his obligation to make himself the 
author of his decisions, he will resist the 
state's claim to have authority over him.
That is to say, he will deny that he has a 
duty to obey the laws of the state simply 
because they are the laws. In that sense, 
it would seem that anarchism is the only 
political doctrine consistent with the 
virtue of autonomy.' (l)
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Before examining the case in more detail, it 
is proposed to make qne terminological concession. This 
concerns the use of the term ‘anarchism*. In the history 
of European thought * anarchism*is a generic title given 
to a variety of social philosophies which are united by 
a general hostility towards the authority of government.
It is in terms of the positive prescriptions which are 
advocated that anarchism subdivides into a variety of 
contending ideologies, ideologies which range from the 
extreme individualism of not only the anti-state but 
anti-society anarchism of Max Stirner to anarcho- 
syndicalism which stresses a collectivist view in that 
it is argued that the control of industry and the 
subsequent dissolution of the state would be brought 
about through the power of trades unions.
It is clear that R.P. Wolff belongs within 
this tradition at the individualist end of the spectrum 
even though he seems to be advocating a measure of 
mutual co-operation. However, because his objections 
to the authority of the state are based on what he sees 
as the implications of Kantian moral philosophy, the 
substance of his argument is more accurately characterised 
in terms of the competing claims of autonomy and heteronomy, 
In other words, there is a prima facie philosophical 
point at issue which can only be obscured if it is 
understood in ideological terms. Furthermore, this work's 
primary concern is the examination of the relationship 
between authority, the state and the individual through
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the medium of an emerging philosophical model, not to 
offer prescriptions for the supposed betterment of either 
the individual or society which is the main purport of 
anarchism or any other ideology.
These reservations notwithstanding, it is 
proposed to continue to employ the term * anarchism* 
as descriptive of Wolff*s radical interpretation of 
Kantian philosophy as it will be argued that autonomy 
does not necessarily imply anarchist conclusions.
‘Anarchism* will, therefore, be retained as a term which 
usefully differentiates between ‘autonomy* understood in 
Kantian terms and Wolff*s extended notion of autonomy 
which encapsulates a particular view of the relationship 
between state and individual.
2. One way of construing Wolff*s objection to the
authority of the state is to understand it in terms of 
conflicting rule-systems. On the one hand there are 
the morally binding maxims of the self-legislating 
individual, on the other the rules which are generated 
by the state and which carry with them the authority of 
the state. Wolff*s contention is that it is the first 
set of rules which must, in all circumstances, take 
priority, as not to allow this would be to undermine 
man*s moral autonomy.
Before proceeding,it should be noted that 
Wolff seems to be mainly concerned with law, although 
it is only one category of rules in the totality of that 
rule-governed situation which is the state. Other rules 
include those of custom, the society*s (not the individual*s)
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moral code(s), and religiously inspired codes of conduct. 
However, for the purposes of this argument it is of no 
consequence that Wolff limits himself to seeing social 
rules as being law; any rules of whatever character 
which clash with the individual's exercise of autonomy 
will be subject to the same objection. All rules which 
are in some sense external to the individual constitute 
a possible condition of heteronomy and are, as such, a 
threat to autonomy.
At this point it is apposite to introduce a 
distinction which Kant makes in his discussion of the 
rule of law. This is that civil law is to be differentiated 
categorically from moral law. The former is a necessary 
condition for the existence and continuance of society, 
the latter is a necessary condition for the realisation 
of man*8 moral capacity. In each it is freedom which 
is posited as good in itself and is accepted as such.
Thus, in ethical life, man becomes free when he is in 
possession of a good will, that is, when his moral 
principles, his maxims, are realised in accordance with 
the moral law. The accessibility of the moral law is 
mediated through the various formulations of the categorical 
imperative, that is, through purely formal, rationally 
derived, criteria. In Kantian terms, the state of 
freedom, the realisation of moral autonomy, is completed 
when the individual*s actions are motivated by the 
dictates of pure rationality. .
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There is a parallel to be drawn between the
conditions within which individual moral freedom is
achieved and the conditions within which the individual
may be conceived of as free politically. Kant does not
explicitly argue the desirability of society, per se, as
a necessary alternative to the state of nature, although
it is true that he is open to interpretation in these
terms (2). Rather, he accepts the social nature of man
as given as is man*s rationality, and it is only in a
social, i.e., rule—governed, context that rationality
and informed * right* rules are possible. Another way of
putting it is to suggest that as freedom is conceived
within the framework of a rule-governed situation, then
to the extent that society embodies that rule-governed
situation it would be irrational to will its dissolution.
If the necessity for society is given, then the role of
the political philosopher is to establish those criteria
by which the laws or rules governing society may be
adjudged to be *right* or *just*.
The criterion of * rightness* for the laws
governing society will be the extent to which they are
compatible with the freedom of the individual. Kant
formulates this in the universal principle of right:
*Every action which by itself or by its maxim
enable the freedom of each individual*s will
to co-exist with the freedom of everyone 
else in accordance with a universal law is 
right.* (3)
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ICant is proposing that the rightfulness of a law (maxim)
is to be judged by the criteria of rationality and
freedom in that law is conceived of as the means by
which substantive rights are created which guarantee
to the individual those grounds on which unjustified
interference with his freedom of action can be penalised.
To achieve this reconciliation between freedom and
coercion Kant, as in his moral philosophy, introduces
the major characteristic of rationality: universality.
A law will be a just law if it is such that it would
be a maxim that rational beings would adopt in a
situation of mutual choice where individual interests
were set aside. In terms of a comparison with his
moral philosophy, there is an obvious similarity between
the universal principle of right and the first formulation
of the Categorical Imperative;
*Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst 
at the same time will that it should become 
a universal law.* (4)
However, a more productive comparison is with that
formulation of the Categorical Imperative which enjoins:
* every rational being must so act as if
he were by his maxims in every case a legislating 
member in the universal kingdom of ends. The 
formal principle of these maxims is: so act as
if thy maxim were to serve likewise as the 
universal law (of all rational beings).* (5)
Although he does not use the phrase ‘kingdom of ends*
in the context of his political philosophy, there is an
equivalence between the notion of a ‘kingdom of ends*
and the requirement for ‘the freedom of each individual*s
- 196
will to oo-exist with the freedom of everyone else* in 
the universal principle of right. Just as the ‘kingdom 
of ends* requires equal consideration of each person as 
an end in himself, so the same requirement is implied 
if there is to be no infringement of the freedom of any 
individual will. It is therefore reasonable to use the 
notion of the * kingdom of ends* in the context of Kant*s 
political philosophy.
The vital difference between the rules generated 
by the Categorical Imperative and those governed by the 
principle of right is that the former are concerned with 
establishing a good will in the mind of the individual, 
whereas in the latter the individual is legislating as 
a member of a * kingdom of ends* for substantive laws 
which will govern society and which may even justify 
the use of coercive force.
It can be seen that Kant*s political theory 
is rich in that it aims to engender criteria by which 
the rightness or justice of law can be judged, and 
insofar as this can be achieved, effectively delimits 
the areas within which the individual may rightfully 
enjoy freedom of action as well as providing a source 
of rights whereby the individusIraay claim protection 
from or retribution for unjustified interference with 
his liberty. Furthermore, by directing the force of the 
criterion of right on the law and not on the individual 
motivation, Kant categorically differentiates the civil 
from the moral law. He is not guiding individual 
ratiocination for the satisfaction of a personal end;
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he is offering criteria which purport to justify the 
constraints of law and this is a public not a private
matter. Elsewhere Kant explicitly states;
*As hard as it may sound, the problem of 
setting up a state can be solved even by a 
nation of devils (so long as they possess 
understanding). It may be stated as follows;
* In order to organise a group of rational 
beings together who require universal laws 
for their survival, but of whom each 
separate individual is secretly inclined 
to exempt himself from them, the constitution 
must be so designed that, although the 
citizens are opposed to one another in their 
private attitudes, these opposing views may 
inhibit one another in such a way that the 
public conduct of the citizens will be the 
same as if they did not have these evil 
attitudes.* (6)
The Kantian state could be peopled by morally evil men,
but providing they are rational they can devise just
laws, and providing they abide by the law they remain
good citizens.
If the moral and the civil spheres are
categorically different rule-governed situations, then
the grounds on which Wolff bases his case for anarchism
in the name of autonomy is undercut. If there is no
necessary connection between moral intent and civil
probity, there would appear to be no necessity for any
conflict. The question of the individual*s morally
autonomous assent to the law does not apply: law is
the outcome of political not moral discourse. Even
though both are rational in character, they are not
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directed, as has been shown, to the same ends - one is 
personal and motivational, the other is public and 
substantive,
2, Furthermore, although a distinction can be drawn
between the categories of rules which obtain in the moral 
and civil spheres, it is significant that no such 
distinction can be drawn between the respective ‘kingdom 
of ends‘. In his political philosophy, the principle of 
right makes an appeal to the main criterion of rationality, 
universal law. But the world view which is implied here 
is of a universal community of rational wills. But the 
formulation of law is embodied in society; it is related 
to society and, hence,to a finite community. In other 
words, substantive law is framed by men in whom rationality 
is embodied, that is, rationality will have a content in 
the shape of values, beliefs, assumptions and knowledge. 
What is more, the principle source of such contents of 
consciousness will be the society or state in question.
So it will be that anywhere there are law-governed 
societies, just laws will accord with universal principles 
but this does not entail that all laws willbe the same 
everywhere. The universal ‘kingdom of ends‘ where the 
‘ends* are rational wills will, as a matter of practical 
necessity, stand in need of translation into a ‘kingdom 
of ends* in which rationality is embodied in a specific 
society. The specific content of the laws which result 
will be determined by the character and needs of the 
specific society.
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By the same token that rationality is embodied 
within a given content means that a principle which, it 
is proposed, can stand as the criterion of just law cannot 
be understood as an absolute standard standing outside 
the social context within which the law is being judged. 
Except that it includes reference to purely formal 
qualities such as the logical requirement of non­
contradiction, the principle itself will stand in need 
of interpretation and this can only be achieved validly 
within the society in question. The effect is to make 
any suggested appeal from positive law to a governing 
criterion or principle complex and difficult. Nonetheless, 
insofar as principles, such as the universal principle 
of right, can be formulated which purport to offer 
standards of justice, existing and proposed law may be 
held to be subject to scrutiny on the basis of inter­
pretations of the principle. Within the context of the 
model, the resolution of disagreements involved in the 
interpretation of such principles will be a central 
function of the political community and its procedures.
This relationship between universal principle 
and practical embodiment is paralleled in Kant*s moral 
philosophy where the formal criteria expressed in the 
various formulations of the Categorical Imperative 
require interpretation in their embodiment as maxims 
which will govern or guide conduct. Once more, the 
translation needs to occur from the concept of man as a 
pure rational will to that of man as a social being, 
the contents of whose consciousness are socially derived.
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Insofar as rationality needs embodiment in a content 
for its intelligibility, it follows that the individual 
in framing his maxims must conceive of the ‘kingdom of 
ends* in terms of his own world-view, the character of 
which will be largely coloured by his own social origins. 
There is, for example, no inconsistency involved in the 
moral approval which may be given to polygamy in one 
society but to monogamy in another where the social 
mores are different. As with the formation of law, so 
with morality, the maxims which govern conduct must take 
into account the relevant characteristics of the particular 
milieu within which they are to operate. In terms of the 
practical formation of maxims, the ‘kingdom of ends’ 
within which the individual reasons will be his own 
society or state or some subgroup within it.
It would appear that no significant distinction 
can be drawn between the moral and political ‘kingdom of 
ends’ where each is conceived of in terms of universal 
communities of rational wills, or between the moral and 
political ‘kingdom of ends’ where each is conceived of 
as specific societies within which specific laws are 
formulated or specific maxims are established. If the 
moral and political ‘kingdom of ends* are essentially 
the same, rationality as it is embodied in the contents 
of consciousness will also be the same. It follows that 
there can be no possibility of conflict between the 
injunctions of a just law and those of a moral maxim.
To put it slightly differently, in legislating for the 
same ‘kingdomof ends’ in both morals and politics there
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can be no contradiction if the terms in which what it is 
to be an ‘end* are also the same, particularly what it 
is to be considered as an ‘end* worthy of respect and 
with a claim to freedom. There can be no possibility 
of a just law which enjoins an immoral act, or a moral
act which conflicts with a just law.
Those states of affairs in which there could 
be the possibility of a conflict between individual 
morality and the rule of law will only arise if either 
or both are defective, that is, if
(a) the law is unjust,
or (b) the individual’s moral code is mistaken,
or (c) the law is unjust and the individual’s moral
code is mistaken.
Although each of these situations raises problems concerning 
the identification of unjust laws or mistaken moral 
reasoning as well as practical problems for the individual 
as a moral agent and the individual as a citizen, they 
are aberrations from an ideal model and they do not 
affect the anarchist objection to the authority of the 
state as being considered to be superior to the autonomous 
judgment of the individual. In fact, it is argued that 
if to be autonomous is to espouse a principled, 
predominantly Kantian view of the nature of moral 
reasoning and moral rules, then using arguments based 
in precisely the same assumptions concerning freedom and 
rationality the question of a challenge to the authority 
of the state is misplaced in that it should only arise 
in the contingently aberrant conditions in which either 
the laws of the state or the maxims of the individual are
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rationally defective.
4. The foregoing objections to anarchism are
founded in distinctions between rule systems and are, 
consequently, logical objections to what are seen as 
confusions of categories. To a certain extent, such 
objections may be held to be negative in that they do 
not further the explanation of the relationship of man 
to society and the place of authority in this relation­
ship. Given the status which is accorded by anarchism 
to the individual vis a vis the state, it is appropriate 
to examine more closely the nature of the relationship, 
and, in particular, the state of autonomy as purporting 
to be descriptive of a possible state of personhood 
within society.
It is here that Wolff*s conception of autonomy, 
though derived from Kantian philosophical roots, is too 
coarse-grained in its interpretation. For Kant, the 
autonomous agent is he who exercises his will in terms 
determined by rationality. That is, autonomy is the 
exercise of the rational will, qua will; not, it should 
be noted, by the person as being subject to desires, 
wants, needs, values and so on, in short, all the 
attributes of personhood. It is as a rational will that, 
the autonomous agent is understood as generating purely 
formal law - a priori criteria which are derived from 
reason alone. It is because it is divorced from the 
contingent features of personhood, e.g., desires, needs, 
values and psychological characteristics, that such a 
will is free. In ‘The Fundamental Principles of the
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Metaphysic of Morals* Kant states;
*Now we cannot possibly conceive a reason 
consciously receiving a bias from any other 
quarter with respect to its judgments, for 
then the subject would ascribe the determina­
tion of its judgment not to its own reason, 
but to an impulse. It must regard itself as 
the author of its principles independent of 
foreign influences. Consequently, as 
practical reason or as the will of a 
rational being it must regard itself as 
free, that is to say, the will of such a 
being cannot be a will of its own except 
under the idea of freedom.* (?)
It is the freedom of the will which is at the root of
autonomy; the freedom of the person is a further
question. But Wolff does not differentiate between
the two. He interprets autonomy in terms not of the
will determining its principles ‘independent of foreign
influences*, but as the person so doing;
* Since the responsible man arrives at moral 
decisions which he expresses to himself in 
the form of imperatives, we may say that he 
gives laws to himself, or is self-legislating. 
In short, he is autonomous. As Kant argued, 
moral autonomyis a combination of freedom 
and responsibility; it is a submission to 
laws which one has made for oneself. The 
autonomous man, insofar as he is autonomous, 
is not subject to the will of another. He 
may do what another tells him, not because 
he has been told to do it. He is therefore, 
in the political sense of the word, free. 
(Wolff*s emphases) (8)
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A number of points arise from this. It should be noted, 
in passing, the confusion of the political with the moral. 
To imply that the morally autonomous man*is free * in the 
political sense* is to make a categorical mistake in line 
with the lack of differentiation which has already been 
discussed. To be free politically is to be subject to 
laws which are just and legitimate, not to deny subjection 
to any law and the authority which must accompany it.
As far as being morally autonomous or morally free is 
concerned, this is another matter independent of the laws 
of the state, be they good or bad. An individual can 
remain morally autonomous even in an unjust state. The 
eventuality of a law enjoining a morally unacceptable 
act will be discussed later; such contingent circumstances 
are not at issue here where it is the rejection of 
authority, in principle, which is at stake.
Of greater significance is the difficulty
inherent in Kant*s notion of autonomy, a difficulty which
Wolff simply ignores. In the first place, the point has
often been made that the freedom of the good will in
Kantian philosophy is bought at the pricecf the mora1 life
only being capable of full realisation if the rational
will is in a state of struggle or tension with the
desires. A good will is recognised by virtue of the
imperative demands of reason and reason alone, not
inclination.* One way of putting it is to say that the
* It is significant that Kant's argument has the, effect 
of making inclination, and particularly a contrary 
inclination, a necessary condition for the recognition 
of the demands of the categorical imperative. If men were 
purely rational beings, it is arguable that the categorical 
imperative would be unnecessary.
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a priori is at war with contingency. Of course, it 
is this very contrast which gives substance to the 
notion of freedom which Kant develops, but, given that 
man, being an earthbound creature and not a divine will, 
is necessarily subject to contingencies, it is a state 
of freedom which beckons more as an ideal rather than 
as a realisable state. This in itself is enough to 
induce a certain wariness when a notion of autonomy is 
floated which appears to suggest that simply because man 
is rational and may be held responsible for his decisions 
that this is sufficient grounds for accepting that 
autonomy is to be equated with authority in the political 
sphere. A state of being, viz., Kantian freedom, which 
appears to be an ideal to be aimed at is to be sharply 
differentiated from a state of being, viz., Wolffian 
autonomy, which is fully achieved simply by virtue of 
man being a rational creature.
But the difficulty goes further than this.
There is a sense in which by positing the demands of 
reason as being in conflict with the contingencies of 
life, this in itself creates a false dichotomy. Even 
reason needs to be embodied: embodied in language,
embodied in assumptions concerning personhood, and 
embodied in assumptions concerning society. This is 
evidenced in the extent to which commentators have 
noticed that those examples of moral reasoning in which 
Kant has chosen to illustrate his thesis contain 
underlying presuppositions. The example of the tests 
for honesty in one’s dealings with others assume that
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truth—telling in the circumstances suggested will be 
valued by society. The fact is that in both moral and 
political discourse, if anything is to be said which 
concerns the human condition, assumptions will have to 
be made, assumptions which are inherently contestable 
not having the logical status of self-evident axioms. 
Rationality itself in moral and political language is 
subject to the contingencies of social derivation present 
in the context in which it is expressed.
Such a conclusion forms the basis of an objection 
to anarchism insofar as the individual, in anarchist 
terms, is conceived of as primarily atomistic in relation 
to society at large. The individual is a self—legislator 
and society is no more than the sum of all these autonomous 
parts. The objection which the foregoing analysis throws 
into relief is that such a picture of man in society is 
fundamentally mistaken. If there is agreement among men 
as to the nature of rules in society, for the anarchist 
it can be no more than a provisional agreement wholly 
dependent on the constituent individuals remaining in 
the same state of mihd. It is obviously an unstable 
state of affairs, but, more importantly, it subtracts 
from rules an essential element both in terras of what 
it means to have a rule and what, in a social context, 
it means to be rule—governed. This is that for a rule 
to be a rule it must be a source of authority which can 
be legitimately invoked in the face of individual objections 
This does not mean that a rule cannot be successfully 
challenged; but it does mean that there is no, and can
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be no, prior assumption that individual judgment must 
in all circumstances take precedence, which is the 
essence of the anarchist view.
The contradiction in the anarchist case which 
emerges is that if anarchism is fundamentally hostile to 
rules other than those which are self-legislated, it 
must be incompatible with society as a condition or state 
of affairs necessarily embodying rule-governed situations 
of one kind or another, but particularly the rule of law. 
But personhood understood in terms of the contents of 
consciousness is in itself dependent on the social 
context. Should that context disintegrate, as it would 
given the anarchist rejection of authoritative rules, it 
is difficult to understand the force that a notion such 
as autonomy would have in such a consequential setting.
The point which Wolff ignores is that for the concept of 
autonomy to be intelligible as descriptive of a state 
of being, it necessarily pre-supposes a social context. 
This is at odds with what would appear to be the 
underlying model of anarchism which is a reversal of 
that usually developed in classical political philosophy: 
anarchism begins with society and regresses to a state of 
nature.*
* If, as it would appear, anarchism rejects the rule of 
law, per se,it seems to be committed to a continuous 
enactment and re-enactment of self-legislated rules on the 
part of each individual. This means that there has to be 
a continual appraisal of the rules to see if they are 
appropriate rather than a Sartrean-like rejection of 
rules. The autonomous individual is not authentic in 
existentialist terms.
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5« The remaining objections to the anarchist case
rest on an analytical critique of the concept of autonomy 
employed by Wolff. Autonomy, Wolff insists, is born of
responsibility;
'The fundamental assumption of moral philosophy 
is that men are responsible for their actions. 
From this assumption it follows necessarily, 
as Kant pointed out, that men are meta­
physically free, which is to say that in some 
sense they are capable of choosing how they 
shall act. Being able to choose how he acts 
makes a man responsible, but merely choosing 
is not in itself enough to constitute taking 
responsibility for one's actions. Taking 
responsibility involves attempting to determine 
what one ought to do, and that, as 
philosophers since Aristotle have recognised, 
lays upon one the additional burdens of 
gaining knowledge, reflecting on motives, 
predicting outcomes, criticizing principles, 
and so forth.
The obligation to take responsibility for 
one’s actions does not derive from man's 
freedom of will alone, for more is required in 
taking responsibility than freedom of choice. 
Only because man has the capacity to reason 
about his choices can he be said to stand 
under a continuing obligation to take 
responsibility for them.' (9)
In the first place, Wolff shifts autonomy from being
descriptive in character to being a normative concept.
It is possible to maintain that the self-conscious
rational element in man's make-up places him in a
unique position in the universe in that he is in some
sense freed from the strict determinismcf causality
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which governs and underlies the explanation of all else 
in the world. In other words, to hold that man has 
freedom of will and is in that sense autonomous is a 
case which commands respect. But to move from this to 
the proposition that the individual is ’under a 
continuing obligation to take responsibility* for his 
choices, i.e., to exercise autonomy, is more suspect.
The immediate effect of establishing autonomy 
as a normative concept is to allow, implicitly, that 
where human conduct and states of mind are concerned it 
can, in principle, be either autonomous or non-autonomous. 
To have an obligation to do something is to admit that 
the obligation may be ignored. If two classes of 
conduct and states of mind are implied, it must be the 
individual who decides in favour of autonomy who is 
worthy of the anarchist’s privileged status with respect 
to the authority of the state. Should the individual 
not admit or simply ignore the obligation to take 
responsibility for his own choices by not exercising 
his capacity to reason, then it is difficult to see how 
he qualifies as being autonomous.
The practical problem which results is one of 
identification. The autonomous man is to be recognised 
by virtue of the extent to which he is actively ’gaining 
knowledge, reflecting on motives, predicting outcomes, 
criticizing principles, and so forth*. But the questions 
which follow are how are such ratiocinations to be 
judged as having been satisfactorily completed and who 
is to make the judgment? For Kant, the only judge could
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be the individual concerned, but such, an individual is 
acting as a moral agent, simpliciter, that is, he is 
consciously seeking to act in accordance with the moral 
law for its own sake. In these terms, the individual 
is engaged in the task of testing his maxims against 
the rational dictates of the categorical imperative and 
rigorously excluding inclination in whatever form it may 
occur. Whatever the problems which may result from this 
view of man and his engagement in moral reasoning, it is 
based on an acceptance of man’s capacity to structure 
experience in moral terms and the integrity of his 
desire to fulfil his moral nature in the state of 
freedom which possession of a good will entails. In 
such a case, it is the individual who is the guarantor 
of the purity of his motives simply because as a moral 
agent striving for that which has the highest moral worth, 
the individual and only the individual is in a position 
to make such judgments.
However, as has already been noted, Wolff makes 
no distinction between the rational will and that which 
may be considered to be contingent, viz., inclination.
He simply accepts the person as a given entity in whom 
the capacity to reason is simply pre-eminent. Moreover, 
the point at issue is not the search for the grounds of 
right action, but the status of the individual’s judgment 
vis a vis the authority of the state. In such a case, 
the problem disclosed is not the essentially private one 
of judging the moral worth of one’s own actions, but is, 
rather, the public difficulty of deciding who has reached
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the required state of intelligent reasoning to be 
considered worthy of autonomous status as against the 
state’s authority. To allow the judgment to remain a 
private matter would be simply to admit as autonomous 
anyone who claimed his decision or judgment deserved 
greater respect than the laws of the state simply because 
he had thought about the matter at issue, or claimed to 
have done so. In other words, the claim to autonomy 
is open to anyone, no matter how base, self-deceptive or 
stupid the person may be. And yet such a conclusion 
seems inescapable given the notorious difficulty, if not 
downright impossibility, of establishing the true nature 
of an individual’s motives independently of the individual 
in question.
In fact, the basis of the claim to autonomous 
status on Wolff’s account reduces to something like a 
right - perhaps an ’honorary right* would be better — 
that is, a right which is justified simply on the grounds 
of the individual’s assumed capacity and responsibility 
for rational decision-making, not that decisions made on 
rational grounds alone have, in fact, been made. Given 
that the exercise of such a right, if that is what it is, 
has built into it such destructive implications for 
society and, as has been argued, for individuality itself, 
it is by no means self-evident that the acknowledgment 
of such a right should be conceded.
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It is the ease that the difficulties involved 
in establishing the nature and existence of an autonomous 
act are compounded by Wolff’s curious notion of what it 
is to ’take responsibility for one’s actions’. In 
Wolff’s terms, ’taking responsibility’ is ’attempting to 
determine what one ought to do’, i.e., by bringing 
rational capacities to bear upon the matter at issue.
It should be noted that this is a process which can 
remain a private matter if the individual so wishes, a 
point which has been noticed already. But it is not 
clear why rationally weighing up or considering a course 
of action in these terms specifically involves the taking 
of responsibility. There is no reason to suppose that 
a man who is habitually thoughtful has taken more 
responsibility for his actions than another whohappens 
to be more impulsive. One may be considered to be more 
responsible than another, but not because he has taken 
that responsibility.
The root of the difficulty lies in the fact 
that Wolff has chosen to imply that taking responsibility 
in this context is essentially a private matter, whereas 
for the notion to have a content which is clear and 
useful rather than vague and obfuscatory it must be 
indicative of a public action. It is perfectly intelligible 
for an individual to say that he takes responsibility 
for his actions (whether he thought about them beforehand 
or not) in that by so-doing he is admitting that his 
actions can be judged and that he can be blamed if they 
are found wanting. So understood, taking responsibility
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is clearly implied by the exercise of autonomy, but such 
a meaning cannot be entertained by Wolff because as a 
public demonstration it implies the existence of 
standards by which actions may judged, standards 
independent of the individual concerned, and it implicitly 
acknowledges the right of others to judge and to blame.
In other words, ’to take responsibility* in this public 
sense is an acknowledgement on the part of the individual 
that he is part of a wider social order which may make 
legitimate demands upon him, but this is contrary to the 
anarchist case,
6. A further implication which is involved with
the conception of autonomy in normative terms is that it 
introduces a relative element. If it is the case that 
the individual may choose whether or not to be autonomous, 
then autonomy ceases to be a term which is descriptive of 
a permanent state of consciousness or state of being.
It is misleading to think of autonomy as something like 
a title, such as sainthood, which once attached or 
accorded to an individual is thereafter indicative of a 
special status. Autonomy, on the contrary, is only 
evidenced when it is exercised, and whether to exercise 
it or not is a matter for decision. In other words, 
if what is meant by autonomy is making decisions for 
oneself rather than accepting the authority of others, 
then the individual may choose whether or not to 
exercise it often or occasionally, whether to exercise it 
on trivial or important matters. Furthermore, even the 
assumption that all men are rational beings masks real
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differences in the actual capacity for rationality as 
between individuals. The result is that while it is 
reasonable to suggest that, in general terms, all men 
are, in principle, potentially autonomous, it still 
remains the case that it is a matter of degree; 
it is a judgment based primarily on the incidence and 
importance of the occasions on which the individual 
decides matters for himself, and this will vary according 
to inclination, personality and circumstances.
In fact, autonomy is more intelligibly, and, 
hence, more properly applied to those occasions on which 
the individual exercises his own judgment. That is, in 
the social sense of the term which Wolff* adopts, it is 
the quality of specific judgments and actions which 
are autonomous or not, and it is only by way of such 
specific acts that the term finds any general application 
to an individual. If such is the case, then the argument 
that the individual has a right to autonomous status 
based on a duty to make autonomous judgments collapses 
as it has been argued that autonomy is vested in the 
quality of specific judgments and actions, not in general 
attributes of personhood. If there are rights to be 
claimed then they must be sought in justifications which 
are to be found in the qualities of autonomous actions, 
not in conditions which are necessary for the exercise 
of autonomy (such as rationality), or in general pre­
dispositions to exercise autonomy (the ’obligation’ 
involved).
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7» Finally, Wolff’s contention that the individual
has an obligation to exercise autonomous judgment 
independently of authority can be challenged. The 
following example in which Wolff attempts to show how 
autonomy can be reconciled with authority contains 
elements which make it particularly germane to the
present issue;
’If I am on a sinking ship and the captain is 
giving orders for manning the lifeboats, and 
if everyone else is obeying the captain 
because he is the captain, I may decide that 
under the circumstances I had better do what 
he says, since the confusion caused by dis­
obeying him would be generally harmful.
But insofar as I make such a decision, I 
am not obeying his command; that is, I am 
not acknowledging him as having authority 
over me.* (lO)
The interesting feature of this example is that it 
illuminates the circumstances in which the exercise of 
autonomy is inappropriate and the exercise of authority 
wholly justified — the contrary of Wolff’s inter­
pretation. In Wolffian terms there is an obligation 
on every individual as a rational being to be autonomous, 
that is an obligation which rests on every member of the 
crew. If, however, that obligation were realised, the 
result in this case would be likely to be disastrous 
as the action demanded by the emergency is unlikely to 
wait upon the results of individual decision-making by 
the crew. Instant obedience to the captain, because he 
is the captain and has authority vested in him, 
constitutes a good reason for putting aside the claims 
of autonomy, even supposing such claims were valid in
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th.© first place. In fact, although Wolff insists that 
the individual has an obligation to think and act 
autonomously, there are occasions and situations on 
which it can be claimed that there is a duty to obey 
authority. The duty of the soldier to obey his superior 
officer or the duty of the crew to obey the captain is 
not subject to autonomous judgments and agreement with 
such orders as are given, (ll)
The root of the difficulty lies in Wolff’s 
misrepresentation of the Kantian concept of autonomy.
The context within which Kant develops his notion of the 
autonomous will is that of moral choice. While it may 
well be that in moral terms the state of autonomy is 
expressive of man’s developed moral capacity, it does 
not follow that all situations are specifically moral 
in character and that the assumption of autonomy is 
appropriate in all possible contexts. As mentioned above, 
the primary duty of the soldier is to obey; it will only 
be in exceptional circumstances that this primary duty 
may be over-ridden and action taken on the basis of 
personal decision-making. When this does happen, any 
justification will have to be based on contingencies 
or principles other than an appeal to the individual’s 
supposed right or duty to autonomous conduct. In other 
words, the example aptly illustrates that there are 
rules concerned with social action which are not moral 
in character and which make no necessary claim on the 
individual qua moral agent.
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The point is highly significant in terms of the 
implications it has for the individual’s relationship 
with the authority of the state. Two conclusions follow 
which will be merely sketched in here. First, that the 
individual has no prior prima facie right or duty to 
the exercise and status of autonomy where the laws, rules 
or conventions which govern the civil life of the state 
are concerned. As has been demonstrated, the rules 
which order the state are to be differentiated categorically 
from those which may be held to govern moral conduct.
If there are grounds for recognising the primacy of 
autonomous decision-making in a political context where 
the authority of the state may be challenged, then such 
grounds are other than an appeal to the duty of the 
individual as a free and rational agent to decide matters 
for himself. A moral rationale is in itself an insufficient 
justification for the assumption of autonomous status in 
a political context.
Secondly, iH the case for upholding the individual, 
qua moral agent, reserving to himself the prior obligation 
to think and act autonomously in moral matters, it is 
necessary to demonstrate that the situation in which 
autonomous action is proposed is, in fact, a moral context.
In other words, should the individual find himself morally 
at odds with the injunctions of a civil law or rule, it 
will be necessary to draw a distinction between the 
individual’s response insofar as he acts as a moral agent 
and insofar as he responds as a member of the body politic.
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Such conclusions are necessarily tentative, and these and 
other matters which arise from them will be considered 
more fully in the following chapter.
Summary
The primary concern of this chapter has been 
to enquire into the challenge which is posed to the 
authority of the state by anarchism. In particular, 
that form of anarchism which is represented by R.P. Wolff 
in his essay ’In Defense of Anarchism* has been selected 
as offering the strongest philosophical challenge in 
that it is purportedly based in Kantian moral philosophy.
It has been argued that Wolff is fundamentally mistaken 
in his interpretation of Kant in terms of the political 
implications of his concept of autonomy in that he does 
not recognise Kant’s differentiation between categories 
of rule-governed behaviour, viz., the moral and the 
political. Neither does he recognise the Kantian 
distinction between the autonomy of the rational will 
and its opposition to inclination and other contingencies. 
By ignoring these matters, Wolff distorts the Kantian 
concept of autonomy imbuing it with a content which 
is inimical to the existence of all authority.
Also, simply taking the Wolffian concept of 
autonomy as meaning ’assuming responsibility for one’s 
own actions and decisions’ it has been demonstrated that 
by endowing the concept with a normative function, 
autonomy ceases to be descriptive of a general state of 
being or consciousness in the individual, but is more
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properly applied to specific occasions on which the 
individual may or may not decide matters for himself.
As such, autonomy will become relative between individuals 
as it will be dependent on the incidence of its occurrence. 
Moreover, as autonomy resides in the occurrence and not 
in some general state of being, the justification for the 
assumption of autonomy’s status vis a vis authority must 
be found in the circumstances in which it is exercised. 
Wolff also interprets the notion of ’taking responsibility* 
in terms of it indicating a private decision by the 
individual to bring rational capacities to bear on a 
problem rather than a public declaration of a readiness 
to inour blame. Wolff’s definition has the effect of 
creating great difficulties in judging the extent to 
which any decision or action is, indeed, autonomous. 
Finally, drawing on the distinctions examined earlier 
between categories of rule-governed behaviour, it has 
been denied that in situations which are social but 
not necessarily moral in character there is any primary 
and permanent obligation to the assumption of autonomy.
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Chapter 9
Morality and the State
1. To conclude that the anarchist case fails to
offer a substantiated case in favour of the claims of 
autonomy as against the claims of the state’s authority 
does not carry with it the implication that there is no 
moral dimension to the relationship between state and 
individual. Even to argue that there is a categorical 
difference between moral rules and civil rules does not 
preclude the possibility that the relationship which is 
involved between state and individual as it relates to 
the observance of and attitudes towards such rules has 
elements within it which are of moral signifioance,
It is this relationship which must now be further 
examined, particularly as the extent and nature of the 
individual’s obligation to the state will have important 
implications for both the legitimation of the state’s 
authority and the delimitation of that authority’s 
jurisdiotion.
One aspect of this relationship has already 
been the subject of enquiry - the Hegelian notion of 
Sittlichkeit has been examined and shown to be expressive 
of man’s subjective sense of obligation to his parent 
state (see chapters 3 & 4), Such an obligation is 
grounded in the extent to which the contents of 
individual consciousness are determined by the society 
into which the individual is born and in which he 
develops; also, if the contents of consciousness are.
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partly at least, determined by a specific social milieu, 
then it will be that society which is familiar and which 
is understood whioh, in turn, is likely to be the milieu 
within which the individual’s will to freedom will be best 
able to find expression. In other words, Sittlichkeit 
expresses the notion of a subjective obligation to the 
state based on the extent to which personhood itself is 
derived from the state, and the extent to which the 
state offers the most-favoured, because best understood, 
milieu within which personhood may be most fully 
expressed.
Analysis of the relationship between state and 
individual in these terms is fundamentally deterministic 
in that it posits the contents of individual conscious­
ness as being in some measure a reflection of the norms, 
ideas, knowledge, beliefs and values present in society 
at large. Such a model is most explicitly exemplified 
in the personhood and way of life to be found in those 
tribal societies which have managed to remain relatively 
uninfluenced by contact with Western civilisation. 
Morality in such a restricted model would necessarily 
be conventional and heteronomous (l) as the limitations 
of the model do not allow for the expression of self- 
conscious individualism and the concomitant value which 
is placed on autonomous judgment-making and the realisa­
tion of the individual as a se If-legislator in moral 
matters. It is, of course, moral personhood understood 
in these individualistic terms which forms the basis of 
the anarchist view that there is a ba»ic incompatibility
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between the demands of external authority and those of 
the autonomous agent.
So far, criticism of anarchist theory has 
focussed on confusions or contradictions implicit within 
the anarchist concept of ’autonomy*; but the concept of 
’autonomy* is central to personhood as it is understood 
in terms of the citizens of a modern state. Specifically, 
it is indicative of that power of decision which, to use 
Hegel’s phrase (2), is ascribed ’to the subjectivity of 
explicitly independent self-consciousness'. It is, 
therefore, necessary to understand the nature of the 
relationship of the individual as a self-conscious moral 
agent to the state, particularly if the authority of the 
state and the autonomy of the individual is not to be 
left in the ultimately sterile state of conflict which 
is the conclusion of anarchism.
2. It has been argued in previous chapters that
personhood is an achievement which is only to be attained 
within a social context of one kind or another. Moral 
autonomy, as an aspect of personhood, is only possible 
if the individual has developed the capacity for moral 
reasoning and making moral judgments. In other words, 
the individual cannot be intelligibly conceived of in 
atomistic terms, simpliciter; the achievement of 
personhood requires a social context whioh is necessarily 
a rule-governed complex of situations. However, this 
dependence on a social context for the achievement of 
personhood is not, and cannot be, the only link in the 
relationship between individual and state. If it were.
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the way would be open for a development of the anarchist 
argument which- could, without inconsistency, claim that 
although society may be necessary for the development of 
individual personhood, that does not entail that value 
should be placed on society and that the autonomous 
individual should be free to reject society in whatever 
form it takes as being intrinsically inimical to the 
exercise of autonomous judgment.
But such an argument is flawed. It has been 
argued in the previous chapter that should the anarchist 
rejection of society be carried to its logical conclusion, 
the result would be the dissolution of society. If 
everyone accepted their responsibility to exercise 
autonomous judgment, agreement between men as to social 
conduct generally would be entirely subject to the chance 
agreement of the judgment of atomistic wills and reasoning. 
In such a situation, social rules, such as the rule of 
law, would be denuded of all force, qua rules, and a 
state of affairs comparable to the classical state of 
nature would pertain.
The question which arises is, given a completely 
anarchistic state of affairs, to what extent would moral 
judgment and moral conduct be possible? The question is 
particularly pertinent as moral autonomy and its exercise 
are those aspects of individuality which must be taken 
into account in any argument purporting to limit the 
authority of the state. In answering such a question, 
it is tempting to suggest that where the individual is 
already capable of making autonomous judgments, his moral
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principles will ensure that he will continue to act with 
moral probity in whatever situation he finds himself, 
even one which is anarchic. However, such an argument 
ignores the extent to which the formulation, inter­
pretation and application of moral principles depends 
on the context being understood within which they are 
situated. Karl Popper, in considering the role of 
tradition in society, envisages just such a state of 
affairs and explores its implications for rational 
conduct :
*.... whenever we happen to be surrounded by
either a natural environment or a social 
environment of which we know so little that 
we cannot predict what will happen, then we 
all become anxious and terrified. This is 
because if there is no possibility of our 
predicting what will happen in our environ­
ment — for example, how people will behave - 
then there is no possibility of reacting 
rationally. Whether the environment in 
question is a natural or a social one is 
more or less irrelevant.’ (3)
Lacking all reverence for any rules, conventions or laws
beyond those which are generated by the self, the anarchist
state of nature would be, in principle, just such an
environment as Popper describes - one in which human
conduct would be completely unpredictable. A society is
only maintained by a continuing acceptance by its members
of the authority of those values, codes, conventions,
traditions, rules and laws which impart to the society
in question its own discernable identity. Such an
acceptance may be either overt or taoit; it can be
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critical or passive, there can be commitment to change 
or to the status quo: but whatever the attitude, the
authority of the rules, laws, conventions etc, must be 
acknowledged to some degree for the cohesion of the 
society to remain intact. Should a society disintegrate 
and not be swiftly replaced by a new complex of governing 
rules then the state of affairs envisaged by Popper will 
come into being; a state of affairs which, lacking all 
predictability, will simply engender terror and anxiety - 
not,strictly a Hobbesian state of nature born of the 
imperfections inherent in man’s nature, but something 
like it in effect, born of the ohaotic unpredictability 
of men’s actions,
3. The point can be illuminated (and itself
illuminates) by considering one of the ambiguities in
Kantian moral philosophy, a process which also discloses
the extent to which Wolffian anarchism distorts or
deviates from the concept of autonomy understood in
Kantian terms. The ambiguity in question is based
initially in Kant’s insistence on the purely rational
or a priori nature of his moral philosophy:
’Now it is only in pure philosophy that we can 
look for the moral law in its purity and 
genuineness (and, in a practical matter, this 
is of the utmost consequence): we must,
therefore, begin with pure philosophy (meta- 
physic) , and without it there cannot be any 
moral philosophy at all. That which mingles 
these pure principles with the empirical does 
not deserve the name of philosophy .....’ (4)
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The extent to whioh Kant ultimately manages to adhere to 
this self-imposed rigour in the formulation of the 
principles embodied in the various formulations of the 
categorical imperative is not at issue here. What is 
relevant is that the examples which Kant introduces to 
illustrate the practical application of his principles 
are not free of empirical data. When Kant demonstrates 
the inconsistencies involved in the willing and making 
of false promises, he necessarily presupposes social 
institutions and modes of life in which the activity of 
promise-making matters. Also, his discussion conoerning 
the morality of suicide is only intelligible in the light 
of an acceptance of empirical data on the nature of the
body and its mortality. J.G. Murphy suggests another
problem whioh similarly requires data drawn from 
experienoe;
’.....whether or not I act immorally in hoarding
a certain commodity - candy or oxygen, say, —
will depend in part on such empirical facts
as its scarcity and the extent to which it is
needed or desired by people.* (5)
Or again, all moral problems concerned with the ownership
of property will necessarily presuppose social institutions
and values which relate to ownership.
In the light of such examples it is reasonable
to conclude that, without necessarily disputing the
rational purity of Kant’s formal principles, where
practical moral reasoning is concerned which is aimed
at determining the rightness of moral conduct in real
situations, the situation in question will need to be
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understood in terms of the likely attitudes, dispositions 
and behaviour of others concerned. In other words, in 
order to make moral judgments which are relevant to the 
moral dilemma, relevant facts have to be known and 
assumptions made of an empirical nature. Indeed, that a 
moral dilemma is recognised within a particular situation 
in itself presupposes a recognitional framework; without 
the shared assumptions, facts, norms values and codes 
which are implicit in a social context, the grounds on 
which it is even possible to bring moral judgments to 
bear begins to crumble. The anarchist world of atomistic 
beings subscribing only to their own individual judgments 
and principles is a world without prediotability, which 
lacks the grounds on which assumptions concerning human 
conduct can be made, and which, consequently, offers no 
framework within which what it is to act morally or not 
can be judged.
Not only does practical moral judgment-making 
depend on a rule-governed social context for its 
intelligibility, but this condition, which is rendered 
ambiguous by the anarchist case, is implicitly recognised 
by Kant. While it is possible that purely rational 
wills may find themselves in agreement on moral matters 
by the application of a priori principles, what is more 
certain is that where the affairs of men are concerned 
(as opposed to purely rational wills) there is no such 
agreement. In fact, widely differing, if not contra­
dictory, maxims may be juètified by reference to the 
categorical imperatives. In other words, Kant’s
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philosophy implicitly allows for the diversity of rules 
which can exist and which can be contained within the 
framework offered by the rational principles. For Kant, 
society is implicitly given and, as has been argued, the 
social institutions and rules by which men live have to 
be taken into account in the interpretation of the 
categorical imperatives and the making of moral judgments. 
Wolff, on the other hand, appears to assume that social 
life will continue on the basis of a purely rational 
agreement (as with pure wills) as he refuses to acknowledge 
that the actual moral diversity which exists is founded 
in a given social diversity of governing rule—governed 
situations which have their own particular claims to 
authority.
The important and positive conclusion which 
emerges from this critique is that a social context is 
a necessary condition for the functioning of man’s moral 
capacities. Not only is a state of nature antipathetic 
to the development of personhood but even if it were 
willed by the universal adoption and application of 
autonomy-founded anarchism, the resulting state of 
affairs would be inimical to the functioning of autonomy 
as expressive of the fulfilment of human moral capacities.
It follows from such a conclusion that if the 
practice of morality is dependent on the maintenance of 
a social order, then there must be an obligation on the 
part of the individual as a moral agent to maintain the 
conditions within which the practice of morality is 
possible. It would clearly be contradictory for the
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individual in the name of radical moral autonomy to will 
the destruction of the very conditions within which the 
practice of morality becomes possible. Where the choice 
is between the maintenance of an existing rule-governed 
situation and the chaos of anarchism, the individual, 
qua moral agent, is bound by the logic of morality to 
choose in favour of the former.
The conclusion that morality is grounded in a 
rule-governed situation can be extended to include the 
activities of man as a rational agent. Insofar as the 
praotice of morality is a rational activity, it follows 
that all rational activities, not just morality, require 
a rule-governed society for their expression. Just as 
moral praotice requires a rule-governed context for its 
intelligibility so rational actions, by the same token, 
derive their intelligibility by virtue of their being 
understood within some rule-governed context. That 
being so, it follows that man, qua rational agent, must 
support a rule-governed society rather than the incoherent 
state of affairs implied by anarchism.
4. There is another aspect of the relationship
between moral rules and social rules which anarchism 
ignores. This is the extent to which the capacity to 
make moral judgments contains within it the logical 
conditions which make the development of social rules 
possible. The point is that insofar as moral judgments 
embody moral rules then it is the case that rationality 
and, particularly, universality is implicit within such 
judgment-making. While judgments remain interior, so to
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speak, or personal to the individual concerned, their 
status, qua moral judgments remains undisturbed and, as 
such, they are an expression of the morally autonomous 
standing of the individual. However, if, as Wolffian 
anarchism seems to envisage, two or more individuals, 
that is an embryonic society, mutually agree to adopt 
such rules, then a change takes place in the character 
of such rules and the relationship to them of the 
individuals concerned. They are no longer private 
rules which are subject only to the rational appraisals 
of the individual concerned; instead, the process of 
mutual agreement has the effect of explicitly externalising 
them, the result of whioh is to impart to the rules an 
authority over and above the judgments and appraisals 
of the individuals concerned. In particular, the 
implicitly universal character of moral judgments becomes 
explicitly universal when these rules publicly relate to 
and govern the conduct of a society. Moreover, not only 
does the universaUsability of moral judgments strengthen 
and become explicit in the transformation into public 
rules, but the moral perspective which is founded in 
universalisability, that is a concern for moral rightness, 
is itself transformed in the externalising process into 
a public concern for right conduct, that is a concern 
for justice and fairness.
Such an analysis has important consequences.
Not only does it demonstrate the extent to which anarchism 
refuses to face the logical development of its own 
arguments, but it offers an account of the genesis of
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rules within society. If social rules can be held to 
be the expression of the externalisation of private moral 
judgments, then the legitimating procedures of the state 
may be held to be the means by which social rules are 
formalised. But because the moral foundations are 
recognised, the need for the law to be justified and 
ultimately legitimated in terms of ’right* is emphasised.* 
At this point it is necessary to displace Kant 
in favour of Hegel as the central figure, as for Kant 
the only category of moral obligation which is acknowledged 
is that which is based in a good will, that is, the duty 
placed on the individual rational will to bring about 
that which accords with the Categorical Imperative. In 
other words, it is morality (moralit^at) conceived of 
as a personal obligation to bring about a state of 
affairs not yet realised which is his central concern.
But the obligation of the individual to the maintenance 
of social order is of a different category; it is to an 
existing state of affairs, it is a means to an end, viz., 
the maintenanoe of the conditions which are necessary 
for the conduct of moral reasoning and judgment-making, 
and that state of affairs need not necessarily be good 
in itself. What the foregoing analysis allows is the 
Hegelian notion of Sittlichkeit developed to include an
* Insofar as law can be held to contain a moral dimension 
as an inherent characteristic, the problem of accounting 
for the legitimacy of law other than in terms of self­
legitimacy - a problem faced by legal positivists - 
is resolved. The problem disclosed is that of establishing 
the formally inherent properties or characteristics which 
a valid law should have.
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obligation which is founded in the moral nature of man. 
It should be noted that this dimension of Sittliohkeit, 
unlike the subjective bond between individual and state 
delineated in chapters 3 and 4, is objective in that it 
is an obligation capable of unambiguous analysis and 
capable of being consciously known. The concept of 
Sittlichkeit, therefore, embodies the moral obligation 
which the individual has towards the state both in 
terms of his identification with that society which is 
in large measure responsible for the character of his 
personhood and within which, as a most-favoured milieu, 
personal freedom is most likely to be realised; and in 
terms of the individual’s recognition, either implicit 
or explicit, that the state is a necessary state of 
affairs for the realisation of a moral way of life; and 
that the state itself is a moral entity insofar as it 
is capable of embodying justice within its rules and 
laws. The individual is, as a result, obligated to the 
maintenance and betterment of the state, an obligation 
which is not inter-personal in Kantian terms, but which, 
none-the-less, derives logically from man’s status as 
a moral agent and which is, therefore, moral in 
character. It could be said that the sense of duty 
which is present in the individual’s moral dealings 
with others and the sense of duty which is present in 
the individual’s relationship with the state are both 
informed by the same capacity to struoture the world in 
moral terms.
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4, The foregoing analysis stands in need of
qualification on at least two related issues. First 
of all, the argument that the individual has an 
obligation to maintain the state would appear to carry 
with it the implication that the obligation is to uphold 
the status quo. This does not follow. The argument 
has been couched, so far, in terms of clear-cut 
alternatives: the implications whioh the maintenance of
society has for the individual as a moral agent as opposed 
to the implications which the dissolution of society 
would have for the individual as a moral agent. The 
conclusion that it is morally unwarrantable to will the 
dissolution of society does not entail that it is equally 
unwarrantable to will change, even radical change, in 
society. What has been posited so far are extremes — 
the state/society or not the state/society. Between 
these extremes lie the most complex problems of politics, 
viz., the extent to which the individual’s general 
obligation to maintain the state requires obedience to 
specific laws or to specific forms of government, or, 
conversely, the extent to which the authority of the 
state is justified in exacting obedience from individuals 
and the limits, if any, of that which may be legitimately 
authorised in the name of the state.
Secondly, some comment is required on the 
contention (see p. 233) that the individual has a moral 
obligation to the maintenance of the state even though 
that state may not necessarily be good in itself. The 
analysis so far has been conducted in morally neutral
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terms in that all that is required for the exercise by 
the individual of personal morality (moralit^at) is a 
sooially rule-governed situation. Whether or not the 
rules governing society are just or unjust, whether or 
not the government of that society is legitimate or 
illegitimate is irrelevant, in principle, to the 
justification of the individual’s moral obligation to 
the maintenance of a situation within which the moral 
life can be lived. The categorical difference between 
the rules governing civil life and those governing 
personal morality has already been demonstrated, a 
differentiation which allows the Kantian conclusion that 
the organisation of society requires only intelligenoe 
and not moral worth on the part of its inhabitants
(’As hard as it may sound, the problem of setting up a
state can be solved even by a nation of devils (so long 
as they possess understanding)®) (6). If this argument 
holds, then it must follow that unless the laws of the
state interfere with the fulfilment of the demands of
personal morality, the character of the civil rules:.in 
terms of their justice or lack of it is, strictly, 
irrelevant. It is possible for a man to live a moral 
life in an unjust state, albeit not so easily as one 
ordered by just laws. The necessary condition for the 
enactment of the moral life is an ordered social 
context, not that specific qualities, such as justice, 
should inhere within that order.
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That said, the necessary qualification is that 
although any ordered state, however unjust, is morally 
preferable to a state of social chaos, this does not 
entail that the character of the state’s laws are of no 
moral concern to the individual. The argument which 
has been developed and which interprets Sittlichkeit in 
terms of a specific moral dimension ensures that the 
character of a state’s laws will be a matter of continuing 
moral concern to the citizen in that any appraisal of the 
laws will, necessarily, contain a moral element. To 
suggest this much is enough to establish the grounds on 
which the notion of ’right* or justice within the law 
can be based. An examination of the nature of ’right* 
and the implications arising from this for the freedom 
of the individual and the authority of the state will 
be examined later.
Summary
The principal concern in this chapter has been 
to demonstrate the moral necessity for the state as embody­
ing the required rule-governed conditions within which 
the individual’s moral life may be enaoted and find 
fulfilment. Such an argument adds further strength to 
the grounds for upholding the individual’s moral 
obligation (Sittlichkeit) to the maintenance of the 
state. That argument has been framed in terms of 
positing the implications for the moral life of the 
state’s dissolution and has been morally neutral with
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regard to the justice of the laws and rules which govern 
the state. However, in analysing the extent to which 
civil rules may be held tc be an externalisation of 
moral rules, it has been argued that both universality 
and right derive from this specifically moral source and, 
as such, will have a particular claim on the moral concern 
and obligation of the citizen.
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Chapter 10
Authority, the State and the General ¥±11
1. The stage has now been reached where the
central problem of political authority can now be examined. 
This is the problem of locating and delineating the 
legitimising source of the state’s authority; more 
specifically, it is the legitimation of law which is 
the area of enquiry as it is through law and the devolution 
of authority made necessary by the administration of law 
that the state’s authority is most clearly apprehended.
To this end, it will be helpful to rehearse those 
conclusions reached so far in this work which are 
directly relevant to this problem as such conclusions 
form a framework of assumptions within which the enquiry 
is contained.
First of all, it is intended to discuss authority 
within the context of the ideal model of a political 
society developed earlier in this work. It will be 
recalled that the purpose of developing suoh a model is, 
principally, to enable the enquiry to be conducted within 
a context which is relatively free of the highly ambiguous 
features which permeate real societies and actual political 
situations. The model, although an idealisation, is, 
nevertheless, an abstraction from that whioh is known in 
actuality, and, as an abstraction,may be held to retain 
those features which are fundamental to the political 
process. In other words, its ideal nature derives not 
from its status as a theorem developed from what may be
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held to be self-evident assumptions, but from its status 
as a model representing the necessary conditions which 
are held to be present within the actuality of the 
political process.
It follows that if it is the case that where 
there are problems concerned with the legitimation and 
scope of authority in the ideal model, then not only will 
such problems be exposed with the greatest clarity as 
they will be unclouded by the presence of complicating 
contingencies, but both the form in which the problem 
is exposed and the conclusions to be drawn from any 
subsequent enquiry will bear the character of being the 
worst and best possible cases respectively. If the 
problems of authority and freedom which arise in actual, 
and hence less than ideal political societies are still 
present in an ideal model, such problems will be exposed 
as being fundamental to the political process,and in this 
sense may be held to be worst possible cases. Similarly, 
any adequate case purporting to resolve such problems 
will be the best possible in that if it is adequate to 
meeting the conditions present in the ideal model, it 
will be adequate to meeting those present in actuality 
as it will be dealing with, as stated, problems 
fundamental to the political process. For example, if 
there are principles which may be held to limit the 
exercise of authority in an ideal state, they should be 
adequate to their limiting function in a less than ideal 
state. To say this is not to imply that as the best 
possible case its application to political actuality
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will be perspicuousÎ the contingencies present in reality 
will create a complexity of additional factors which 
may well obscure the fundamental character of the case 
derived from the ideal model. Nonetheless, it is the 
best possible case precisely because it is fundamental, 
and this quality will remain even though the contingencies 
present in actuality may hinder an appreciation of it 
in these terms.
Secondly, it has been argued that insofar as 
problems of political authority are social problems, it 
is necessary to delineate the necessary features present 
in society which are relevant to the presence and 
exercise of authority. In particular, the logical and 
practical necessity for society to be understood as a 
rulS'-governed or complex of rule-governed situations 
has been insisted upon and the early chapters of this 
enquiry demonstrated the consequent requirement for 
authority as a practical necessity born of the inherent 
ambiguities arising from the formulation and application 
of rules, per se. This is a case which has been reinforced 
by demonstrating that the anarchist attempt to conceive 
of society without authority, other than that of the 
autonomous individual, is ultimately incoherent as it is 
the rule—governed basis of society whichanarchism 
undermines.
Next, in spite of an inherently unavoidable 
arbitrary element, the state has been chosen as the 
social unit in which it is appropriate to locate authority. 
The principal reason is that the state is that unit which
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is open to definition in terms of the Jurisdiction of 
law and is, therefore, a coherent and identifiable socially 
rule-governed entity. Also, it is within the state that 
contingent features such as the embodiment of tradition, 
territorial boundaries, and that peculiar sense of moral 
obligation referred to as Sittlichkeit are to be recognised.
Finally, given the paradox of freedom whereby 
individual freedom is an intelligible concept only within 
the context of a rule—governed situation, it has been 
argued that when men decide for themselves on the social 
rules by which they shall live, this is the condition 
within which individual freedom can be held to be 
realised in an intelligible form. In other words, 
men may be held to be free where the social rules which 
delimit individual freedom of action arise from delibera­
tion among those subject to the rules. The activity of 
politics is the process of such deliberation, a process 
which results in the formulation and legitimation of 
rule(s).
The foregoing characteristics are integral 
features of the ideal model, although the last one which 
introduces individual freedom as an essential element 
invites immediate comparison with the rationale under­
lying Kant*s universal principle of right. The recogni­
tion of this principle as a necessary element in the 
model will be developed during the discussion which 
follows.
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2. To propose that a formal principle such as
Kant*s principle of right is an element within that 
category of social rules through which the individual's 
freedom is realised, and at the same time to posit the 
social conditions which are necessary for the formulation 
of such a framework of rules is to imply that there at 
least two important strands of thought, or, more precisely, 
conditions which have to he met before the formulation 
and legitimation of rules within a political community 
are properly constituted and understood. In order to 
explore this dualism it is appropriate to consider the 
conception of politics and the state described by 
Jean—Jacques Rousseau in 'The Social Contract*. Of special 
significance in this respect is the notion that the 
legitimation of law in a political society is to be 
traced to its matrix within the body politic, the 
Sovereign, and to its expression through the medium of 
the 'general will*. The notion of the 'general will* 
also focuses attention on the crucial problem which 
centres on the nature of the individual's obligation 
to obey the laws of the state and the extent to which 
the state may legitimately exercise authority over him.
However, before preceding to deal directly 
with these matters it is necessary first to comment on 
the nature of Rousseau's theory and its relationship 
with the ideal model adopted here. There is a congruence 
between the two which brings with it its own particular 
difficulties - difficulties mainly of an interpretive 
nature. For example, consider the mode of association
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presented in this model. It has been argued consistently 
throughout this work that personhood is an achievement 
necessarily connected, both logically and practically, 
with the existence of society. The inter-relationship 
and inter—dependence which exists between the individual 
and society has already been explored in connection with 
the development of the Hegelian notions of Sittlichkeit 
and volksgeist. It has been argued that the ties which 
bind the individual to the state in terms of the moral 
obligation to which he is subject are based on the 
desire for freedom and the requirement that freedom is 
most likely to be achieved within an environment which 
is understood. Such an environment is likely, in fact, 
to be that into which the individual was born and reared. 
It follows from such conclusions that neither the 
legitimacy of the state's authority nor the basis of the 
individual's obligation to the state is founded in a 
contract of any sort. The central contention is that 
the individual is bound to the state in terms of a 
necessity which is part and parcel of the attainment 
of personhood and that it would be misleading to 
introduce into such a mode of association the voluntary 
element which appears to be implied by contract theory.
In this respect, it is of interest that 
Rousseau, apparently an advocate of contract theory, is, 
in fact, ambivalent in his approach to the problem of 
association. It is certainly the case that he makes use 
of the familiar contrast between civil society and a 
state of nature, and that he uses the concepts of
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'contract*, 'compact* and 'treaty* to indicate, variously, 
the nature of the relationship between individual and 
state. But, significantly, although 'rights' appear 
in his argument, they are not central to his thesis.
For example, Rousseau does not begin by explicitly 
establishing as necessary assumptions the specific rights 
which are to be upheld or surrendered in establishing 
the- contract. His statement of the problem to be 
considered leaves the matter of rights implicit, if they
are there at all;
'The problem is to find a form of association 
which will defend and protect with the whole 
common force the person and goods of each 
asscciate, and in which each, while uniting 
himself with all, may still obey himself 
alone, and remain free as before.* (l)
The tenor of the language lacks the conviction which
would be appropriate to a theorist who holds that men
have certain and inalienable rights which must be
protected. Rousseau's language is more tentative,
expressing ends such as the protection of the individual
and his property as well as the autonomy and freedom
of the individual as desirable ends in view rather than
rights which need to be enshrined. Or again, in
Rousseau's solution to the problem the terminology is
significant ;
•Fach member of us puts his person and all his 
power in common under the supreme direction 
of the general, and, in our corporate capacity, 
we receive each member as an indivisible part 
of the whole.* (2)
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Once more, although Rousseau is ostensibly describing 
the terms of the contract, it is noticable that his 
description does not resolve itself into the respective 
rights and duties of the state and subject, but, rather, 
he may be understood as stating, albeit opaquely, the 
logical ccnsequences for the individual if and when a 
political community is established. Furthermore,
Rousseau illustrates his account of the emergence of a 
political society with examples which indicate that the 
political community is the outcome of a process of 
political evolution rather than a contractual event.
He comments on the significance of the family as 
offering the most primitive model for the eventual 
emergence of a free society. Such an example is revealing 
because the family can be understood as a corporate body 
in embryo within which the members are bound each to the 
other by the ties of affection and mutual dependence.
It is the case that the development of claims to rights 
in such a mode of association would be a signal that the 
ties which bind the participants are disintegrating.
Rights tend to be the posited safeguards for individuals 
understood in atomistic terms.
In the same chapter, Rousseau also comments on
the institution of slavery;
'Nothing can be more certain than that every 
man born in slavery is born for slavery.
Slaves lose everything in their chains, even 
the desire of escaping from them; they love 
their servitude, as the comrades of Ulysses 
loved their brutish condition.' (3)
248
The significance of these examples is that each draws on 
the social nature of man as he is viewed in specific 
contexts (i.e., the family and the state of slavery).
The attitudes ascribed to men in each case, whether it 
Ibe independence and a love of freedom which is 
engendered by the family, or the opposite which a state 
of slavery encourages, are the outcome of the specific 
nature of the particular context. Such examples and 
the points they illustrate are, strictly, irrelevant to 
a theory of contract association which needs only to be 
concerned with working out the form of the contract to 
be entered into, i.e., agreement on the rights to be 
retained and surrendered to authority in exchange for 
the measure of security to be obtained. It is, in 
other words, predicated on the assumption that a mode of 
association needs to be brought into existence and that 
it can be worked out using rational considerations only. 
Observations of the kind that the family may contain 
within it the conditions which foster autonomy, and the 
institution of slavery the conditions which sap the 
desire for freedom have no place in a model which is 
theorem-like in its structure. In fact, any other 
existing mode of association is likely to conflict with 
the imperatives created by an association based on a 
recognition of rights.
It is clear that Rousseau is fully alive to the 
effects on the consciousness of the individual of the 
institutions which exist at any given time. Indeed, 
later in 'The Social Contact*, his extended comments
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on the constitution and law of ancient Rome give 
evidence both of his sense of historical precedent 
and his awareness of the importance for the individual's 
attitudes and beliefs of the current social and political 
climate of opinion and framework of accepted beliefs 
which pertain at given periods of history. Thus, 
although Rousseau's model is framed within the terminology 
of classical contract theory and it retains the essentially 
normative character of such theory, nevertheless it is 
shot through with an awareness of man's social nature 
and the extent tc which the individual is shaped by the 
institutions within which he lives and the historical 
conditions which obtain. To that extent it can reasonably 
be claimed that his philosophy is open to interpretation 
in terms which are not entirely dissimilar to those which 
characterise the relationship between man and state 
adopted in this work, particularly insofar as the conditions 
which underlie the terms of the association present in 
'The Social Contract' are similar to the moral and, to 
a certain extent, sociological considerations dwelt on 
here .
It is the case that Rousseau is at one and the 
same time both rich in his political thought and ambiguous 
in its expression. As such, he remains.in constant need 
of interpretation. That being the case, while there is 
no intention to force an interpretation of 'The Social 
Contract* into, say, an Hegelian mould, it is legitimate 
to interpret specific aspects, where they will bear the 
burden of such interpretation, in a manner which emphasises 
their congruence with the present thesis.
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3» The foregoing observations find their full
significance when the matter of Rousseau's notion of the 
'general will* is approached, as this is the concept 
which touches most centrally on the problem of political 
authority of present concern. However, the problem 
itself needs to be stated carefully and this requires 
a restatement of the conclusions and assumptions within 
which it is embedded.
It is argued that in social and political terms, 
'freedom* is to be understood as the state:in which men 
live by laws for which they, and they alone, are 
responsible in the sense that they have endorsed them.
In a society or state embodying this principle it will 
follow that the legitimising source of all law must 
reside within the political community. Ideally, the 
population of such a community and that of the state 
will be one and the same. To suggest that the political 
community is the source of legitimacy is to imply that 
sovereignty and, hence, ultimate authority resides 
within the body politic. As a matter of practical 
necessity, in order to impose a period on the time allowed 
for discussion and amendment, all laws must have been the 
subject of legislation by agreed procedures (whatever 
they may be) by which the body politic gives the 
imprimaturs of legitimacy to the law(s) in question.
It is the validity of the legitimising process which 
imparts to law its de jure authority - de facto recognition 
is another matter.
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As law engendered in this way is the proof 
whereby a political community can be said to have 
existence, it would appear that the individual who is a 
member of such a community is thereby bound to accept 
and obey all laws which have been subject to the 
legitimating process. If the individual were not 
obligated in this way, it is difficult to see any 
substantive force that law could have in ordering the 
affairs of the state, and the political community 
would be liable to dissolution into anarchy or some other, 
probably authoritarian, form of government. In other 
words, it is a necessary condition for the continued 
existence of a political community that the individual 
recognise that his interests are best served by upholding 
the law. To say this much is not to imply that the 
individual has entered into a contract which obligates 
him in legal or quasi-legal terms, but is, rather to 
suggest that the continued existence of a political 
community demands a sophisticated sense of civic 
responsibility if the continued existence of such a 
community is desired. A political community represents 
a way of life- a way of life, it has been argued, which 
offers the greatest opportunities for the realisation of 
freedom in personal terms as compared with other possible 
forms of social and political organisation. This being 
the case, the maintenance of the conditions for the 
realisation of freedom demands the continued existence 
of the political ccmmunity. To that extent, the 
individual must be prepared to acknowledge the importance
-  252 -
of law as it embodies, in some sense,the will of the 
community as a whole as against the realisation of 
personal interests where they conflict with the law.
At the very least, the individual must understand and 
recognise the significance of law for social life 
generally, and must be prepared to accommodate his 
judgments to include its demands.
4. It is tempting to conclude, in fact, that where
a political community exists as being the social organisa­
tion best suited to the realisation of freedom, the law 
is paramount and that the individual is under a permanent 
obligation to accept the supremacy of the law if he 
wishes the way of life in the political community to 
endure. Such a conclusion would be both consonant with 
J.A.L. Austin's positivistic view that the law is the 
command of the sovereign, the sovereign in this case 
being the political community, and with the more 
authoritarian interpretation of Hegel which stresses 
the supremacy of the state and reduces individual 
freedom to the 'freedom* to obey the state. However, 
before examining the implications of such a conolusion 
and its preceding rationale, there are two justificatory 
points to be made on the case as it stands. In the first 
place, it has been argued in the previous chapter that 
public discussion is essential to the decision-making 
process within a political community. There must not 
only be freedom of speech but the health of the body 
politic depends on advantage being taken of such a freedom 
to explore publicly the issues which are relevant to
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whatever legislation or action is proposed. To that 
extent, law which finally emerges with statutary force 
is the result of a participatory process and is not an 
imposed and arbitrary decree as far as any individual 
citizen is concerned. The individual would have the 
opportunity to put his point of view; indeed, as a 
citizen, he will have an obligation to voice his 
objections or reservations. As such, he will have been 
a participant in the legislative process even though the 
result may not be to the satisfaction of any one person.
Secondly, although the conclusion reached 
would appear merely to reinforce the objection to the 
paradox by which the individual is required to sacrifice 
real freedom of action in order that freedom in some 
general and ill-defined sense be obtained, such an 
objection is too coarse-grained stated in these terms.
It is possible to conceive of individual freedom in 
terms of complete freedom of action, but such freedom 
can only be bought at the price of sacrificing justice 
and must, by its nature, be fragile and limited to the 
few. A tyrant or dictator may be free in these terms, 
but such a concept of freedom has little to do with the 
problem of the freedom of the individual in society.
Given that the present concern is with freedom in 
society or the state and given the imperfections of men, 
it will be the case that freedom and constraint 
necessarily go hand-in-hand. The enquiry into anarchism 
has demonstrated the contradictions implicit in the 
notion of a society which is not regulated by rules which
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are themselves constraining mechanisms. What is of 
importance is not the fact that there are rules, but 
their character, source and means of legitimation.
5» That said, the conclusion suggested in the
first paragraph of the preceding section is too 
extreme in that it does not allow for the reality of 
principled objection to, and rejection of law, and the 
case on which it is based is ambiguous in important 
respects. It is this latter consideration which will 
be examined first. In particular, what has been 
referred to as the * legitimating process* inherent in 
the establishment of law is far from clear. At the 
heart of the notion of legitimation in this context is 
the assumption that law which is engendered by the 
political community embodies within it the will of the 
community and it is this which imparts to it its 
legitimacy and its authority. It is, of course, 
precisely this notion which Rousseau developed in his 
concept of the 'general will*, and it is this which 
must now be considered.*
* The danger which is present, particularly in a 
representative democracy, cf oppressive power being 
wielded by the government in the name of the general 
will is discussed by Bertrand de Jouvenal in On Power, 
Beacon Press, Boston, I962, pp. 254-279»
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The difficulty inherent in discerning in a
corporate body such as the state an identifiable entity
conceived of in terms which indicate that it is to be
thought of as being more than the sum of the individual
parts which make the whole has already been faced in
connection with the exploration of the Hegelian notions
of Sittlichkeit and volksgeist. Where legislation is
concerned, the difficulty is compounded as there are no
empirical data, such as identifiable national characteristics,
which are relevant to the notion of 'will* in this context.
Rousseau is quite specific in differentiating
the general will from the will of all:
'There is often a great deal of difference 
between the will of all and the general will; 
the latter considers only the common interest, 
while the former takes private interest into 
account, and is no more than the sum of 
particular wills: but take away from these
same wills the pluses and minuses that cancel 
one another, and the general will remains 
the sum of the difference.* (4)
Furthermore, even though he seems to suggest that the
general will is exercised through assemblies of the
whole people, nonetheless the actions of such an assembly
are of themselves no guarantee that they will result in
an expression of the general will;
* the general will is always upright and
always tends to the public advantage; but 
it does not follow that the deliberations of 
the people always have the same rectitude.
Our will is always for our own good, but we 
do not always see what that is; the people 
is never corrupted but it is often deceived, 
and on such occasions only does it seem to 
will what is bad.' (5)
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It follows that if it is possible for the political
assembly as a whole to be mistaken in its perception of
the general will, it will also be possible for the
majority to be mistaken where there is a difference of
opinion, or, conversely, for the minority or even the
lone individual to be the agency through which the
general will finds expression. It is significant in
this respect that Rousseau accords a degree of respect
amounting to reverence to the man who fulfils the role
of legislator. Although the legislator lacks the
authority of sovereignty, it is clear that he has to
have penetrating and disinterested insight into, and
understanding of, those laws or constitutions which
are in the best interests of the society he serves.
In other words, although Rousseau does not explicitly
attribute this to him, it would appear that he is a
major source for the expression of the general will:
'In order to discover the rules of society 
best suited to nations, a superior 
intelligence beholding all the passions of 
men without experiencing any of them would 
be needed. This intelligence would have to 
be wholly unrelated to our nature, while 
knowing it through and through; its 
happiness would have to be independent of 
us, and yet ready to occupy itself with 
ours; and lastly, it would have, in the 
march of time, to look forward to a distant 
glory, and, working in one century, to be 
able to enjoy the next. It would take gods 
to give men laws.* (6)
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It is the specific role of the legislator to draught
law, but in the absence of such an exceptional individual
there is no reason to suppose that any member of the body
politic may, on occasion, even unknowingly, give
expression to that which is in the best interests of the
community as a whole and, as such, be voicing the general
will. This gives rise to two difficulties: (a) how is
the general will to be differentiated from that which
is merely an expression of individual wills, and (b) what
is the relative status, in terms of legitimacy, of that
which is an expression of the general will as opposed
to that which is not but which may, in fact, be law?
6. The importance of the first question is
paramount because the expression of the general will
is binding upon the individual in absolute terms:
** whoever refuses to obey the general will
shall be compelled to do so by the whole body. 
This means nothing less than that he will 
be forced to be free; for this is the 
condition which, by giving each citizen to 
his country, secures him against all personal 
dependence. In this lies the key to the 
workings of the political machine ; this 
alone legitimises civil undertakings, which, 
without it, would be absurd, tyrannical and 
liable to the most frightful abuses.' (7)
In this passage, Rousseau emphasises that the state is
justified in using force to coerce the individual who
flouts the expression of the general will; the clear
implication is that the individual has an absolute
obligation to obey that law within which the general
will is embodied. It can only be in conditions which
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cloud the Individual's judgment of where his duty lies 
that he could be led to disobey; in particular, the 
pursuit of private interest may lead the individual to 
attempt to put aside his public duty. The use of coercion 
can then be understood as the assertion of the authority 
of the Sovereign, an authority which is necessary if the 
rule of law and, hence, the cohesion of the social unit, 
viz., the political community, is to be maintained.
In that sense, the notion of being 'forced to be free* 
becomes intelligible as the imposition of such constraints 
on the freedom of the individual are necessary to 
maintain the conditions within which a free or political 
society can continue to exist.*
* The implication of interpreting the notion of being 
•forced to be free* in these terms is that the use of 
coercion is not just an expedient or unfortunate but 
necessary evil as suggested by Utilitarian political 
philosophy; rather, coercion is logically entailed by 
the overriding claims for the preservation of freedom 
and justice. So understood, Rousseau's philosophy is 
entirely consistent with Kant's;
*.....if a certain use to which freedom is put is 
itself a hindrance to freedom in accordance with 
universal laws (i.e. if it is contrary to right), 
any coercion which is used against it will be a 
hindrance to a hindrance of freedom, and will thus 
be consonant with freedom in accordance with 
universal laws - that is, it will be right. It 
thus follows by the law of contradiction that right 
entails the authority to apply coercion to anyone 
who infringes it.' Kant, I., 'The Metaphysical 
Morals' in Kant's Political Writings, (ed. Reiss, H.),
c.u.p., 1970 p. 134.
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The appropriate analogy here is with the 
Kantian concept of the autonomous man who is 'free* 
when he acts in accordance with the moral law, but who 
ceases to be autonomous when his desires or other 
considerations deflect his will from acting in 
accordance with the moral imperative. For Kant, it is 
crucial that the individual can choose and that autonomy 
is gained in an act of will which is the personal concern 
of the individual alone, but then the context is one of 
private, individualistic morality. Rousseau, on the 
other hand, is dealing with social relations, and, in 
particular, the conditions which are required to uphold 
a specific,'if ideal, set of social relationships, namely, 
the political state of affairs which has to pertain if 
freedom in a social sense is to be secured. In such 
conditions, obedience to the law is a matter of public 
concern because if it is undermined the whole society 
will be at risk.
7» But how is a genuine expression of the general
will to be recognised? To answer this question it is
necessary to examine more closely the vehicle through
which it is known, that is, the law. That the law is to
be identified, in Rousseau's theory, with the general
will is unambiguous:
'The sovereign, having no force other than the 
legislative power, acts only by means of the 
laws: and the laws being solely the authentic
act of the general will, the Sovereign cannot 
act save when the people is assembled.* (8)
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The concluding remark in the above quotation again 
underlines Rousseau's conception of society understood 
in terms of relationships arising from actual association 
within an assembly of the whole community. But when he 
considers the characteristics of law, other considera­
tions surface;
'But when the whole people decrees for the 
whole people, it is considering only itself; 
and if a relation is then formed, it is 
between two aspects of the entire object, 
without there being any division of the 
whole. In that case the matter about which 
the decree is made is, like the decreeing 
will, general. This act is what I call 
law.' (9)
The reasoning here gives rise to the conclusion that the 
defining characteristic of law is its generality or 
universality; that is, that law is only law if and 
when (a) it is engendered by the whole of the sovereign 
populace, and (b) the rule which so emanates is universal 
in its application to that populace. To put it in 
Rousseau's language 'the law unites universality of willr.
with universality of object* (lO). That which does not 
so originate or that which does not have this general 
scope is not law but is 'a decree, an act, not of 
sovereignty, but of magistracy* (ll). Once more the 
distinction surfaces which runs throughout 'The Social 
Contract*, viz., the clear differentiation between the 
spheres of private or particular wills and those which
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are the province of civil affairs - the public and the 
general will,*
It has already been noted in section 3 that it 
is the legislative procedure, in this case the sovereign 
assembly, which imparts to law its de jure legitimacy.
It is the second defining characteristics, the 
universality of jurisdiction which goes some way towards 
establishing the criteria necessary for the differentia­
tion of the general from the particular will. The 
matter may be viewed in the following way. If the 
raison d'etre of a political community is the formulation 
and legitimation of the rules by which its members live, 
it follows that such rules must be framed in accordance 
with principles which may be held to govern right conduct. 
Right conduct here, of course, does not carry with it the 
implication of moral worth understood in individualistic 
terms, but right in accordance with that necessity which 
is the logical outcome of the rationale underpinning the 
existence of the political community itself. In other 
words, as has been posited earlier, the basis on which a
* Although the notion of magistracy in Rousseau's terms 
is clear, it also implies a further differentiation 
within the body politic. Executive functions concerned 
with the implementation of law and the management of the 
state will also be acts of magistracy unless or until 
suchacts are shown to be valid expressions of the 
general will. The implication is that the exercise of 
authority within the state will be subject to the 
limitation that authoritative decisions must be shown 
to be consistent with the law in that they authentically 
express the general will. In a political community, the 
final validation would be through the vigilance and 
critical capacities of the citizens.
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political community rests is the desire for freedom, in 
particular, the freedom of men to live according to 
rules or laws for which they and they alone are 
responsible. If freedom is the basis for the state, 
that principle which most adequately expresses both the 
underlying ideal and the form within which it should be 
translated into law is Kant's formulation of the
universal principle of right;
'Every action which by itself or by its maxim 
enables the freedom of each individual's will 
to co-exist with the freedom of everyone else 
in accordance with a universal law is right.*(12)
The principle is formal insofar as it encapsulates the
criterion of civil right against which all external
actions (not wills) must be consistent; it is also formal
in that it is not only rationally derived from the
considerations which are necessary for the preservation
of freedom, but from its universal quality which is a
necessary feature of its status as a fundamental principle.
It follows that in a political community which must place
value on equality of consideration and respect for reason
in the framing of law, such a principle will inform the
legislative process. Law which is partial or which
discriminates against members cr sections of the community
without sufficient reason will offend against the criterion
in respect of both universality of application and the
just enjoyment of freedom.
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¥hat is significant in Rousseau's thinking is 
that his defining characteristic in respect of the generality 
of law is entirely consistent with the Kantian requirement 
for universality as expressed in the principle of right, 
but that, for Rousseau, the requirement for universality 
is derived not from an a priori consideration of the 
logic of law and freedom, but from a consideration of 
the social processes which result in the formulation of 
law. Rousseau's criterion of universality derives from 
the constant political need in the framing of law to 
disregard sectional or individual interests and to 
consider only those of the whole community — it can only 
be in these conditions that the general will can be. 
expressed. So it is that the universality of law is the 
logical conclusion of a process in which the community 
is conceived of as a corporate body which is the author, 
in the strict sense of being the originator, of its own 
laws. It also follows that as the*laws are, properly 
speaking, only the conditions of civil association* (l3) 
the expression of that association in the language of 
politics will also be characterised by rationality and 
universality, even though these may be perverted on 
occasion to suit the wills of sectional or individual 
interests.
What is more, even though the requirement, which 
Rousseau insists upon, for a legislator will be criticised, 
it is clear in the conception of this superior being 
that the qualities which are desired are those of 
rationality, impartiality and an incisive understanding
— 264
of the requirements of both law and community. That 
being so, it is legitimate to conclude that above all 
the general will is an expression of rational will.
Law which is consistent with the demands of freedom 
and rationality will, therefore, be judged to be a 
true expression of the general will; on the other hand, 
law which is tainted with the contingencies of the partial 
or the arbitrary may be judged to be no more than an 
expression of individual wills in which faulty judgment 
or sectional interest is displayed.
It is in these terms, it can be concluded, that 
the notion of the general will is to be understood and 
it is in these terms that the criterion emerges whereby 
expression of the general will as opposed to the particular 
will may be distinguished. But what is of particular 
importance for the model of an ideal political community 
presented here is that there need be no disjunction 
between the social process by which law is formulated 
and the formal criterion by which the validity of the 
law, qua law, is to be judged in a free society. It is 
this criterion which is the lynch pin, because although 
Rousseau presents a model of a specific society in that 
it must be relatively small in order to meet in general 
assembly, once the criterion is established whereby the 
general and particular wills may be differentiated, the 
mode of association can be left open in terms of its 
specific organisation and procedures; what must remain 
constant in the mode of association is a wholehearted 
attachment to the supremacy of freedom and rationality
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as the values which should permeate all stages in whatever 
social processes are devised for the formulation and 
legitimation of law.
8. So far, the discussion has proceded on the
assumption that all rules which are legitimated by the 
body politic and which are compatible with the criteria 
of freedom and rationality are law, and that the business 
of the political community is limited to the creation of 
law in these terms. However, the sovereign body, and, 
even more likely, the executive arm of the sovereign 
body, government, will promulgate rules whose scope is 
not general and which may be directed towards particular 
groups or even particular persons in society. Rousseau
admits both the existence and validity of such measures;
 * even what the Sovereign commands with
regard to a particular matter is no nearer 
being law, but is a decree, an act, not a 
sovereignty, but of magistracy.* (l4)
In other words, a distinction may be drawn between what
may be called the rules which govern right conduct,
which are universal in scope and which are informed by
the principle of universal right, and those rules
which are limited in scope and whose necessity is
dictated by the need to achieve specific ends. In a
paper devoted to the analysis of the categories of
social rules. Professor F.A. Hayek explicates this
distinction and offers a terminology to accommodate it;
* By nemos we shall describe a universal rule 
of just conduct applying to an unknown of 
future instances and equally to all persons 
in the objective circumstances described by
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the rule, irrespective of the effects which 
observance of the rule will produce in a 
particular situation. Such rules demarcate 
protected individual domains by enabling 
each person or ogranised group to know which 
means they may employ in the pursuit of their 
purposes, and thus to prevent conflict between 
the actions of the different persons. Such 
rules are generally described as * abstract* 
and are independent of invididual ends.
They lead to the formation of an equally 
abstract and end-independent spontaneous 
order or cosmos.
In contrast, we shall use thesis to mean 
any rule which is applicable only to particular 
people or in the service of the ends of rulers. 
Though such rules may still be general to 
various degrees and refer to a multiplicity 
of particular instances, they will shade
imperceptibly from rules in the usual sense
to particular commands. They are the necessary
instrument of running an organisation or taxis » *(15)
The distinction involved invites comparison with Michael
Oakeshott's notions of enterprise and civil associations
(already examined in chapter 2). As has been noted, a
political community does not exist for a specific purpose
other than the realisation of freedom; to that extent it
is end—independent and the rules which emanate from it
will govern conduct as and when the circumstances in
which the conduct is enacted and the rule applies are
held to be relevant. The rules of a political community
or a civil association will preserve this character,
termed * nemos* by Hayek. Enterprise association, on
the other hand, is end—directed and the rules engendered
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will be directed towards the achievement of that end; 
the rules will be managerial in character and, as such, 
will be consistent with the rules termed f thesis * by 
Ha ye k .
That a political society can change its 
function from being a civil association concerned with 
noraes to an essentially managerial society concerned to 
achieve specific ends would appear to present no 
fundamental difficulty. Rousseau suggests that in his 
model of a relatively small assembly such a change in 
the mode of association is simply to be achieved by an 
act of will:
* merely by virtue of a new relation of all
to all, the citizens become magistrates and 
pass from general to particular acts, from 
legislation to the execution, of the law.
This changed relation is no speculative 
subtlety without instances in practice; it 
happens every day in the English Parliament, 
where, on certain occasions, the Lower House 
resolves itself into Grand Committee, for 
the better discussion of affairs, and thus, 
from being at one moment a sovereign court, 
becomes at the next a mere commission.* (l6)
It is more probable that, typically, the so-called acts
of magistracy will be delegated to the executive, i.e.,
the government of the state.
What is of crucial importance, however, is the
relationship between the two rule categories. In the
model of a political community developed here, there can
be no doubt that the sovereignty of the political
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community should be paramount in that the executive should 
be accountable for its acts of magistracy to the sovereign 
body. It follows that rules (thesis) engendered by the 
executive should neither take precedence over nor 
conflict with law (nemos) which is an expression of the 
general will. A demonstration of what may be termed the 
supremacy of sovereignty over magistracy is exemplified 
in way in which the Prevention of Terrorism Act has to 
be renewed at stated intervals precisely because it 
abridges civil liberties and gives extra powers to the 
security forces. There can be no greater internal 
danger, short of outright subversion, than that the 
political community should mistake its function in favour 
of exercising an exclusively managerial role or that it 
should allow executive acts and rules to over-ride the 
principles inherent in law, especially, to use Rousseau*s 
terminology, where such law is an expression of the 
general will.
Summary
The discussion in this chapter has centred on 
two topics; (a) the legitimising of law through the 
legislative process, and (b) the conditions necessary 
for the characterisation of law as the guide to right 
conduct in a free society. In order to explore these 
areas, Rousseau*s theory of the state as presented in 
*The Social Gcntract*has beentexamined with particular 
relevance to its capacity to illuminate and develop 
the ideal model presented here, Rousseau*s theory has
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been shown to be based, on the assumption of corporate 
association, not contract theory. Also it has been 
demonstrated that the qualities inherent in law, 
understood as an expression of the ‘general will*, are 
consistent with Kant*s universal principle of right, 
especially with regard to universality and rationality. 
On this basis it has been argued that the de jure 
legitimation of law within the ideal model does not 
need to be based on the existence of a relatively small 
political community as is assumed by Rousseau, but that 
public agreement on the procedures by which law is 
formulated is sufficient. Also, the universal principle 
of right offers a criterion by which legitimacy of law 
may be judged - legitimacy as judged by its consistency 
with its function as a guide to right conduct as opposed 
to furthering sectional or individual interest. The 
distinction between the notion of law as the guide to. 
right conduct and rules or decrees which are necessary 
to bring about specific ends has been discussed with an 
insistence on the supremacy of the former.
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Chapter 11 
Universality and Right
1. The examination of the factors contributing
to the legitimacy of law in a political community has, 
so far, been focused on two elements, viz., the extent 
to which legitimacy depends on agreement concerning the 
processes through which law is formulated and ratified, 
and the formal characteristics which must inhere within 
the law for it to be judged consistent with the demands 
of freedom implicit in the notion of a political community. 
Stress has been placed on the role of procedures or the 
modes of association in the realisation of de jure 
legitimacy, while the formal criteria for judging the 
consistency of law with the demands for freedom begin to 
offer the means by which limitations can be placed on 
the scope of law even though it may, in other respects, 
be considered legitimate. As they stand, these 
conclusions are insufficient in themselves either to 
offer a complete account of the legitimation of authority 
within a political community or to offer a substantive 
rationale on which the grounds obligating the individual 
to accept and obey the law can be challenged.
It is the latter consideration which will be 
examined first. In particular, the adequacy of 
universality as a criterion by which to judge the 
adequacy of law in terms of civil right or justice must 
be subjected to scrutiny. To this end, the respective 
notions, of, and implications arising from, universality
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as it is employed by Rousseau and Kant will be examined, 
and, in the light of this examination, an interpretation 
of universality will be offered which is consistent with 
the requirements of the ideal model.
2, It is helpful, initially, to return to that
aspect of Rousseau*s theory in which the legitimacy of 
law is to be understood as arising from an agreed 
procedure or mode of association. In Rousseau*s terms, 
law should be the embodiment of the general will; if 
it is less than this it is merely the expression of 
particular wills. The problem is how the one is to be 
differentiated from the other. In the previous chapter, 
the argument was developed that Kant*s universal 
principle of right appeared consistent with the 
characteristics of law in terms of both generality of 
inception and generality of application, and on this 
basis the principle could function as the means by which 
the one could be differentiated from the other.
Rousseau, however, does not attempt directly to develop 
the criterion of universality as a means of distinguishing 
the embodiment of the general from the particular will; 
instead, he has recourse to the notion of the legislator 
as the man with the qualities necessary to frame law 
which faithfully reflects the general will. Such a 
person has the god—like qualities of supreme disinterest­
edness, and the ability to discern that which is truly 
in the public interest and to translate it into law:
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*In order to discover the rules of society- 
best suited to nations, a superior 
intelligence beholding all the passions of 
men without experiencing any of them would 
be needed. This intelligence would have to 
be wholly unrelated to our nature, while 
knowing it through and through; its 
happiness would have to be independent of 
us, and yet ready to occupy itself with ours; 
and lastly, it would have, in the march of 
time, to look forward to a distant glory, 
and working in one century, to be able to 
enjoy the next. It would take gods to give 
men laws.* (l)
It is a conception which invites comparison with Plato*s 
guardians in terms of the intellectual and moral qualities 
required; but while Plato*s Republic is founded in a 
metaphysic and an epistemology which enables him to 
conceive of the emergence and education of such superior 
beings in terms of the internal consistency of hisraodel, 
for Rousseau, the appearance of the legislator is 
apparently left to the vagaries of chance. That great 
lawmakers have appeared from time to time in history 
gives substance to the ideal of such intellectual 
qualities and civic virtues being encompassed by one man, 
but that such a being should be required in a political 
community in which ultimate responsibility for the law 
resides within the community is profoundly unsatisfactory. 
The need for a legislator in a society unused to political 
discourse would be entirely understandable, but the 
vernacular language of politics contains within it the
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characteristics which are consistent with the framing 
and application of law, viz., the assumptions of 
universality in its scope and equality in its application 
In other words, it should he within the competence of a 
political community to frame its own laws as well as 
ratify them.
Of greater significance are the implications 
for a political community should such a legislator be 
lacking. If the community itself cannot differentiate 
between law which is an expression of the general will 
and that which is not, it follows that the continued 
existence of the political community as the embodiment 
of the values of justice and freedom must be in a 
state of continual jeopardy. Should, for example, the 
state of affairs come about in which the political 
community conceives of itself in managerial terms then 
the laws which result will be narrowly end-related 
and bear the character of decrees (thesis). Or if the 
pursuit of sectional interest becomes uppermost, once 
more the law, and with it the community, will degenerate • 
the former into unjust decrees, the latter into a mere 
collection of competing interests. It is at least 
arguable that in contemporary politics the problem is 
mirrored in situations such as that in South Africa 
where the minority effectively legislate in their own 
interests and against those of the majority. Such a 
situation could be interpreted as being a case in which 
the general will has been subordinated to the pursuit
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of sectional interest with the result that the state is 
diminished as a political community. It is in these 
terms that the need for a legislator is to be understood, 
and in these terms it can be seen that such a solution 
is profoundly unsatisfactory.
Such a criticism of the role of the legislator 
is to accept the description offered by Rousseau in 
literal terms, that is, to accept that the notion of a 
legislator is offered by Rousseau as a practical solution 
to the problem of ensuring that the laws of his political 
community will be just laws and accurate reflections of 
the general will. Later, in this chapter, a different 
interpretation will be suggested which avoids these 
difficulties and which illuminates the ideal model 
developed here.
3* Even though it is possible to maintain that it
should be within the capacities of a political community 
to frame its own laws, the problem of distinguishing 
that which is consistent with the principles of freedom 
and rationality remains because Rousseau*s insistence 
on the fallibility of men is valid. At this point the 
suggested solution, that is, the application of the 
universal principle of right, must be considered.
It has already been noted that the Kantian 
principle of right is consistent with the criterion of 
universality employed by Rousseau. However, Kant*s 
universality apparently goes beyond Rousseau*s concept 
in certain important respects. Universality in the 
Rousseaunian sense is to do with the generality of
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application; that is, the difference between a law and
a decree is that the former must apply, either actually
or potentially, to everyone within the society and the
latter singles out, in terms of application, a
particular person or group. By this criterion, a law is
to be recognised as a law and not a decree if its scope
is implicitly universal:
* as the law unites universality of will
with universality of object, what a man, 
whoever he be, commands of his own motion 
cannot be a law; and even what the Sovereign 
commands with regard to a particular matter 
is no nearer being a law, but is a decree, 
an act, not of sovereignty, but of magistracy.*(2)
‘Universality of object* is exemplified in the case of a
law protecting certain forms of wild life as it applies
to all and defines conduct which is permissable in that
area of life. An example of this kind, together with
examples like the laws defining acts of murder, rape,
theft and so on, illustrate the strongest form of
universality of application. At the opposite extreme,
the naming of a specific person or group as being subject
to specific constraints for some particular reason bears
the character of a command and not of law.
Between these extremes there will be an
imperceptible shading of the degrees of universality a
law may disclose before it sheds completely the character
of being law. This shading is mainly the consequence of
the creation ofcategories of persons who are specifically
subject to the provisions of the law. Rousseau notes this
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attribute of law in the following terms:
‘.....law considers subjects en masse and 
actions in the abstract, and never a particular 
person or action. Thus the law may indeed 
decree that there shall be privileges, but 
cannot confer them on anybody by name. It 
may set up several classes of citizens, and 
even lay down the qualifications for member­
ship of these classes, but it cannot nominate 
such and such persons as belonging to them; 
it may establish a monarchical government and 
hereditary succession but it cannot choose a 
king, or nominate a royal family.* (3)
Thus the law is not necessarily weakened in its status
qua law by its necessity to create classes or categories
of persons. However, though Rousseau does not consider
this, the process of category-creation may be, in turn,
characterised as being more open-ended or more closed-
ended depending on the nature of the case. A law making
the wearing of seat belts compulsory for all drivers of
cars and their passengers is open-ended as this is a
category within which all the members of a community may
find themselves included at seme time or other. As such,^
it remains a strong case of universality of application
in the sense that the universality applies not only to
the class of drivers and passengers, per se, but also,
implicitly, to the whole community insofar as all are
eligible for inclusion in this class. On the other hand,
a law introducing conscription for all eighteen year old
men is weaker in terms of universality because although
it applies to the whole category of eighteen year old men,
its implicit scope of application is limited to a finite
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section of the population, viz., those who are male and 
eighteen or under — all others must necessarily be 
excluded on the grounds of sex and/or age. The status 
of such a law, in terms of its consistency with the 
criteria of freedom and justice, will be ambiguous as 
the criterion of application has ceased to be even 
implicitly universal and for this reason it requires a 
special justification. It would appear that the more 
criteria are introduced which create categories standing 
in need of a special or ad hoc justification, the more 
suspect will be the status of the law as defined by the 
criterion of universality. Laws which define legal or 
illegal conduct in the most general terms will be more 
secur.Qoin their status than those which create specific 
categories of persons, particularly categories which are 
exclusive in their membershipby virtue of some qualifying 
criteria.
4. Although there is nothing inconsistent between
Rousseau*s concept of universality and Kant*s formulation 
of the universal principle of right, the respective 
notions of universality employed by each apparently 
differ in important respects. This is particularly the 
case if the assumption is made that each is concerned 
with developing a model which is self-consistent and does 
not stand in need of support or addition from other 
sources. In the first place, Rousseau*s conception of 
universality derives from the conditions implicit in the 
mode of association outlined in *The Social Contract*,
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that is, the requirement for universality is necessitated 
by the participation of free and equal individuals as 
associates in framing the laws which will regulate the 
functioning of their community. Kant, on the other hand, 
begins from a more strictly individualistic standpoint 
in the sense that all men, as rational individuals, are 
bound by the demands of pure reason. So universality, 
for Kant, derives not from a mode of association, but 
transcendentally from that which is the defining 
characteristic of all men, namely, reason. Moreover, 
man*s freedom resides entirely in his capacity to free 
himself from the limitations of his empirical or 
corporeal condition by apprehending that reality disclosed 
by pure thought. To put the matter in more explicitly
Kantian terms, it is through the insights of reason that
the merely phenomenal can be pierced and knowledge of 
the noumenal gained.
That the universal principle of right is the 
product of pure thought and is an a priori principle is
not in doubt;
‘What is right? The jurist, if he does not 
wish to lapse into tautology or to base his
answer on the laws of a particular country
at a particular time instead of offering a 
comprehensive solution, may well be just 
as perplexed on being asked this as the 
logician is by the notorious question;
‘What is truth?* He will certainly be able 
to tell us what is legally right within a 
given context, i.e., what the laws say or 
have said in a particular place and at a 
particular time; but whether their provisions
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are also in keeping with right, and whether 
they constitute a universal criterion by which 
we may recognise in general what is right and 
what is unjust are questions whose answers 
will remain concealed from him unless he 
abandons such empirical principles for a time 
and looks for the sources of these judgments 
in the realm of pure reason.* (4)
The problem lies in the extent to which the principle is 
capable of fulfilling its function as the criterion of 
just law. To begin with, it must be noted that in 
stating *let your external actibns be* such that the free 
application of your will can co-exist with the freedom 
of everyone in accordance with universal law* (5) Kant 
places freedom at the heart of the principle and to that 
extent it is fair to claim that for Kant, the law is the 
means by which the autonomy of the individual is to be 
preserved and enhanced. But in contrast with the freedom 
of the good will which knows that which is in accordance 
with the moral law as delineated in the ‘Groundwork of 
the Metaphysic of Morals*, the freedom with which he is 
concerned in his theory of law is not the freedom of the 
will but with the freedom to act.
While it is possible within the purely moral 
philosophy to erect a convincing theory of moral duty in 
terms of what Kant calls ‘pure knowledge* (6), as he is 
there concerned mainly with explicating the nature of the 
individual*s apprehension of his duty in terms of ratio­
cination, such a course is not open to him in connection 
with the political philosophy as freedom of action requires
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a public arena within which to find expression — it demands 
a social context. In particular, if freedom of action 
is to be safeguarded, it must be known what actions are 
to be subject to the constraints of law and which are 
not. In other words, insofar as it is public conduct 
which is the subject of concern, then what counts as . 
freedom is not a matter to be settled a priori, but it 
will depend on the specific freedomswhich are valued and 
which may be embodied in the traditions of a given 
society. Even with so basic an example as the outlawing 
of theft, the right of the individual to enjoy his 
possessions is dependent on the mores of the society in 
question - tribal societies are known of which hold all 
possessions in common and so would have no concept of 
theft as it is usually understood. Furthermore, even if 
it is allowed that acts of violence against the person 
are not subject tc cultural considerations (and this is 
by no means self-evident), it is the case that empirical 
knowledge of what constitutes an act of, say, murder is 
necessary for it to be the subject of legislation and, 
hence, subject to the criterion of the principle of 
right. If the principle is not to remain inert but is 
to prove capable of application is must necessarily take 
into account the empirical world,
3 . It is the manner of its application to actual
or proposed laws that the problem of the relationship 
between the a priori and the contingent world becomes 
critical. If it is granted, as has been argued, that
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the embodiment of the principle through a recognition 
of actual freedoms is the case, then it must be shown 
how such an embodiment is achieved. If the example 
of theft is taken, it is clear that a prior assumption 
must be made that value is placed on the freedom of 
the individual to enjoy possessions which are right­
fully his. It follows that a rule inhibiting the freedom 
of others to remove, arbitrarily, the individual's goods 
will be necessary for the preservation of the valued 
freedom.
As a transcendental principle, the implication 
is that the method of application must be essentially 
similar to that of the categorical imperative where 
moral law is concerned. That is, that by speculatively 
reflecting on a world in which the proposed maxim or, 
in this case, law has universal force, any element of 
self-contradiction in the law will be exposed immediately. 
The simplest demonstration is to take a contrary example. 
Suppose it is intended to pass a law legitimating the 
arbitrary taking of life - making murder legal. While 
it could be argued that such a course would be to increase 
the permissable freedom of action of all to kill others, 
the effect of universelising such a rule would be to 
make life for everyone insecure, and certainly to remove 
the possibility of free actions on the part of those 
who would be victims of such an ensuing state of.affairs. 
In such a case, the injunction to act externally so that 
the exercise of free choice could harmonize with the
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freedom of everyone else according to universal law 
would be contravened. It also follows that the contra­
dictory of the postulated law would be consistent with 
the principle, that is, that a law aimed as securing 
the right of the individual to live free from the fear 
of arbitrary violence will accord with the spirit of the 
qualifying principle and can be universelised without 
inconsistency.
That the test of universalisation has recourse 
to empirical considératiens is significant, emphasising 
once again,the need for the principle to find embodiment, 
and hence inteirpre taticn, within a social context. 
Further, although the principle does not carry any 
necessary implication of furthering human happiness and 
is not utilitarian in that fundamental sense, it cannot 
escape the consequentialist aspect of the utilitarian 
case in that the social effects of legislation on 
specific matters has to be taken into account in that 
it has to be seen whether the legislation, in fact, 
brings about the desired extension of freedom.
While the test of universalisation can be shown 
to be capable of application as a criterion of justice 
in fairly straightforward cases of maxims aimed at 
protecting the individual from arbitrary violence, 
greater difficulty is experienced where legislation is 
proposed in other areas of life. To take an example 
used earlier, it would appear that legislation 
protecting certain species of wildlife would have the 
effect of limiting the freedom of action on the part of
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some without any very obvious gain in freedom elsewhere 
unless the rather tenuous case is accepted that the 
freedom of all to enjoy the protected species will be 
enhanced. However, such an argument is unconvincing as 
the case in favour of protection is not essentially tc 
do with freedom at all but is to do with the value 
placed on preserving certain species from extinction.
The implication is that although it may be accepted 
that freedom can be held to be the primary value in a 
political community, it is possible, on occasion, for it 
to be subordinated to the requirements of other values 
in specific cases. To say this much is net to suggest 
that freedom is lost sight of, merely that in appropriate 
circumstances other values important in the life of the 
community have also to find expression.
Of a different order of difficulty is legisla­
tion in the field of industrial relations. Laws either 
legitimating the right to strike or outlawing such action 
present difficulties in the application of the Kantian 
criterion. The reason is that in terms of freedom of 
action, strike action extends and inhibits freedom at 
one and the same time. The freedom of the strikers is 
enhanced whereas the freedom of those affected by the 
strike will be restricted. In fact, legislation 
affecting either the rights cf what- may be called the 
* no—rights* of groups as opposed to individuals is 
likely to be influenced strongly by the contingent 
context within which the legislation is proposed.
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Considerations other than those to do with freedom will 
predominate. But even if it is granted that politics 
is fundamentally to do with individuals and their desire 
for freedom, arguments deploying freedom in these terms 
will be used both for and against the case, whichever 
form the legislation takes.
On the basis of such examples, and it is not 
difficult to multiply such difficult cases, it would 
appear that the universal principle of right is 
ineffective as a criterion of justice if its status as a 
principle of pure reason is to be safeguarded. Even 
cases involving personal violence are not immune from 
the necessity to have empirical data taken linto account 
and this alone detracts from the a priori force of the 
principle. In fact, understood in these terms, it would 
appear thattthe Kantian approach to the problem of 
establishing the justice of law is particularly open to 
the Hegelian charge cf vacuity. It must also be said 
that in ‘The Metaphysical Elements cf Justice* Kant 
does not further his case by offering any substantial 
examples of the principle*s application. This is a 
deficiency which has led one commentator (7) to deny 
that Kant has a theory of law at all. Indeed, Kant‘s 
reluctance to demonstrate the fully normative character 
of the principle of right as a criterion by which the 
validity of law may be judged in terms of its justice 
permits him to assert that ‘it is the duty of the people 
to tolerate even what is apparently the most intolerable 
misuse of power* on the positivistic grounds that ‘it is
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0 . .impossible to conjireive of their resistance to the supreme 
legislation as being anything other than unlawful and 
liable to nullify the entire legal constitution,* (8)
It is significant that both Rousseau and Kant, 
faced with the same problem of establishing unequivocally 
the distinction between just and unjust law in practical 
terms, offer apparently unsatisfactory solutions.
Rousseau introduces the notion of the legislator, the 
objections to which have already been noted; and, Kant, 
by refusing to acknowledge the need for empirical 
content with its utilitarian implications, ultimately 
refuses to face the problem at all and has recourse to 
straightforward injunctions that the law must be obeyed 
at all costs. It is also significant that a philosophical 
approach which is based in an overt recognition cf the 
social context , such as John Stuart Mill* s , is not so 
fatally affected by this difficulty. Mill*s principle 
of liberty (9) is more forthright in establishing the 
criterion by reference to which the individual liberty 
of men may be restricted. That said, the problem still 
remains of demonstrating that the universal principle 
of right fulfils an indispensible function within the 
legitimation of Taw in spite of its vulnerability to 
the charge of vacuity.
6. So far, the analyses of Rousseaunian and
Kantian approaches to the problem of justice have 
tended to emphasise the differences in their respective 
models. However, if the philosophies are interpreted
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laying more stress on implicit considerations, not only 
do the differences narrow but, as will be demonstrated, 
each reinforces and illuminates the other in a way which 
strengthens the tenability of each. Also it should be 
borne in mind that the primary objective is to offer 
interpretations which are consistent with, and buttress 
the general model, developed in this work. It is the 
validity of the universal principle of right within 
this context which is the end in view.
With this qualification, it is appropriate to 
reconsider the role of the legislator in ‘The Social 
Contract*. It will be remembered that, ostensibly, the 
legislator appeared to be introduced as a means of 
over-coming the lacuna caused by the fallibility of 
the body politic in expressing the general will and the 
need to have the general will realised in law if the 
continued existence of the political community is not 
to be jeopardised. Understood in the historical and 
incipiently sociological cast of much cf Rousseau*s 
writing, it would appear that he is advocating the 
legislator as a role which needss tc exist, rather like 
a political institution, as a response to a practical 
difficulty. But philosophically the notion of the 
legislator can be understood not as a role but as a 
personification of the qualities which may be held to 
be necessary for the realisation of the general will.
In fact, the picture of the legislator which 
emerges from Rousseau*s description (iG) is of an 
intelligent, conceptually sophisticated, rational being.
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He is disinterested in his concern for the well-being of 
the community, objective in his appraisals and impartial 
in his judgments. Finally, he is aware of the political 
needs of a free society, particularly the need not to 
serve sectional or individual ends, and is persuasive in 
eliciting acceptance of his recommendations. In essence, 
it is rationality cast in a practical mould, rationality 
made effective.
Kant, on the other hand, begins with rationality, 
particularly as it is defined by the criterion of 
universality. But it has been shown that universality, 
or more strictly, universalizability in a priori terms 
alone leads only to vacuity where the universal principle 
of right is concerned. If, however, the notion of 
universal law is interpreted as being that which is in 
accord with the demands of reason, then on this matter 
the convergence cf Rousseau and Kant becomes apparent.
To interpret the notion cf ‘universal law* in this way 
is, admittedly, to do some damage to Kant*s conception 
of pure reason as the implication now admitted is that 
reason itself has to be situated in a content, and so 
the strict a priori character of Kant*s use of ‘universal 
law* is lost. However, even though the interpretation 
does not do justice to the extent of Kant*s metaphysic, 
the universal principle of right becomes once more a 
practical principle capable cf application within the 
framework of the ideal model. Similarly, in this 
context, the qualities evinced by Rousseau*s legislator 
become the specific characteristics of rationality
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needed for the realisation of justice or right in the 
laws of a political community.
There is a further aspect of their respective 
philosophies in which Kant and Rousseau complement each 
other. Central to the universal principle of right is 
the idea of freedom; indeed, the principle itself may 
be understood as a statement of the assumption that the 
freedom of the individual is the raison d*etre of the 
law. But it must be remembered that the law is not 
concerned with the individual*s sense of moral duty but 
with delimiting the extent to which the individual can 
rightfully exercise his freedom of action. The 
corollary of this is that the law not only constrains 
but ifc legalises and so creates the conditions within 
which freedom of action can be exercised as cf right.
Mary Gregor argues that the universal principle of 
right is to be understood as the defining principle 
through which the individual has * the right to acquire 
rights in general* (ll). Seen in this light, the 
principle implicitly recognises man in the context of 
social relationships in which individual actions impinge 
on the actual or proposed actions of others. It is to 
do with the outer freedom of individuals to pursue their 
own ends - not tc determine these ends but to determine 
the framework of rules within which such personal ends 
may be pursued. Interpreted in these terms, the principle 
can be understood as underlining the essential rationale 
of men joined in a mode of association the purpose of 
which is to live by laws which are just, that is, laws
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which protect and enhance the actual freedom of the 
individual. This, of course, is precisely the end which 
is sought within Rousseau*s political society and which 
is recognised in the established mode of association 
within that society, and it is also, for that matter, 
the end in view of the model developed within this work.
Summary
The central problems examined in this chapter 
are the means by which law as, in Rousseau*s terms, an 
expression of the général will may be differentiated 
from decrees which are the expression of individual wills; 
and the means by which law, in Kantian terms, embodying 
rightness or justice can be distinguished from law in 
which that quality is absent. In each case it is 
universality which is proposed as the criterion of 
right, but it is a notion of universality which differs 
significantly in each case. For Rousseau, universality 
is primarily universality of conception and of application. 
As a criterion it is shown tc be capable of differentiating 
between extreme cases of law at its most general and of 
decrees at their most partial, but it is less effective 
in indicating the validity of laws which create 
categories of individuals, particularly where these 
categories are subject to exclusive qualifying criteria.
Kant*s universal principle of right, on the 
other hand, has been shown to be open to the charge of 
vacuity. It has been demonstrated that the application 
of the principle necessarily requires interpretation in
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empirical terms and, in particular, the insistence cn 
freedom which is central to the principle, must be 
embodied in the specific freedoms which are valued in 
the social context of its application.
However, it has been further argued that 
relevant aspects of both Rousseau*s and Kant*s 
philosophies are open to interpretation which shows 
them to be complementary. It has been argued that 
Rousseau's notion of the legislator, criticised as a 
prospective role in society, is philosophically more 
productive if it is regarded as a personification of 
the qualities required for the realisation of just laws, 
qualities which are predominantly rational. Such a 
conception is congruent with Kant's stress on 
rationality, particularly if the notion of 'universal 
law' is understood in terms of practical reason rather 
than purely a priori reasoning. It has also been shown 
that the universal principle of right contains within it 
an implicit recognition of man in a social context in 
that the principle is concerned with the rightness of 
law, and law itself governs the outer freedom of men.
To that extent, the principle implicitly recognises 
man in a mode of association with his fellows, a mode 
which is concerned with realising freedom and justice, 
and, to that extent, the central concern is congruent 
with mode of association developed by Rousseau in 'The 
Social Contract*.
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Chapter 12 
The Realization of the Rational State
1» So far, the idea of law has been presented
in terms of itcbeing understood as the means by which 
the extent of the individual*s outer freedom is delimited, 
while the legitimacy of law has been seen in terms of 
the rightfulness of its claim on the individual to accept 
its constraining function. As far as legitimacy is 
concerned, it is the nature of this *rightfulness* 
which has been examined. In particular, it has been 
argued that a major test of such rightfulness is to be 
found in the criterion of practical reason, in terms of 
which, Kant*s universal principle of right has been 
interpreted. But to interpret it in terms of practical 
rather than pure or a priori reason is to imply that it 
is reason situated in a social context. It is the 
further implications of reason so situated which must 
now be examined.
The problem is to delineate the character of 
embodied reason which will determine both the nature of 
the individuates autonomy and the realization of the 
state in terms of the ideal model, that is, the 
association of men in a political community responsible 
for the laws by which they will live. It is a problem 
which Hegel resolved by positing historical stages 
culminating in the development of the modern state.
This is the condition which is the achievement, of a 
synthesis between the autonomous but subjective freedom
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of the individual and the objective freedom, realised
by virtue of the rationality of its articulation, of the
social context, the state. Hegel states it in the
following way:
* The state is the actuality of concrete 
freedom. But concrete freedom consists in 
this, that personal individuality and its 
particular interests not only achieve their
complete development and gain explicit
recognition for their right ....but .... 
they also pass over of their own accord 
into the interest of the universal; and, 
for another thing, they know and will the 
universal; they even recognise it as their 
own substantive mind; they take it as their 
end and aim and are active in its pursuit.*(l)
Freedom is attained through the individual's awareness
that his personal freedom is a product of rationality
and that rationality can determine the conditions of his
outer freedom, that is, the social context within which
he lives. The result of attaining a rationally
articulated society or state is that the individual*s
subjective personal freedom is reflexively enhanced:
*The principle of modern states has prodigious 
strength and depth because it allows the 
principle of subjectivity to progress to its 
culmination in the extreme of self-subsistent 
personal particularity, and yet at the same 
time brings it back to the substantive unity 
and maintains this unity in the principle 
of subjectivity itself.* (2)
The freedom of the rational individual is complete
because as both personal and outer freedom are grounded
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in rationality there is no dichotomy. Stated in these 
terms, the Hegelian principle of the state is in accord 
with the principles developed and incorporated within 
the ideal model, which also has the purpose of seeking 
a harmonization of individual and civic freedom. In 
other words, Hegel*s argument is consistent with the 
ideal model in that both posit the modern state as that 
in which the individual reaches his highest degree of 
freedom by living in and recognising the kind of society 
which brings about and maintains the conditions for that 
freedom.
Butthe similarity ends there because, for 
Hegel, the embodiment of rationality is based, ultimately, 
in a metaphysic which centres on the notion of Geist. 
Although Geist is not easily to be equated with more 
familiar or conventional conceptions of God,nonetheless 
the foundation of Hegel*s metaphysic is unmistakably 
theological - the realization of the rational state can 
be interpreted as a facet of the wisdom and creativity 
of God*. Given that it is through reason that the universal
* Although it is the intention, in this chapter, to 
establish, on logical grounds, a case in favour of the 
growing manifestation of reason within the historical 
development of the state, the notion of Geist will stand 
interpretation in terms of one or more of the * logos 
doctrines*. In particular, interpretations of the 
opening of St. John*s Gospel appear to offer a Christian 
notion of * logos* which bears resemblances to Hegel*s
*Geist*. For an outline of the various * logos doctrines* 
see Kerferd, G.B., *logos*, in The Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, (Edwards, P. ed.), Macmillan, N.Y., 196?,
Vol. 5, pp. 84/5.
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is expressed, and this in itself is an expression of 
Geist, it is within the idea of the state differentiated 
into distinct esta.tes or classes that Hegel claimed to 
perceive the subjective rationality of the autonomous 
individual synthesised with objective rationality as 
articulated in the make-up of the modern state. 
Rationality itself is an expression of Geist and so is, 
in Hegel*s words, *The march of God in the world, that 
is what the state is* (3), and this is manifested through 
the various stages of history culminating in Hegel* s 
conception of the state.
It can be seen that, given the underlying meta- 
physic, it is possible, particularly using a persuasive 
interpretation of history, to construct a content within 
which to embody the rational criterion. But if the 
metaphysic is not accepted then any model of the state 
which attempts to incorporate Hegelian and Kantian 
principles will be in danger of being rendered vacuous 
unless the model also incorporates presuppositions which 
will allow the construction of a content. Such an 
underpinning is here supplied not by theological 
metaphysics, but by epistemology,
2. To establish these foundations it is helpful
to return to elements in the early descriptions of the 
ideal model. In particular, it has been, maintained that 
the political community is not teleological in character 
except insofar as it exists to embody the values of 
freedom and justice. But to deny a teleological design
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does not mean that the workings of the state, both in 
its governmental functioning and legislative activity, 
is not end-directed. Both aspects of the state, 
legislature and executive, respcnd in their respective 
capacities to the imperatives created by the contingencies 
of life. The need for executive action arises, in the 
main, from the need to take specific actions in response 
to specific contingencies, and the implementation of 
policy (bearing in mind that the powers of the executive 
are derived from the sovereign body). The legislature, 
on the other hand, is mainly concerned with the formula­
tion of law which is indeterminate in its future 
application, but even here the need for law is itself 
based in an awareness of the state and needs of society; 
in other words, the requirement that rules are necessary 
to achieve freedom and constraint arises from perceptions 
of existing situations. For example, changes in the 
law over the years in connection with marriage and 
divorce have been, partly at least, occasioned by changes 
in public opinion about the status and rights of women 
in the modern world. So it is that while there is no 
specific gcal which it is the purpose of a political 
community to achieve, nonetheless it is the purpose of 
the state to meet whatever contingencies it is faced with 
and to deal with them in the light of its underlying 
principles.
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Furthermore, it has been insisted that 
rationality is the basis upon,which is founded the 
response of the political community to the problems it 
faces; also, the underlying principles expressive of 
freedom and justice are necessarily rational, and 
rationality is the basic constitutent of those aspects 
of personhood to do with individuality and autonomy.
But it is rationality situated in a social context and 
embodied with a specific content. In other words, 
rational understanding takes place within a way of life 
explicitly expressed through its language, presuppositions 
held, conceptual schemes developed, and the inherent 
social and moral values. However, rationality embodied 
in this way does not imply (and this has been maintained 
throughout this study) an.espousal of a thorough-going 
cultural relativism in which knowledge and truth are 
simply that which is agreed within a particular society. 
Although coherence is an important criterion in the 
conception of truth, there is no contradiction involved 
in maintaining that there is objectivity in knowledge 
even though language and other social factors are 
extremely important influences on the terms in which the 
individual will perceive and understand the world.
At the very least, objectivity is assumed to the extent 
that there exists independent checks on the claims to 
knowledge and truth in the relevant spheres in which 
such claims are made. In other words, it is maintained 
that knowledge is not just a matter of culturally agreed
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beliefs, truth is not just a matter of convention or 
even coherence.
These elements - politics understood as a 
response to problems, the importance of rationality 
situated in a social context, the partnering of socially 
determined frames of reference with objectivity in the 
pursuit of truth - are all elements in the epistemological 
framework within which this study is developed. Such 
elements have, however, remained* either implicit or have 
been expressed in a piecemeal fashion as required by the 
issues raised in this study. It is now appropriate to 
offer a more systematic account of the epistemological 
basis, and here it is argued that Popperian epistemology 
offers an account which is largely in agreement with the 
presuppositions mentioned above. In particular, three 
specific areas of Popper?s theory invite such an 
interpretation; these are (a) its evolutionary aspect,
(b) the * three worlds* categories, and (c) the contention 
that all perception is theory-soaked. Each of these 
aspects will be examined in turn.
3. Popper*s evolutionism is based in the biological
observation that the prime function of all organisms is 
to survive and that the need to obey this imperative
demands of all life a perpetual engagement in problem-
solving:
*All organisms are constantly, day and night, 
engaged in problem-solving; and so are all 
those evolutionary sequences of organisms - 
the phyla which begin with the most primitive
forms and of which the now living organisms
are the latest members.* (4)
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Although it is expressed here in biological terms, the 
process of adaptation in the face of problems posed 
embraces the whole of the living world from the most
basic form of life to man;
*Yet clearly it is in science that we are mcst 
conscious of the problems we try to solve.
So it should not be inappropriate to use 
hindsight in other cases, and. to say that the 
amoeba solves some problems (though we heed 
not assume that it is in any sense aware of
its problems); from the amoeba to Einstein
is just one step.* (5)
Popper translates the notion of biological problem-solving
into an epistemological formula or tetradic scheme;
P], “> TS -> EE Pg
P^ stands for the initial problem, TS for the tentative
solution, EE for error elimination as applied to the
tentative solution, and Pg is the situation which arises
from the previous stages and which may, in fact,
constitute another problem. One commentator (6) has
noted that it is essentially a feed-back process in which
past experience continually informs and alters the present
rather than being cyclic or dialectical in character.
When the organism in question is a society or
state then there is no intrinsic difficulty in including
it within the general scope of Popper*s evolutionary
problem-solving. Popper himself in his description of
the Open Society implicitly endorses the problem-solving
approach in his advocacy of piecemeal engineering as the
most effective response to the problems which beset
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society rather than, say, Utopianism:
*....«blueprints for piecemeal engineering 
are comparatively simple. They are blueprints 
for single institutions, for health and 
unemployment insurance, for instance, or 
arbitration courts, or anti-depression 
budgeting, or educational reform. If they 
go wrong, the damage is not very great, and 
a re-adjustment not very difficult. They 
are less risky, and for this reason less 
controversial. But if it is, easier to reach 
a reasonable agreement about existing evils 
and the means of combating them than it is 
about an ideal good and the means of its 
realisation, then there is also more hope 
that by using the piecemeal method we may get 
over the very greatest practical difficulty 
of all reasonable political reform, namely, 
the use of reason, instead of passion and 
violence, in executing the programme.* (7)
In this context, it might be objected that
* organism* is an inappropriate term to indicate the
kind of preferred society described by Popper as it is
a concept which he specifically uses to indicate closed
societies, particularly tribalistio cultures in which
the relationships which bind people together are * semi-
biological ties - kinship, living together, sharing
common efforts, common dangers, common joys and common
distress* (8). Nonetheless, even an open or abstract
society of the most individualistic, depersonalised kind
envisaged by Popper must still be recognisable as a
society, per se, and so must maintain a form of unity
which enables it to be termed (organism* with some
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justification. The point is that a primitive or 
authoritarian society described as an ^organism* 
appears to be eligible for inclusion within the general 
evolutionary scope of Popper's theory in that it is a 
form of social organisation adapted to meet the 
contingencies of its time. But there is no reason to 
suppose that the model of the Open Society stands in 
any way cutside this scope in that it represents the 
possibility of yet another, more successful organism.
By the same token, the ideal model of a political community 
presented here may be taken as yet another possible organism 
which is devoted to the preservation of, not just the 
individuals who comprise the community, but the values 
of freedom and justice within a problem-solving context. 
Indeed, once the semantic propriety is accepted that, in 
this context, any state may be termed an organism, then 
it is particularly apt, that the Open Society should be 
so termed as it is the example, par exellence of socially 
situated problem-solving.
There is also the fact that modern states and, 
for that matter, philosophical models, are influenced in 
the form they take by that which has gone before. Popper 
specifically acknowledges the debt which Western 
civilisation owes to the Greeks (9), and no new state is 
brought into being (such as the United States of America) 
and no radical changes to the constitutions of existing 
states takes place in an historical vacuum. This does 
not mean to say that history presents a progression of
3o4
forms of government beginning with authoritarian 
tribalism and working towards something like, in modern 
democracies, an Open Society. The contingencies which 
attend the circumstances in forms of government are 
cast are too complex to allow anything as cumulatively 
hierarchical as this. But it is the case that the 
examples provided by the democracy of ancient Athens, 
the authority invested in the divine right of kings in 
feudal times, and the rise and fall of modern dictator­
ships, to mention some of the forms of government which 
have existed, form part of the general political 
tradition of Western Europe, and no innovation in 
government can be instituted without some knowledge of 
the strengths and weaknesses of its forerunners. What 
is more, there is good reason to believe, with Popper, 
that Western democratic forms of government have proved 
most successful, so far, in such terms as raising the 
standard of living of their populations and of promoting 
the values of freedom and justice; so, it can be argued, 
that with all the setbacks and vicissitudes to which 
states have been subject in the course of their histories, 
nonetheless there is an evolutionary trend to be observed 
in that as history unfolds a cumulative store of political 
knowledge is passed on which affects present constitutional 
and political practice. Hegel uses the phrase * the cunning 
of reason* to indicate the extent to which individuals 
may unconsciously be held to be the vehicles of Geist, 
but it is a phrase which is capable of indicating the 
extent to which knowledge of past practice helps to shape
- 305 -
present and future forms of government.
The further implication is that once values 
such as freedom and justice are introduced as criteria 
by which the legitimacy of a form of government is to 
be judged in normative terms, it can then be maintained 
that history discloses a hierarchy. This is a matter 
which Aristotle discussed when he stated that the first 
object of the science of politics is to * consider which 
form of government is best in the absolute sense and 
what qualities that form must have in order to approximate 
most closely to the ideal when no external impediment 
intervenes* (lO). Once equipped with a *prinoiple of 
virtue* (ll) it becomes possible, as Aristotle argued 
in Books III and IV of the *Politics*, to judge which 
forms of government approach the ideal most closely 
and which deviate most widely. It is in these terms 
that a hierarchy is disclosed. Moreover, once the idea 
of à principle of virtue is accepted with its implications 
of hierarchy and progression in historical terms, then 
Hegel's belief in the moral superiority of the rational 
state over other forms of government is not so very far 
from Popper's espousal of the Open Society as that which 
most embodies rationality in its response to the problems 
of the time, even though, given his strictures on Hegel, 
it is a comparison which Popper may not relish.
4. The notion that if not a progression, then at
the very least a trend in political development or 
evolution is discernible is given added substance if 
Popper's productive notion of a third world is accepted.
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Popper indicates the nature of this world in these terms; 
'.....the world consists of at least three 
ontologioally distinct sub-worlds; or as I 
say, there are three worlds; the first is 
the physical world or the world of physical 
states; the second is the mental world or 
the world of mental states; and the third 
is the world of intelligibles, or, of ideas 
in the objective sense; it is the world 
of possible objects of thought: . the world of
theories in themselves, and their logical 
relations; of arguments in themselves; and 
of problem situations in themselves.* (12)
The second world of individual mental activity is the
mediator between the first world of objects and the
third world of human ideas made objective by virtue of
their being established in autonomous terms. Thus
language is a third world construction which exists
autonomously in relation to any given individual's
subjective experience of it, but also the use of
language by the individual in connection with his
appreciation or perception of the objects of the first
world will largely determine the terms in which that
appreciation or perception is understood.
It also follows that not only is the individual*s
conception of the first world affected by the theories,
assumptions and conceptual structures which he adopts,
but his view of himself will be so affected. The largely
socially derived nature of personhood has been insisted
on earlier in this work; in other words, insofar as
rationality is itself embedded in linguistic forms.
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the individual needs to be initiated into a linguistic 
community of some kind for his individuality and self- 
consciousness to develop. But the linguistic community 
is only one element, even if it is the necessary 
element, which affects the individual*s conception of 
both himself and the outside world. The many other 
facets of the third world will also be influential - 
the customs, the laws, the state of knowledge, the 
religious beliefs and the political ideas as well as the 
institutions within which all these are embedded. All 
these and many more will inform individual self- 
consciousness and all are open to change and trans­
formation by individual consciousness as a result of 
involvement in the problem-solving process. Understood 
in these terms, the notion of the third world and its 
effect on individual consciousness is consistent with the 
presuppositions of the ideal model.
There is, however, one aspect of the third 
world which is likely to cause difficulty for any society, 
including a political community. This is the autonomous 
status which ideas have within the notion of the third 
world; an autonomy which is reinforced if Popper's 
contention is accepted that knowledge is not dependent 
for its status, qua knowledge, on its being 'possessed* 
by individual minds, but that it occupies a public 
domain and its existence is ensured by it being recorded 
rather than by it being known by any particular individual 
The continuing presence of autonomous ideas, theories and 
ideologies must present the state with a continual threat
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of instability, and a political community in particular 
cannot censor or stifle the propogation of ideas*.
But a political community will only be threatened by 
damaging ideas if the community itself either loses 
sight of or loses the will to protect its attachment 
to freedom and justice within a rational way of life.
This does not preclude the right and duty of a political 
community to protect itself against attempts by an 
unrepresentative minority to force, say, a totalitarian 
ideology on it.
5 , Finally, and most productively, the Popperian
argument that all perception is theory-drenched dovetails
with the three worlds aspect of his philosophy. Popper
attributes even to lowly forms of life the capacity to
meet the problems of life with theory-like expectations
already built into their sense organs:
'Sense organs incorporate the equivalent of 
primitive and uncritically accepted theories. 
Moreover, there is no theory—free language
to describe the data, because myths (that is,
primitive theories) arise together with 
language. There are no living things neither 
animals nor plants without problems and their 
tentative solutions which are equivalent to
theories ....
Thus life proceeds, like scientific 
discovery, from old problems to the discovery 
of new and undreampt—of problems. And this 
process - that of invention and selection -
* The notorious public book-burnings which took place 
in Nazi Germany testify to the ruling party's awareness 
that a threat existed in that form.
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contains in itself a rational theory of 
emergence. The steps of emergence which 
lead to a new level are in the first instance 
the new problems (Pg) which are created by the 
error elimination (EE) of a tentative 
theoretical solution (TT) of an old problem 
(Pl)-'(13)
While the argument that the sensory perceptions of all 
forms of life are theory-drenched in their approach to 
the problems they encounter may be open to objection, 
the contention that human life, the life of language- 
users, is so theory-laden is entirely acceptable.
Without denying the objective existence of first world 
objects, the meaning which such objects have to the 
subjective consciousness of the language—user will be 
determined by the presuppositions which he brings with 
him. This is exemplified if one considers the number 
of different beliefs which, in an historical time-scale, 
have affected perceptions of the same object, the sun; 
and even within the developing tradition of western 
scientific knowledge, that same object has undergone a 
number of changes in the form in which it has been 
understood. It follows that if the objects which may 
be said to have existence in the first world are subject 
to theoretical interpretation, then the features which 
characterise the third world, being in themselves the 
creations of man's intellectual and creative abilities, 
must by their nature be considered to be theory-drenched
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in their conception as well as in the ways in which they 
are subsequently perceived*.
Obviously included within the scope of such 
third world products will be ideas, institutions, values 
and concepts which constitute the political domain.
Of particular importance will be the presuppositions which 
will inform the public concept or concepts of freedom 
and justice. These are notions, it has been argued, 
which are the direct product of man's self-consciousness 
and rationality, but the form which they take will be 
situated within the prevailing framework of knowledge 
and belief. To interpret Popper^s contention that all 
perception is theory-drenched in this way is to establish 
a theoretical congruence with Michael Polanyi's argument 
that, in science, 'all judgments take place within an 
interpretive framework, and can only be understood and 
estimated by reference to it* (l4). Although Polanyi's 
case is directed towards science, that is only a 
particularly sophisticated area of judgment-making and 
there is no reason to suppose that the general case is 
not applicable to that area of life concerned with the 
making of political judgments.
* By virtue of the differing times and conditions within 
which a culture progresses and its heritage accumulates, 
it is likely that the original perceptions of its 
creations will differ markedly from those which follow.
For example, the cave paintings of Lascaux were unlikely 
to be thought of in terms of aesthetic appreciation by 
the originators. Their original significance was likely 
to have been magical or ritualistic.
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The main difference is likely to be that 
whereas within science there is likely to be greater 
unanimity for most of the time as to what constitutes 
the accepted framework of reference or paradigm, in 
politics there will be a variety of such frameworks.
It is a variety which will have its genesis in various 
political ideologies, in religious beliefs, and in the 
traditions which inhere within a particular society.
It is a variety which will find expression not only in 
the proposed solutions to the problems which the 
political community faces, but which will also affect 
the terms in which the problems may be perceived, and 
may even, occasionally, determine the very nature of 
a problem.
It is, of course, the specific function of a 
political community to address itself, through its 
procedural mechanisms, to the problems with which 
society is faced, and it is through the political 
community that the arguments based on the various 
persuasions will find expression and possible resolution. 
Similarly, it is through public debate within the 
political community that the content which may be given 
to key concepts such as freedom and justice will find 
expression in the specific freedoms which are held to 
be worthy of being upheld and the specific terms in 
which justice is to be understood through its embodiment 
in law. In other words, the vacuity of the Kantian 
universal principle of right is avoided by giving it a 
content, not a content which is a priori in origin, but
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a content which is based in the concrete terms in which 
the notions of freedom and justice are understood.at any 
given time.
In the ideal model, the ideals of reason and 
truth will be held to be the criteria which all proposals 
and rationales should have to meet in public debate, and, 
once more the necessity for complete freedom of speech 
in this respect is underlined. But, even in an ideal 
model, reason and truth are not and cannot be standards 
which are available independent of the general context. 
What is more, the epistemological basis of the model 
does not require that this be so. Although the conditions 
of public debate should be sufficient tc disclose 
inconsistencies or falsehoods when they are proffered 
within arguments, what will count as a good reason or 
what will count as a preferred solution to a problem,or, 
for that matter, what will count as a preferred inter­
pretation of freedom or justice will be a matter of 
judgment. And in such judgment-making, the criteria of 
reason and truth will be embodied within the various 
paradigms or interpretative frameworks.
The immediate objection which presents itself 
is that of circularity. If standards of truth and 
reason are themselves embedded within the various 
interpretive frameworks, it would appear that there is 
no criterion available capable of differentiating 
between them. The criterion of truth would appear to 
be consistency. This, in fact, is the nature of the 
case, but it is not the whole case. The contention is
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that in the conditions within which a decision is taken 
there is no equality of status among all possible 
frameworks of reference. The plausibility or esteem 
with which each is held will be affected by the course of 
its history. A paradigm which has been fruitful in 
providing policies or laws which have met past 
contingencies with success is likely to command greater 
support within the community than one which has not been 
successful or one which has net been tested. So it can 
be held that with the evolutionary development of society 
in terms of it meeting successive contingent problems, 
both the proposed solutions and the critical standards 
which are brought to bear will themselves be heavily 
influenced by the historical course of the society in 
question in that at any one time there is likely to be 
a single or a very limited number of dominant frameworks 
which supply acceptable critical criteria in terms of 
reason and truth, and which supply acceptable solutions 
for dealing with the problems of society. In these terms 
it can be maintained that consistency is tested by the 
de facto results of the solutions which are generated 
by an interpretive framework a conclusion which is 
consistent with the underlying problem-solving epistemology.
Both the variety of problems with which a 
state is likely to be faced and the possible plurality 
of responses available has important implications for 
the ideal model. The critical point in such a state of 
affairs will be engendered by the imperatives created by 
the requirement for practical decision-making. The
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particular procedural devices adopted by the body politic 
for the purpose of setting a period on discussion and 
reaching decisions will ensure that, as a matter of fact, 
rationality arid truth as embodied in a preferred view or 
paradigm will predominate; a view which will, in turn, 
be reflected in the law or policy adopted. In other 
words, the exigencies imposed by procedural mechanisms 
and a set time-scale require the emergence of preferred 
views and preferred solutions. However, to introduce 
procedural mechanisms which effectively limit discussion 
and enquiry is to admit that, especially in politics, 
absolute standards are not available and that being so, 
mistakes may be made, skillful rhetoric or persuasion 
may triumph over a more dispassionately argued case, 
and even when the best possible solution is adopted it 
may still prove inadequate to the situation. The virtue 
of Popper's Open Society is that the rationality of its 
underlying epistemological assumptions is reflected in 
a sufficiently flexible attitude of mind and institutions 
which enable mistakes to be corrected, policies 
discontinued or reversed, or laws to be repealed or 
amended in the light of consequent situations (Pg)•
A form of government which does not share this dedication 
to rationality and flexibility will have a built-in 
predisposition to continue with, and continue to justify, 
unsuccessful policies or solutions long after their 
deficiencies have been made manifest. It is a recognition 
that problem-solving is both rational and realistic in 
this sense that frees politics from the supposed need
315
for absolute standards and absolute solutions. It 
also follows that as Popperian epistemology has been 
adopted as being both appropriate to and consistent with 
the requirements of the ideal model, that this aspect 
of the Open Society should be incorporated into the ideal 
model. Furthermore, the greater the awareness on the 
part of the political community that its own deliberations 
and decisions are fallible, and the greater the awareness 
that attempted solutions themselves create new situations 
and, hence, the possibility of new problems, the greater 
will be the effectiveness of the community in actually 
achieving its goals and realising its values.
6. There is one aspect of the relationship between
the ideal model and the epistemological underpinning 
which requires some examination. That is the extent to 
which it can be maintained that the virtues of justice 
and freedom are implied by the epistemological pre­
suppositions. In other words, is there a logical 
connection between problem-solving in a social and 
political context and the values of freedom and justice 
cr is the relationship purely contingent? In suggesting, 
tentatively, that there is such a logical connection, 
it must immediately be admitted that there is no 
straightforward entailment involved, such connection as 
there is exists by virtue of various arguments.
First of all, problem—solving as an activity 
implies an open-minded devotion to rationality, howsoever 
situated, as the means by which solutions may be achieved. 
It has, however, been argued throughout this work that
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both the morally inspired concern for justice and the self- 
conscious state of autonomy which is the basis for the 
concern for individual freedom are both derived from 
man's rational capacities. It follows that insofar as 
the model assumes that the political community is composed 
of men (problem-solvers) with moral sensibilities and 
not psycopaths or Kantian 'devils* that there is a logical 
connection to be made between the activity of problem- 
solving and the suggested values. Freedom and justice 
can be held to be the model's immanent values insofar 
as the political community is composed of men with moral 
perspectives, as all problem-solving will be donduoted 
within such perspectives.
Secondly, while it can be maintained that 
problem-solving as an activity, sui generis, does not in 
itself entail the acceptance of any values other than a 
commitment to rationality, it can be maintained that 
where social problems are concerned, neither the problem 
to be solved, the nature of the proposed solution, nor 
the means to bring this about take place within a value- 
free climate. Problems, solutions and proposed courses 
of action all involve choices which Will necessarily 
reflect differing views, differing scales of values and 
differing priorities; a state of affairs which, it has 
been argued, is part of the raison d'etre of a political 
community. But if, as a matter of practical necessity,* 
social problem—solving implies a consideration of values, 
then it is the values which a political community exists 
to realise which must be reflected in the problem-solving
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activities of such a community. In other words, whatever 
the nature of the problem, the proposed solution or the 
proposed means of attaining the solution, the realisation 
of freedom or justice cannot be jeopardized and should 
be pursued. Once more, within the context of the ideal 
model, it can be argued that social and political problem- 
solving, as indicative of the underlying epistemology, 
will have imparted to it a concern for freedom and justice 
by the nature of the social context within which the 
problem-solving takes place. To the extent that this 
indicates a necessary involvement with these values, so 
it can be maintained that within the context of the model 
there is a logical connection between the epistemologica1 
assumptions and the realisation of freedom and justice.
7 . Finally, thé epistemologica! basis of the ideal
model serves hot only to provide a content for the other­
wise highly abstract categories of freedom and justice 
which have been posited as intégré! to the model, but 
it also allows for the completion of the description of 
the functioning of authority within the model. So far, 
the emphasis has been placed on the de jure legitimacy 
of law, that is, the right of law not only to constrain 
but to elicit from those subject to it a sense of duty 
or obligation to its terms or to those offices and officers 
through which it is expressed. Moreover, a normative 
element has been built into this feature of the model 
in that it has been argued that inc.a political community 
the legitimacy of law is derived from its function as 
the means by which the outer freedom of the individual
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is established and the basis it provides on which the 
individual may claim rights.
But, given the problem-solving epistemology, 
if the enactment of law is conceived of as being a 
response to a problem, albeit a problem which necessarily 
involves a consideration of freedom and justice in its 
proposed solution, the proof that the problem has been 
solved in these terms will only become apparent when it 
is seen how it works in practice. This assertion is 
consistent with, and is derived from the foregoing 
arguments concerning the nature of problem-solving 
introduced at the beginning of this chapter. As has 
been emphasised, it is a strength of Popperian epistemology 
that it takes into account the unpredictability of social 
action both in achieving its desired ends and in provoking 
unanticipated consequences.
Understood in these terms, it is possible for a
law in its enacted form to be otherwise legitimate yet
still fail to secure recognition by the political community
at large or in some other way disclose itself as being
deficient in realising the expectations which were present
in its inception.* In such a case the failure to achieve
* An interesting example of a law which proved itself to 
lack de facto recognition was the Industrial Relations 
Act of 1971 which was blatantly contravened on two 
occasions by small groups of dockers who defied an order 
made under this act forbidding the * blacking*of goods 
carried by certain road hauliers. Although arrested, the 
men on both occasions were quickly released as the arrests 
threatened to trigger widespread dock strikes. The actions
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de facto recognition may be taken as the judgment of 
the community that the law was fundamentally misconceived 
in that it is not recognised as being in the interests 
of society. One way of expressing this deficiency is to 
state that the law, in practice, is shown not to be an 
adequate expression of the general will in that either 
in its stated form or in its interpretation by the 
judiciary it does not meet the terms in which freedom 
or justice is currently understood or that the legislators 
did not adequately foresee the circumstances in which the 
law would be applied, Once more, if the model is
understood in problem-solving terms, then the law in
question can be seen as simply having failed and to be 
in need of reinterpretation, amendment or withdrawal.
The conclusion is that the actuality of the law *s
legitimacy and authority is not established until it has
de facto force; in other words, the final test of the 
legitimacy of the law is its actual application, not the 
mere fact that the law has formal or procedural legitimacy, 
but the fact that it has effective force in society. Such 
effective force is demonstrated by its acceptance as 
acceptance implies that it is in accord with the will
of both judiciary and government in this case under­
mined the express provisions of the Act and so displayed 
a lack of confidence in its implementation. Apart from 
that the Act aroused the hostility of both the trades 
union movement and the Labour Party and was subsequently 
repealed. For details of this case see J.A.G. Griffith, 
Politics of the Judiciary, Fontana, 2nd Edition, I98I, 
pp. 74-80.
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to outer freedom, i.e. it is more than just the sum of 
individual acceptances but that it is reason situated, 
its universality is embodied and hence has a force, sui 
generis, quite different from the subjective wishes or 
opinions of the individuals who make up the state.
Summary
So far, the enquiry into freedom and authority 
within the state has been carried out in predominantly 
formal or abstract terms. The task addressed in this 
chapter has been to supply a content to the formal 
categories which have been developed. To this end, the 
problem-solving epistemology of K.R. Popper has been 
endorsed as being consistent with the presuppositions 
contained within the ideal model. This consistency has 
been shown by demonstrating the applicability of three 
relevant key aspects of Popper*s theory to the model: 
the evolutionary aspect, the third world notion, and the 
argument that all perception is theory-laden. It has 
been argued that it is the interpretive framework of the 
time and state of society which will supply the content 
to the principles of freedom and justice, and that where 
there is disagreement or contradiction it is the specific 
task of the political community to resolve these 
difficulties. It has also been argued that there is a 
logical connection between problem-solving and. freedom 
and justice within the context of the model. Finally, in 
accordance with the acceptance of problem-solving as the 
basic epistemology, it has been argued that the final
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phase in the legitimation of law and the acceptance of 
authority will lie in the de facto acceptance of law by 
the community and this completes the expression of the 
general will of the community.
- 322 -
References
(1) Hegel, G.¥. Philosophy of Right (trs# T.M. Knox),
O.U.P., New York, 1952, p. l6l,
(2) ibid. p. 161
(3) ibid. p. 279
(4) Popper, K.R. Objective Knowledge, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1972, p. 242.
(5) ibid. p. 246
(6) Magee, B. Popper, Pontana/Collins, London, 1973? 
pp. 65-7 .
(7) Popper, K.R. The Open Society and its Enemies,
R. & K.P., 5th (revised) edition, London and Henley, 
1966, Vol. I. p. 159.
(8) ibid. p. 173
(9) ibid. p. 171
(10) Aristotle Politics, (ed. & trs. J. Harrington), 
Everyman*s Library, Dent, London, 1959» p. IO3 ,
(11) ibid. p. 104
(12) op. cit. p. 154
(13) op. cit. p. l46
(14) Brownhill, R.J. Education and the Nature of Knowledge, 
Groom Helm, London, I983, p. 32.
-  323 -
Chapter 13
Conclusion
1. The world of politics presents to the observer
a confused, ambiguous and often contradictory series of 
events, procedures, activities, prescriptions '^ e') axxck 
theories. Yet from this apparent chaos there is discernible 
a continuing concern with a restricted range of matters 
centering on notions such as freedom, equality, justice, 
authority and legitimacy. Moreover, the importance of 
such a concern in men*s lives is not to be doubted when 
the passionate intensity with which the ideals of, say, 
freedom or equality,' have been pursued - a pursuit which 
has required a life-long devotion, even, on occasion, 
life itself.
While the political philosopher cannot fail to 
be touched by this passion, the first concern, as has 
been argued in the introduction to this work, must be 
with understanding the activity of politics. And this 
requires an attempt to strip away what may be considered 
to be the obfuscating contingencies, to isolate ,the 
essential elements in the activity, arid to consider 
critically the major concerns of the activity. In other 
words, a philosophical model of politics must be erected 
which is capable of demonstrating, unambiguously, the 
central features of political activity, and which wiTl 
provide a context within which the central concerns of 
politics can be explored. The model is the interpretative 
medium through which politics is rendered intelligible in 
theoretical or principled terms, the test of its adequacy
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being the extent to whioh it generates an understanding 
of the political reality. Finally, therermust also be, 
in common with any philosophical enquiry, an attempt 
made to establish the epistemologica1 basis upon which 
the enquiry is grounded. This not only establishes the 
model as being deeply—based but helps in the pursuit of 
what is, for this writer, a phenomenologically inspired 
imperative to attempt to expose the presuppositions which 
imbue the enquiry.
However, an enquiry into the freedom of the 
individual and the authority of the state carried out in 
these terms will be productive of arguments, implications, 
conclusions and ad hoc comments which are embedded in the 
structure of the model - the model, in turn, being subject 
to continuous development. This being the case, such 
arguments or conclusions which are the outcome of this 
enquiry cannot be presented as a summation without the 
distortion involved in detaching them from the general 
philosophical framework. To overcome this difficulty, 
the principal issues, arguments and conclusions will be 
indicated within the context of a brief resume of the 
development of the ideal model, although the issues 
touched upon will inevitably stand in need of reference 
to the appropriate chapter in the text for their full 
development and clarification.
2. The principal feature of the model developed
in this work is that politics is understood in terms of 
a mode of association - in particular, the notion of a 
political community is posited. Such a community is
- 325 -
composed of citizens in which citizenship is defined in 
terms of determinate rights enshrining the freedom and 
equality of its members as political agents. The 
function of the political community is essentially 
association for the purpose of the production of rules 
or law which will govern the conduct of, and delimit 
the areas of freedom available to the community. This 
concern with rules or law imparts to political discourse 
its characteristic quality, viz., a concern with the 
general interest of the community as a whole as opposed 
to the private interests of any of its constitutent 
members.
In order to situate the model within a 
recognisable social context, the notion of the * state* 
has been introduced as being the appropriate social 
unit within which the political community exists. The 
state is held to be not just the government, but the 
whole population subject to the laws and constitution 
enacted by the political community. In ideal terms, 
the political community and the population of the state 
will be one and the same, but in less than ideal terms 
such a conterminus identity is neither possible nor 
necessary.
By situating the political community within 
a determinate society as is offered by the state, it 
becomes possible to develop a sophisticated concept of 
personhood through which the relationship between 
individual and state can be examined within different 
categories of experience. In the first place, the
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Hegelian notion of Sittlichkeit is introduced as indicative 
of the individual*s subjective sense of obligation to the . 
state. By positing personhood as being partly, at least, 
determined by the socialising processes within the native 
society it is possible to offer an analysis of Sittlichkeit 
in terms of the logical relationship between individual 
and state. It is argued that the sense of trust and 
identity which exists between individual and state arises 
from the extent to Which the state comprises that milieu 
which is best understood by the individual as its mores 
are part and parcel of the individual*s consciousness. 
Moreover, insofar as the contents of the individual*s 
consciousness are determined by the parent society, so 
the state will form that most-favoured milieu within 
which the individual*s needs, wants and desires will 
find satisfaction. Furthermore, it is maintained that 
the development of rationality with its capacity for 
engendering abstract thought and the ability to conceive 
of different.possibilities constitutes the logical 
condition for the development of personhood understood 
as the embodiment of a freedom-seeking will. As it is 
argued that freedom itself is only intelligible within 
a rule-governed situation, it follows that the rule- 
governed context which is best understood will be that 
within which freedom is most likely to be realised. 
Sittlichkeit is the summation of all these elements 
conspiring within the individual to produce a sense of 
identity with, and obligatedness towards, the parent 
state.
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It is further argued that as the individual's 
relationship is founded in understanding and the will 
to freedom, the state, as a rule-governed complex of 
affairs, will have an inherent tendency towards stability, 
as change, particularly rapid or revolutionary change, 
will threaten the basis on which understanding rests. 
Anyway, rules which change too rapidly begin to lose 
their prescriptive force as rules. Also, as has already 
been demonstrated, authority itself is a practical 
necessity deriving from the inherent imperfections of 
rule-governed situations and this in itself will be a 
factor which tends to promote stability.
Tradition is a powerful source of both stability 
and legitimacy. In the context of the ideal model it 
is the notion of presumptive tradition which is the 
relevant concept as this employs the notion of tradition 
which carries with it prescriptive force. But although 
tradition can legitimise existing rule-governed practices, 
its connection with authority is subtle in that it cannot 
only be a source of authority*s legitimation, but it 
requires embodiment in authority for its continual re­
interpretation.
The analysis of tradition*s relationship with 
authority also helps to explain how it is that the rule- 
governed fabric of the state can remain relatively 
undisturbed in spite of governmental upheavals. Such 
situations help to underline the distinction which is to 
be made between the authority of government and the 
legitimacy of government; both subsume the notion of
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* rightfulness * but the latter emphasises the legal or 
constitutional aspect whereas the former stresses the 
de facto effectiveness of government in commanding 
obedience.
The next major addition to the model is the 
development of the notion of personhood to include the 
propensity towards individualism, i.e. the individual 
understood not only as a self-regarding but as self- 
determining, particularly with regard to the realisation 
of freedom. In other words, the individual is understood 
as a fully autonomous being in the context of his 
relationship with the state. The particular facet cf 
autonomy which is significant is the extent to which the 
notion of the morally autonomous man responsible for his 
own conduct challenges the authority of the state insofar 
as the state is a source of heteronomy as far as the 
autonomous individual is concerned. Here, it is argued 
that to posit a challenge in these terms is misconceived 
in that it occludes moral and political duties when, in 
fact, the moral and the political are categorically 
different areas of rule-governed conduct. Moreover, to 
deprive the state of any authority in deference to the 
individual judgments of its constituent individuals 
would be tosengender a potentially rule-less situation 
which, in turn, would render incoherent the individual's 
capacity to structure his life in terms of moral rules.
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It follows from these conclusions that insofar 
as the state is the necessary embodiment of the conditions 
within which morality becomes possible, then the individual 
has a moral duty to preserve or bring about a socially 
rule-governed situation. Moreover, insofar as universality 
and right imbue the citizen's conception of law, these 
attributes or qualities derive from the moral capacity 
of the individual ; to externalise private moral rules. It 
is in these terms that the moraleimpinges on the public 
life, and it is in these terms that the notion of 
Sittlichkeit is developed further.
As it is one of the main functions of the 
political community to create its own laws and as the 
attributes of law, universality and justice, have already 
been touched upon, it is appropriate to enquire into the 
political implications involved. In this respect^ a 
consideration of Rousseau's 'The Social Contract* produces 
insights. The notion of the 'general will' has been 
analysed in terms of universality and right, and, as 
such, has been shown to be consistent with the Kantian 
universal principle of right. It is suggested that the 
universal principle -of right appears to offer a criterion 
by which to judge the extent to which law may be held 
to be just and so in accordance with the spirit of the 
'general will*.
However, there are difficulties involved in 
any attempt to apply the principle of right to positive 
law. In Rousseaunian terms, any attempt to apply 
universalisability as a criterion of right only appears
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to b© effective in discriminating extreme cases of law 
understood as an expression of the 'general will* from 
obvious expressions of sectional interest masquerading 
as law. In Kant's case, the objection is simply that the 
principle is open to the charge of being vacuous. But 
it is argued that the principle of right can be rescued 
from these objections if, in the first place, Rousseau's 
* legislator* is understood as a personification of the 
qualities required for the conception of just law, 
qualities which are consistent with Kant's stress on 
the rationality and universality of law. Moreover, it 
is maintained that the principle of right can avoid 
vacuity by being given a content, a content derived 
from the social context within which it is situated.
It is the specific function of the political community 
to realise this state of affairs by being clearly aware 
of its function as the agency through which justice and 
freedom are realised.
Finally the model is explicitly situated within 
its epistemological pre-suppositions. The suggestion is 
that as the model of a political community embodies a 
concern for rational action within a problem-solving 
function, it is particularly amenable to many of the 
epistemological features present in the philosophy of 
Karl Popper, In particular, a case is suggested which 
attempts to secure a logical connection-between problem­
solving as a fundamental political presupposition and 
freedom and justice as understood within the context of
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the model. Also, if legislation is interpreted in 
problem-solving terms, it becomes possible to conclude 
that the legitimation of law and the acceptance of 
authority are both completed by the de facto acceptance 
of law within the state. This is consistent with 
Popper's 'third world* notion and with the notion of 
the 'general will* examined earlier in the study.
3' At its level of greatest abstraction, that is
at the level of philosophically speculative theorising, 
an attempt has been made to create a model and to offer 
insights into the political mode by suggesting an 
interpretation and synthesis of relevant aspects of 
Hegelian, Kantian and Rousseaunian philosophies. The 
completion of the model and the implications which stem 
from it has taken the form of a proposed affinity with 
modern Popperian epistemology. This, possibly, unlikely 
cadre of constituent philosophies is held to cohere by 
virtue of reasonable interpretation and valid arguments. 
Such an approach is based on the conviction that 
philosophical insight generates new philosophical 
understanding; in other words, philosophy is more of 
a seamless coat than a cursory reading ofvarious 
philosophers would seem to indicate.
At the more practical level, that is of the 
model's actual functioning, the essential requirement 
harks back to Aristotle in the insistence that the 
political health of any community, the model's included, 
depends on the clear-headed, self-conscious and willing
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participation in the duties of citizenship by the 
constituent population. The extent to which free-speech 
is defended, the degree of rationality brought to bear 
on the consideration of issues, and the extent to which 
toleration is valued are all tests of the health of the 
political community. It is this aspect which touches 
existing political realities most obviously and most 
pertinently.
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